Cain's 5th Generation Warfare Project

[Bebek Sincap Ratatosk]

I think they're likely to adapt the 5th gen warfare from the large-group-enemy to the small-cell-enemy. The same tactics are necessary for both, probably more so when going against a similar force. Admittedly, the specific actions will be different but the methodology - fast response to quickly changing environment/stimuli/events - is unchanged.

Rather than coordinating an attack on a battalion of soldiers, you're coordinating an attack against a rival cell's safe-house. Fast access to information is probably MORE crucial since the other side can change more rapidly, necessitating a fast response that can be instantly adjusted if new information is available.

I'd argue that the conflict of large-scale military (using 4th gen tactics/approaches) will evolve into the small-cell model when 5th gen takes over as the predominant form of warfare. We're actually seeing this already - small strike forces with only the vaguest of mission objectives that have access to vast quantities of tactical information (real-time maps, HUDs, etc.) that allow a smaller, more mobile group to acomplish a given objective. With the advances in technology giving greater firepower in smaller packages, the large-scale warfare we're still seeing in Iraq won't last to the next large-scale conflict, especially after people on all levels have witnessed the effectiveness of small-cell warfare against a large-scale force (due in no small part to the free flow of information in the Iraqi conflict).

I agree.

Brilliant Post.

[That One Guy]

One thing I wanted to clarify after reading all that again to make sure it made sense - when I said I'm not really into the literature about this stuff, that could potentially be misinterpreted. What I meant was that I haven't delved very much into the formal discussion of this topic, I've just kept an eye on weapons technology, resistance movements, socio-economic planning, guerilla warfare, propaganda, and tons of other things. I'm fascinated by 20th century warfare and how it both fueled and was fueled by the massive technological advances of the past 100-odd years.

If there's any literature regarding this I'd be VERY interested in checking it out. If nothing else I can see how my own observations mesh with others and see what I need to reevaluate.

All this in this thread is sort of off the top of my head, but it's mostly because this general topic is one that definitely interests me and I've been thinking about this sort of thing for a long time. It's fascinating to see how the internet age is affecting things - the comparison to Guttenberg is definitely apt. We're still seeing new uses and potentials all the time, too - not just in warfare but in art (viral marketing, laser graffiti that can take web-submissions) and culture (LEAVE BRITTNEY ALONE!). We haven't even begun to see the boundaries yet, let alone push them.

Also, I wanted to make sure this part of things

Also, thought it was intersting to look at this in light of restriction of personal freedoms.

doesn't get lost in the discussion, both the warfare-specific aspect and the broader far-reaching aspects, as it raises excellent questions with both.

[Richter]

Also, I wanted to make sure this part of things

Also, thought it was intersting to look at this in light of restriction of personal freedoms.

doesn't get lost in the discussion, both the warfare-specific aspect and the broader far-reaching aspects, as it raises excellent questions with both.

I'm just going to air my thought pattern on this:
A populace with both will and unlimited info access, by what we're calling 5th Gen. methods, can become a solid force given enough time and talent, as long as an information source (internet) is present. 
Civilian freedom to travel and easily access materials and tools (A whole separate section) enhances this capability (time frame and result wise). 
Limiting personal freedoms can't totally block out 5th gen. possibility, but it will slow it down, making these things harder to access. 
Consider at the same time that you could be encouraging people to be good sheep with the impulse to cower over running and fighting...

Just makes me think, anyways.  If anyone can read Engineering, Tactics, and Special Operations manuals, how do you stop them from using it? 

[Golden Applesauce]

Functionally, what is the difference between a super-empowered individual and the more traditional small-cell based guerillas?

And secondly, why the heck has nobody shelled Washington yet?  The information is available and the NSA can't possibly be watching every spot within mortar distance of Congress (and if they are, then just build a bigger and longer range mortar.)

[LMNO]

Conflating two concepts:

Ideally, a 5th Gen attack would be in areas that live in Extremistan (Black Swan concept)?

That is, a single event that would have an out-of-proportion effect.

