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Fascinating and Funny Things I Said

Started by Mesozoic Mister Nigel, September 22, 2012, 07:05:40 AM

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Mesozoic Mister Nigel

Did you say something so incredibly witty that you just have to quote yourself and can't wait for the next office party? Here's the thread for it... go to town!








Free virtual lampshade with every post.
"I'm guessing it was January 2007, a meeting in Bethesda, we got a bag of bees and just started smashing them on the desk," Charles Wick said. "It was very complicated."


Murmur

ME: (sitting on guy friend's lap) "Santa, I want a pony for Christmas!"
GUY: "I've got your pony right here!"
ME: "I didn't want a Shetland pony..."
Tolerable Terror for Toddlers Legionaire, Nixon Division™

"Onlookers will be horrified and amazed by the sheer volume of fluid."--TGRR

"SaraLee, I say unto you!  If ye have a cake and halve it, and then halve it yet again, you would have four quarters and yet still not have a dollar.  Eat of that cake, for it is cake which is NOT cake, which ye may have half a mind to have at a reasonable price, yet in indecision achieve satori with said stale Moon Pie.  That's what you get when YOU FUCK WITH US." - DOUR

AFK

I had a riveting discussion with my construction worker friend the other day.
Cynicism is a blank check for failure.

Sano

My friends and I were complaining about how some people try to apply a concept used by one philosopher into the system of another (usually completely unrelated) without at least trying to adapt it. We were looking for succint explanations of how it was wrong when I said, "the rules of the game are different. You can't checkmate in a draghts game". I think it might be the wittiest thing I've said this year.
Everything comes to an end, reader. It is an old truism to which may be added that not everything that lasts, lasts for long. This latter part is not readily admitted; on the contrary the idea that an air castle lasts longer than the very air of which it is made is hard to get out of a person's head, and this is fortunate, otherwise the custom of making those almost eternal constructions might be lost.

Cain

Me: "Listen; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not me? But of course you won't."

Student #1: "Let me first understand you, I replied. justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, sir, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because [student #2), the rugby player, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?"

Me: "That's abominable of you, [student #1]; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument."

Student #1: "Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer."

Me: "Well, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?"

Student #1: "Yes, I know."

Me: "And the government is the ruling power in each state?"

Student #1: "Certainly."

Me: "And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger."

Student #1: "Now I understand you; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself used the word 'interest' which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words 'of the stronger' are added."

Me: "A small addition, you must allow."

Student #1: "Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say 'of the stronger'; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further."

Me: "Proceed."

Student #1: "I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just or subjects to obey their rulers?"

Me: "I do."

Student #1: "But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?"

Me: "To be sure, they are liable to err."

Student #1: "Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?"

Me: "True."

Student #1: "When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?"

Me: "Yes."

Student #1: "And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects, --and that is what you call justice?"

Me: "Doubtless."

Student #1: "Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?"

Me: "What is that you are saying?"

Student #1: "I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?"

Me: "Yes."

Student #1: "Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?"

Student #2: "Nothing can be clearer."

Student #3: "Yes"

Student #1: "Yes, student #2, --sir has said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just."

Student #3: "Yes, student #1, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger."

Student #3: But, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest, --this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice."

Student #2: "Those were not his words".

Student #1: "Never mind, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, sir, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?"

Me: "Certainly not. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?"

Student #1: "Yes, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken."

Me: "You argue like an informer, [student #1]. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the me when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is the ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger."

EK WAFFLR

 Me:
My colleagues think I spice up their lives. I feel like A collegial buttplug.
"At first I lifted weights.  But then I asked myself, 'why not people?'  Now everyone runs for the fjord when they see me."


Horribly Oscillating Assbasket of Deliciousness
[/b]

Mesozoic Mister Nigel

Quote from: Cain on September 22, 2012, 02:17:45 PM
Me: "Listen; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not me? But of course you won't."

Student #1: "Let me first understand you, I replied. justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, sir, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because [student #2), the rugby player, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?"

Me: "That's abominable of you, [student #1]; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument."

Student #1: "Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer."

Me: "Well, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?"

Student #1: "Yes, I know."

Me: "And the government is the ruling power in each state?"

Student #1: "Certainly."

Me: "And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger."

Student #1: "Now I understand you; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself used the word 'interest' which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words 'of the stronger' are added."

Me: "A small addition, you must allow."

Student #1: "Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say 'of the stronger'; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further."

Me: "Proceed."

Student #1: "I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just or subjects to obey their rulers?"

Me: "I do."

Student #1: "But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?"

Me: "To be sure, they are liable to err."

Student #1: "Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?"

Me: "True."

Student #1: "When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?"

Me: "Yes."

Student #1: "And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects, --and that is what you call justice?"

Me: "Doubtless."

Student #1: "Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?"

Me: "What is that you are saying?"

Student #1: "I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?"

Me: "Yes."

Student #1: "Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?"

Student #2: "Nothing can be clearer."

Student #3: "Yes"

Student #1: "Yes, student #2, --sir has said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just."

Student #3: "Yes, student #1, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger."

Student #3: But, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest, --this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice."

Student #2: "Those were not his words".

Student #1: "Never mind, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, sir, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?"

Me: "Certainly not. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?"

Student #1: "Yes, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken."

