This is an excerpt from Liber AAA The Art of Anarchic Artha (A look through the void via Alan Watts) written by the OOO
and you may find it here in full:
http://www.uncarved.org/OOO/watts.htmlThere is one notable Western philosopher, however, who seems to be aiming at something similar. Watts viewed the writings of Wittgenstein as a form of jnana-yoga, intellectual bending and stretching which makes the mind supple and ready to realise profoundly its identity with It. As he was led to point out, many of the questions that seem so deeply meaningful, such as "Why are we here?" and "What is Existence?" are strictly speaking meaningless; somehow we get ourselves tied in mental knots whereby this isn't understood or felt at all. (6)
Wittgenstein started out using the linguistic logic first developed by Frege and Russell, but in trying to explore the construction of language, ended up transcending philosophy itself in the process. His jnana-yoga starts with using Russellian analysis to show how grammatical form can conceal the logical form of a sentence. This analysis acts extremely corrosively to get rid of self-contradiction and hidden assumptions by applying self-evident rules of logic to analyse grammatical constructions and break them into their most basic component parts. Complex sentences very often feature a grammatical "clouding over" of logic as they compress assumptions into too little a space ("Try me for size, babe" would be a good example of a very complex construction hiding out in a simple sentence-what could it exactly mean?). This is where metaphysical problems tend to creep into arguments-they refer to things that don't exist, but we become grammatically deluded by the seemingly convincing layout of language that the questions raised actually mean something in the first place. And as language gains its meaning socially, we can already see a similarity (concerning ego) with eastern philosophies. Wittgenstein was originally involved with logical 'atomism', which states that complex sentences are derived by linkages of 'atomic sentences'. These are in turn built out of atomic facts, which are the basic, 'given' units of language that cannot be analysed further (e.g. saying 'apple' to refer to, well, an apple). This already brings to mind a link with zen-style mysticism via Korzybski, who liked to point out that the experience of 'water' is not a word-you can't drink the word 'water'.
The jnana-yoga reaches another level when we start to work out how atomic facts are linked with atomic sentences in order to be logically linked together into complex sentences. In order to make a proposition that links an atomic fact with an atomic sentence, you already have to think of an atomic sentence that goeswith it. This is because they're atomic, not complex facts. (All we can do here is recommend that the reader checks out some Wittgenstein, sorry). Any attempt to describe the linkage will be itself a logical, and therefore complex, statement, capable of being analysed back to its atomic components. Wittgenstein used peculiarly suggestive language to suggest how the linkage is actually made-he called it 'showing'. An ironic slant on the old Chinese saying "a showing is worth a thousand words"! We're also reminded of zen's insistence on 'direct showing' of reality. We 'picture' (not mentally, but logically) due to the activity linking the atomic fact with its sentence, . . . but . . . something's gone wrong here . . . what about the theory of talking about all this in the first place? It's not logical, it's not atomic, it's not even tautological. It must therefore be meaningless, complete nonsense. The whole of Wittgenstein's philosophy is a giant koan used to tease the mind out of linear, logical thinking, and "that whereof one cannot speak one must consign to silence." The parallel with mysticism is obvious.
There are also implications for the place of mystical writing in the overall scheme of things. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logicophilosophicus (which ends with That Sentence About Silence) states that the limits of thought are the limits of what can be said. Again, another feel of what "stopping thought" could imply. Philosophies can only analyse the use of grammar, grammar being how language use derives its sense and nonsense. This means that Wittgenstein required that philosophers stop lapsing into language use connected with non-philosophical thought. When analysed using Russellian logic, many apparently philosophical writings turn out to have chunks of language use that are instead connected with language "games" such as condemnation, commendation, and so on. This led Wittgenstein to state that his aim was to bring language back to its "everyday use", i.e. its proper home. Language can only truly be analysed as it is actually used. The use of course depends on the world view of the user, which is a given, non-analysable set of assumptions that are left after the analysis has reached the atomic level. A world view is the "logical space" inhabited by language, and is a framework of true/false constructive activity. It can only be 'pictured' through the use of language. World view cannot be viewed in a broader concept, as that broader concept would itself form a world view. In other words, to assume there is an essence of language is meaningless and pointless. The same words can be used in entirely different languages. This is perhaps what gives rise to that feeling that some people who are appearing to talk sense are talking drivel, and vice versa. This is very important when trying to deal with eastern philosophies, as people can become easy prey to the next passing guru who will sell another version of institutionality with nice eastern trappings. As Wittgenstein said, "DON'T LOOK FOR THE MEANING, LOOK FOR THE USE".
To press the point one more time, let us look at music again. Although all Western music uses a 12 tone scale, nobody (from the West) would ever dream of confusing Schoenberg with Wagner. The very essence of what their music is about, what it stands for, is utterly different. It is exactly this way with words. Words are empty (as John Cage enjoyed over the course of several records and a book).
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Don't actually have ANY time to comment right now, but thought this was relevant towards several recent conversations I've had on here, and very interesting. I'll add my own thoughts on the content later.