[That One Guy]

Functionally, what is the difference between a super-empowered individual and the more traditional small-cell based guerillas?

I think the biggest functional difference is that a super-empowered individual is a self-contained unit, capable of independent action based off accessible information, whereas a cell-based guerilla group relies on the group both for methodology and target. Either are essentially the same as far as how they would use information to attack/defend/whatever, it's just the organizational structure they use to implement the information that is different.

Conflating two concepts:

Ideally, a 5th Gen attack would be in areas that live in Extremistan (Black Swan concept)?

That is, a single event that would have an out-of-proportion effect.

From the terrorist/disruption aspect, yes. The best targets are those that have the Extremistan aspects in order to get the largest impact via the least initial stimulus. That doesn't mean that an Extremistan environment is needed - just that it makes things easier to impact.

However, 5th gen also applies to the military. When the Iraq war was still being built up, one of the selling points was that we wouldn't be using lots of troops on the ground - we'd be using our technological/informational advantage to give the "Next Generation of Warfare" a shot. Soldiers with HUD displays getting real-time satellite images on laptops of the target locations, remote drones, etc. that would be able to do the same functions as 2 or 3 times as many soldiers would have done in previous wars (which ties in with the 5th gen concepts). To an extent, that DID happen, but the reality of post-overthrow occupation necessitated a massive number of "boots on the ground" and 4th gen tactics when organizing/supplying/etc. those troops.

5th gen, from what I've seen, isn't necessarily about WHAT is being attacked or defended, but HOW it is attacked/defended. Anything is a target, anything is a weapon, and anyone can combine the two if they have the information. This seems to me to be the essential difference between 4th and 5th gen warfare, but as the terms and definitions are still being debated, that could be a different assessment from the more formal studies of this.

It seems like the guerilla tactics learned in Vietnam and in various resistance movements throughout history are being adapted to larger-scale conflicts due to technological advances, in that small groups are becoming the norm rather than the exception (the scouting platoon is now the WHOLE of the attack rather than a precursor) and are more apt to utilize any available means to accomplish and coordinate whatever task they're taking on. Essentially, the entirety of conflict is moving towards small-scale, intense battles that can be carried out wherever they are needed to be done RIGHT NOW, based off available information.

[Bebek Sincap Ratatosk]

Functionally, what is the difference between a super-empowered individual and the more traditional small-cell based guerillas?

I think the biggest functional difference is that a super-empowered individual is a self-contained unit, capable of independent action based off accessible information, whereas a cell-based guerilla group relies on the group both for methodology and target. Either are essentially the same as far as how they would use information to attack/defend/whatever, it's just the organizational structure they use to implement the information that is different.

Conflating two concepts:

Ideally, a 5th Gen attack would be in areas that live in Extremistan (Black Swan concept)?

That is, a single event that would have an out-of-proportion effect.

From the terrorist/disruption aspect, yes. The best targets are those that have the Extremistan aspects in order to get the largest impact via the least initial stimulus. That doesn't mean that an Extremistan environment is needed - just that it makes things easier to impact.

However, 5th gen also applies to the military. When the Iraq war was still being built up, one of the selling points was that we wouldn't be using lots of troops on the ground - we'd be using our technological/informational advantage to give the "Next Generation of Warfare" a shot. Soldiers with HUD displays getting real-time satellite images on laptops of the target locations, remote drones, etc. that would be able to do the same functions as 2 or 3 times as many soldiers would have done in previous wars (which ties in with the 5th gen concepts). To an extent, that DID happen, but the reality of post-overthrow occupation necessitated a massive number of "boots on the ground" and 4th gen tactics when organizing/supplying/etc. those troops.

5th gen, from what I've seen, isn't necessarily about WHAT is being attacked or defended, but HOW it is attacked/defended. Anything is a target, anything is a weapon, and anyone can combine the two if they have the information. This seems to me to be the essential difference between 4th and 5th gen warfare, but as the terms and definitions are still being debated, that could be a different assessment from the more formal studies of this.