Me: "You argue like an informer, [student #1]. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the me when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is the ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger."

:mittens:
"I'm guessing it was January 2007, a meeting in Bethesda, we got a bag of bees and just started smashing them on the desk," Charles Wick said. "It was very complicated."


Sano

Quote from: Cain on September 22, 2012, 02:17:45 PM
Me: "Listen; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not me? But of course you won't."

Student #1: "Let me first understand you, I replied. justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, sir, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because [student #2), the rugby player, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?"

Me: "That's abominable of you, [student #1]; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument."

Student #1: "Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer."

Me: "Well, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?"

Student #1: "Yes, I know."

Me: "And the government is the ruling power in each state?"

Student #1: "Certainly."

Me: "And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger."

Student #1: "Now I understand you; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself used the word 'interest' which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words 'of the stronger' are added."

Me: "A small addition, you must allow."

Student #1: "Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say 'of the stronger'; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further."

Me: "Proceed."

Student #1: "I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just or subjects to obey their rulers?"

Me: "I do."

Student #1: "But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?"

Me: "To be sure, they are liable to err."

Student #1: "Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?"

Me: "True."

Student #1: "When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?"

Me: "Yes."

Student #1: "And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects, --and that is what you call justice?"

Me: "Doubtless."

Student #1: "Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?"

Me: "What is that you are saying?"

Student #1: "I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?"

Me: "Yes."

Student #1: "Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?"

Student #2: "Nothing can be clearer."

Student #3: "Yes"

Student #1: "Yes, student #2, --sir has said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just."

Student #3: "Yes, student #1, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger."

Student #3: But, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest, --this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice."

Student #2: "Those were not his words".

Student #1: "Never mind, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, sir, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?"

Me: "Certainly not. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?"

Student #1: "Yes, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken."

Me: "You argue like an informer, [student #1]. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the me when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is the ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger."

Isn't that straight from Plato's Republic?
Everything comes to an end, reader. It is an old truism to which may be added that not everything that lasts, lasts for long. This latter part is not readily admitted; on the contrary the idea that an air castle lasts longer than the very air of which it is made is hard to get out of a person's head, and this is fortunate, otherwise the custom of making those almost eternal constructions might be lost.

Lenin McCarthy

"the nightlife in this town is so unevolved. Precambrian. Fuckin' trilobites."

Mesozoic Mister Nigel

Quote from: Sano on September 22, 2012, 08:46:31 PM
Isn't that straight from Plato's Republic?

Hence the mittens.

Cains gets it.  :lol:
"I'm guessing it was January 2007, a meeting in Bethesda, we got a bag of bees and just started smashing them on the desk," Charles Wick said. "It was very complicated."


ñͤͣ̄ͦ̌̑͗͊͛͂͗ ̸̨̨̣̺̼̣̜͙͈͕̮̊̈́̈͂͛̽͊ͭ̓͆ͅé ̰̓̓́ͯ́́͞

Quote from: Sano on September 22, 2012, 08:46:31 PM
Quote from: Cain on September 22, 2012, 02:17:45 PM
Me: "Listen; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not me? But of course you won't."

Student #1: "Let me first understand you, I replied. justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, sir, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because [student #2), the rugby player, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?"

Me: "That's abominable of you, [student #1]; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument."

Student #1: "Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer."

Me: "Well, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?"

Student #1: "Yes, I know."

Me: "And the government is the ruling power in each state?"

Student #1: "Certainly."

Me: "And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger."

Student #1: "Now I understand you; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself used the word 'interest' which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words 'of the stronger' are added."

Me: "A small addition, you must allow."

Student #1: "Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say 'of the stronger'; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further."

Me: "Proceed."

Student #1: "I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just or subjects to obey their rulers?"

Me: "I do."

Student #1: "But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?"

Me: "To be sure, they are liable to err."

Student #1: "Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?"

Me: "True."

Student #1: "When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?"

Me: "Yes."

Student #1: "And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects, --and that is what you call justice?"

Me: "Doubtless."

Student #1: "Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?"

Me: "What is that you are saying?"

Student #1: "I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?"

Me: "Yes."

Student #1: "Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?"

Student #2: "Nothing can be clearer."

Student #3: "Yes"

Student #1: "Yes, student #2, --sir has said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just."

Student #3: "Yes, student #1, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger."

Student #3: But, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest, --this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice."

Student #2: "Those were not his words".

Student #1: "Never mind, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, sir, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?"

Me: "Certainly not. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?"

Student #1: "Yes, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken."

Me: "You argue like an informer, [student #1]. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the me when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is the ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger."

Isn't that straight from Plato's Republic?

:facepalm:
P E R   A S P E R A   A D   A S T R A

Sano

I have a feeling that I'm missing something very important here.  :?
Everything comes to an end, reader. It is an old truism to which may be added that not everything that lasts, lasts for long. This latter part is not readily admitted; on the contrary the idea that an air castle lasts longer than the very air of which it is made is hard to get out of a person's head, and this is fortunate, otherwise the custom of making those almost eternal constructions might be lost.

Anna Mae Bollocks

I'd like to be a fly on the wall in one of Cain's classes. Just for a day.  :lol:

Oh...and I'm stealing "trilobites". Perfect moniker for the locals here.
Scantily-Clad Inspector of Gigantic and Unnecessary Cashews, Texas Division