Discordianism and Morality

[Bebek Sincap Ratatosk]

No, moral relativism states that society dictates the morality, and that you have no outside standards of judgement, not that there is no Universal standard.  There is a Universal standard in relativism, and that is society sets the rules.

That seems to be a much more simplistic position than the one laid on in what I've read. In almost everything I've read on the concept, either metaethical or descriptive moral relativism both make the claim that there is no universal standard of morality. Taken in some forms, it also claims that there is no standard of judgment outside of the culture... but at least based on what I've read, that's a position (and an extreme one) within a broader philosophical argument.

Here's a quote I recalled from Stanford's entry on the topic:

It is important to note several distinctions that may be made in formulating different metaethical relativist positions. First, it is sometimes said that the truth or justification of moral judgments may be relative to an individual person as well as a group of persons. In this article, the latter will be assumed, as in the definition of MMR, unless otherwise noted. Second, that to which truth or justification is relative may be the persons making the moral judgments or the persons about whom the judgments are made. These are sometimes called appraiser and agent relativism respectively. Appraiser relativism suggests that we do or should make moral judgments on the basis of our own standards, while agent relativism implies that the relevant standards are those of the persons we are judging (of course, in some cases these may coincide). Appraiser relativism is the more common position, and it will usually be assumed in the discussion that follows. Finally, MMR may be offered as the best explanation of what people already believe, or it may be put forward as a position people ought to accept regardless of what they now believe. There will be occasion to discuss both claims below, though the latter is probably the more common one.

[Cain]

I'm simplifying because whenever I try and deal with something in a complex manner, I either get ignored or told "I don't understand".  Make your damn minds up.

Oh, and as it happens, appraiser relativism is by far the more common position in real life application, but rarely ever within philosophical texts.  Anthropology is full of texts that argue nothing but society dictates what is right and we have no right to judge anything another culture does because their standards are different from ours and that is all there is to it.

Which is neatly summed up in my original explanation.

[Bebek Sincap Ratatosk]

I'm simplifying because whenever I try and deal with something in a complex manner, I either get ignored or told "I don't understand".  Make your damn minds up.

Oh, and as it happens, appraiser relativism is by far the more common position in real life application, but rarely ever within philosophical texts.  Anthropology is full of texts that argue nothing but society dictates what is right and we have no right to judge anything another culture does because their standards are different from ours and that is all there is to it.

Which is neatly summed up in my original explanation.

Ah, see, I had a little knowledge and it just confused me.

However, I think the Appraiser Relativism seems a far more defensible position than either complete moral relativism, or moral objectivism.

[LMNO]

So, what's it called when the individual chooses their own moral code?

[edit: it appears to be "appraiser".]


Also, I have to look into subjective universal morals more.

[Cain]

I'm simplifying because whenever I try and deal with something in a complex manner, I either get ignored or told "I don't understand".  Make your damn minds up.

Oh, and as it happens, appraiser relativism is by far the more common position in real life application, but rarely ever within philosophical texts.  Anthropology is full of texts that argue nothing but society dictates what is right and we have no right to judge anything another culture does because their standards are different from ours and that is all there is to it.

Which is neatly summed up in my original explanation.

Ah, see, I had a little knowledge and it just confused me.

However, I think the Appraiser Relativism seems a far more defensible position than either complete moral relativism, or moral objectivism.

Appraiser relativism is also about making judgements.  Which distinguishes it from the theories of what is moral, or where morality is derived from.  I would consider it to be more subjective than relative, since it can be applied equally while holding universal moral principles (as defined by the agent in question).  Therefore it becomes a question of interpretation, not relativism.

[LMNO]

I like this.

Cain, I applaud you for sticking with this after it became apparent that most of us had no idea as to what we were talking about.

[Cain]

So, what's it called when the individual chooses their own moral code?

[edit: it appears to be "appraiser".]


Also, I have to look into subjective universal morals more.

Nietzscheanism.

Sartre sez:

When we say that man chooses his own self, we mean that every one of us does likewise; but we also mean that in making this choice he also chooses all men. In fact, in creating the man that we want to be, there is not a single one of our acts which does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he ought to be. To choose is to affirm at the same time the value of what we choose, because we can never choose evil. We always choose the good, and nothing can be good for us without being good for all.

Thus, our responsibility is much greater than we might have supposed, because it involves all mankind. If I am a workingman and choose to join a Christian trade-union rather than be a communist, and if by being a member I want to show that the best thing for man is resignation, that the kingdom of man is not of this world, I am not only involving my own case—I want to be resigned for everyone. As a result, my action has involved all humanity. To take a more individual matter, if I want to marry, to have children; even if this marriage depends solely on my own circumstances or passion or wish, I am involving all humanity in monogamy and not merely myself. Therefore, I am responsible for myself and for everyone else. I am creating a certain image of man of my own choosing. In choosing myself, I choose man.