It seems like the guerilla tactics learned in Vietnam and in various resistance movements throughout history are being adapted to larger-scale conflicts due to technological advances, in that small groups are becoming the norm rather than the exception (the scouting platoon is now the WHOLE of the attack rather than a precursor) and are more apt to utilize any available means to accomplish and coordinate whatever task they're taking on. Essentially, the entirety of conflict is moving towards small-scale, intense battles that can be carried out wherever they are needed to be done RIGHT NOW, based off available information.

I think your comments on the US in Iraq dovetails nicely. 5th Gen really seems useful for attack, but not defense. This would seem to be why Rumsfailed's plan went the way it did. A small group can inflict massive damage... but a small group cannot protect a nation. I think, in hindsight, it's plain that the invasion should have included a huge 'hold and defend' group following behind the actual strike force that cut its way to Baghdad. Gen. Zini, in his Iraq Wargame had recognized that holding the country would take massive boots on the ground, but didn't take into account 5th Gen tactics for our own troops. Perhaps, if he would have, then he and Rumsfeld could have figured this out back in 2002.

[That One Guy]

I doubt things would have turned out any differently, as the Rumsfeld/Cheney war axis had a pretty set plan in mind (go in, overthrow Saddam, be hailed as liberators, leave) and had no intentions of doing anything that deviated from that plan. They systematically ignored every single general that said they'd need more boots on the ground once the overthrow was done, and have been reticent to actually put those soldiers on the ground regardless of popular opinion about the subject.

The ones that are there, however, ARE using some 5th gen tactics. Rather than masses of tanks, air strikes, etc. that typified the invasion, the occupation has relied on smaller groups (generally 1-2 Humvees)  that are given a specific mission, given access to the latest satellite and recon-drone info as well as what locations are currently most likely to offer resistance, etc. and then sent on their way. Urban warfare necessitates much of the 5th gen tactics - large-scale conflict is rendered difficult if not impossible in any dense area (whether dense from jungle or buildings - lots of places for the enemy to hide, strike from, and retreat to).

Vietnam helped usher in the advances that are currently leading to what we're calling 5th gen warfare due to the necessities of fighting a dispersed, organized group in a hostile environment non-conducive to large-scale warfare of the past. The conflicts of the 80s (Nicaragua, Panama, Grenada, Afghanistan et al) were starting to highlight the transition since smaller invasion forces were used and utilized alternate means (hair metal and spotlights in Panama especially) to accomplish their goals.

The Gulf war of the early 90s confused the issue since traditional 4th gen tactics (massive troop movements, coordinated with air strikes repelled Saddam's forces from Kuwait) were so successful. However, it was two large-scale militaries clashing, and thus 4th gen strategies were being used predominantly by both sides. Admittedly, Saddam was starting to use some 5th gen strategies (and expanded much further on those after the Gulf war with his "programs" for biological and nuclear weapons that didn't really exist in reality but definitely influenced US policy), but the conflict as a whole was one of the last gasps for strictly 4th gen warfare.

The rise of information as warfare really started with the first spy sent into the enemy camp. It was refined in WWII with the precursors to the Intelligence services that dominated the post-WWII landscape, and has been escalating ever since. None of the 5th generation concepts are new, really. Small groups acting semi-autonomously have always been a part of warfare. What makes 5th gen a new shift is what those small groups are now capable of due to technological advances and the fact that rather than being the advance party they ARE the attackers/defenders.

As far as Attack vs. Defense goes regarding 5th gen, I really think both sides can and will use these techniques effectively. Attackers can utilize the element of surprise, but once they act, they expose themselves to reaction via the same methods they attacked with - essentially defensively using 5th gen tactics as more of a "the best defense is a good offense" style. Conflicts will probably be shorter in duration since attack and counterattack can both be accomplished quickly and effectively by both sides.

[Requia ☣]

The Rumsfeld plan involved using Iraqi forces as the boots on the ground one the country was taken.  This worked out poorly, since the Iraqi army mostly just went home once they could get away with it.

[Bebek Sincap Ratatosk]

The Rumsfeld plan involved using Iraqi forces as the boots on the ground one the country was taken.  This worked out poorly, since the Iraqi army mostly just went home once they could get away with it.

This is also a very good point.

[That One Guy]

Actually, much of the army before the invasion was Baathist and tightly controlled by Saddam. The Rumsfeld/Cheney people were so certain that the Iraqis would immediately embrace US overthrow that they'd immediately renounce all ties with the Saddam regime/Baath party. Those that didn't were dismissed from the Iraqi army - which was MOST of the Iraqi army, including most of the officer class needed to smooth the transition.

That introduced a highly-trained, very well armed, anti-invasion group at a time when such a group could have the most military impact on the volatile situation, and thus led almost directly to the civil war, with Sunni Baathists on one side, their opposition on the other (mostly Iranian Shi'ites and Shi'ite locals), one side supplied from the Iraqi armory, the other from Iranian arms smuggled across the border. Add in the other ethnic conflicts (Kurds especially) and without the stabilizing factor of the Iraqi army, chaos was inevitable.

[Cain]

I haven't forgotten this thread, btw.  I'm just in a fragile mental state, so I will be coming back to it once I'm sure I'm capable of coherent and deep analytical thinking.  In the meantime, TOG and Rata seem to have grapsed the basics pretty well.  Also, because I'm busy being unemployed, it may take a while for me to tie together any fantastic theoretical insights.

Because of that, tomorrow I will put up a list of useful reading resources and introductory essays.

[That One Guy]

No rush Cain! I'm looking forward to the list, especially with a couple days off later this week 

[Richter]

I think your comments on the US in Iraq dovetails nicely. 5th Gen really seems useful for attack, but not defense. This would seem to be why Rumsfailed's plan went the way it did. A small group can inflict massive damage... but a small group cannot protect a nation. I think, in hindsight, it's plain that the invasion should have included a huge 'hold and defend' group following behind the actual strike force that cut its way to Baghdad. Gen. Zini, in his Iraq Wargame had recognized that holding the country would take massive boots on the ground, but didn't take into account 5th Gen tactics for our own troops. Perhaps, if he would have, then he and Rumsfeld could have figured this out back in 2002.

As far as Attack vs. Defense goes regarding 5th gen, I really think both sides can and will use these techniques effectively. Attackers can utilize the element of surprise, but once they act, they expose themselves to reaction via the same methods they attacked with - essentially defensively using 5th gen tactics as more of a "the best defense is a good offense" style. Conflicts will probably be shorter in duration since attack and counterattack can both be accomplished quickly and effectively by both sides.

This also brings European resistance to German occupation in WWII to mind.  The ability to hide amongst a larger civilian population (without fear of large scale draconian reprisal), doesn't necessarily put the firepower advantage in the hands of the smaller group, but does allow them to hit and fade better.
Any defensive / counterattacking stance may not be possible against such a group without disproportionately greater resources or information.

[Cain]

http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/ - good for understanding the cumbersome nature of much of the US defence culture
http://www.dreaming5gw.com/ - self-explanatory
http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/ - occasionally touches on 4/5GW and counterinsurgency theory
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/index.php - Global Terrorism Analysis
http://www.globalguerrillas.typepad.com/ - John Robb on superempowerd guerrillas and individuals, state collapse and resilience.  His personal weblog with less developed musings can be found at http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/
http://www.skilluminati.com/ - countercultural take on 5GW
http://smallwarsjournal.com/ - excellent resource on lower intensity conflicts
http://www.tdaxp.com/ - war theorist blogger
http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/ - one of the leading modern military theorists
http://zenpundit.com/ - another theorist blogger
http://ubiwar.com/ - unconventional views of modern conflict
http://purpleslog.wordpress.com/ - moar blogging
http://soobdujour.blogspot.com/ - blog
http://www.phaticcommunion.com/ - sort of mega-blog for some of the above blogs
http://smitteneagle.blogspot.com/ - Marine captain with Iraq/Afghan experience, who reads alot of the above blogs

I think that should do for now.