The existentialists say that man is anguish. What that means is this: the man who involves himself and who realizes that he is not only the person he chooses to be, but also a lawmaker who is, at the same time, choosing all mankind as well as himself, can not help escape the feeling of his total and deep responsibility. Of course,  there are many people who are not anxious; but we claim that they are  hiding their anxiety, that they are fleeing from it. Certainly, many people believe that when they do something, they themselves are the only ones involved, and when someone says to them, "What if everyone acted that way?" they shrug their shoulders and answer, "Everyone doesn't act that way." But really, one should always ask himself,  "What would happen if everybody looked at things that way?" There is no escaping this disturbing thought except by a kind of double-dealing. A man who lies and makes excuses for himself by saying "not everybody does that," is someone with an uneasy conscience, because the act of lying implies that a universal value is conferred upon the lie.

When I declare that freedom in every concrete circumstance can have no other aim than to want itself, if man has once become aware that in his forlornness he imposes values, he can no longer want but one thing, and that is freedom, as the basis of all values. That doesn't mean that he wants it in the abstract. A man who belongs to a communist or revolutionary union wants concrete goals; these goals imply an abstract desire for freedom; but this freedom is wanted in something concrete. We want freedom for freedom's sake and in every particular circumstance. And in wanting freedom we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that the freedom of others depends on ours. I can take freedom as my goal only if I take that of others as a goal as well. Consequently, when, in
all honesty, I've recognized that man is a being in whom existence precedes essence, that he is a free being who, in various circumstances, can want only his freedom, I have at the same time recognized that I can want only the freedom of others.

For example.

[LMNO]

In fact, in creating the man that we want to be, there is not a single one of our acts which does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he ought to be.

This just hit me in the face like a flying barstool.






LMNO
-learned something today.

[Golden Applesauce]

It would be his moral duty to torture and rape in the most horrible way possible anyone with "Mal" in their names

                  TAKE IT LIKE A MAN!
                                         \\

[Jenne]

The above is why I usually laugh at the thought of true isolationism or original thought. *shrug*

Excellent explanations, Cain!

[Vene]

I have a fucked up irrational belief system.  You have a fucked up irrational belief system.

Shit, I copied and pasted that wrong.

I am so fucking stealing this.

[Malcoid the Malcontent]

I'm simplifying because whenever I try and deal with something in a complex manner, I either get ignored or told "I don't understand".  Make your damn minds up.

Oh, and as it happens, appraiser relativism is by far the more common position in real life application, but rarely ever within philosophical texts.  Anthropology is full of texts that argue nothing but society dictates what is right and we have no right to judge anything another culture does because their standards are different from ours and that is all there is to it.

Which is neatly summed up in my original explanation.

Ah, see, I had a little knowledge and it just confused me.

However, I think the Appraiser Relativism seems a far more defensible position than either complete moral relativism, or moral objectivism.

Appraiser relativism is also about making judgements.  Which distinguishes it from the theories of what is moral, or where morality is derived from.  I would consider it to be more subjective than relative, since it can be applied equally while holding universal moral principles (as defined by the agent in question).  Therefore it becomes a question of interpretation, not relativism.

This distinction really helps clarify the point I was stuck at. The idea of considering morality to be a universal subjective, rather than relative, makes a hell of a lot of sense to me.

Thanks for the input everyone!

[LMNO]

 (as defined by the agent in question). 

[Malcoid the Malcontent]

Also, a number of people have taken exception with my idea of relating morality to biological evolution, so I want to elaborate a little bit on that.

Firstly, I dont mean to suggest we can determine why people have certain moral ideas, and especially not today. As we can all easily see, people are free to determine this for themselves.

But this doesnt address why we even have the concept of morality. Im speculating on why we even have a choice to accept or reject a certain set of morals.

Fuckgoddamnit, morals aren't "grown" or "evolved" or "born". They appear because you use your fucking brain! Not because your parents caused your fleshy shell to survive up to this point. They are here because YOU are here, right now, playing the Game of the Universe. They appear out of nowhere, out of Chaos, they appear because all the others are playing as well.

Abso-fucking-lutely not. This is just as much a cop-out as saying that we have morals because God gave them to us, or because the Universe loves us and wants us to behave nicely.

Again, at this stage, this far removed from our biological origins, we have sufficent brain power to make these decisions for ourselves. We can chose to love, to hate, to lust, to laugh, to cry. But this didnt just magically poop its way into our species.

The roots of our rather complicated selves lies in our biological origin. If you are proposing some form of Dualism, whatever the hell you think it might be, thats fine. I fundamentally disagree with you.

However, if you accept that we are phyiscal creatures, and that our subjective sense of reality and our concept of self is generated by our phyiscal components, then you should accept that all of this complicated ethical nonsense was initially generated by those physical components.

That seems like quite a claim.  You appear willing to assume that the morally correct choice is also the choice that makes people more likely to pass on their genes, yet, I'm not sure I agree with that at all, particularly given the history of our species. The strongest, far more often than the most moral, seem traditionally to be the most likely to pass on their genes.

My second point is that I am refering to macro-evolution. Within a group, or between two groups, indeed, the strongest is often the victor, and that is dependant moreso on phyiscal stature and aggresion.

What Im talking about is the evolution of the human being in general. Humans never had some great phyiscal advantage. Whatever form we may have evolved from, a vicious saber-tooth tiger would have still been able rip our guts out.

I would speculate that humans became the dominant species on the planet due to our unique level of social cooperation and brain power. I would further speculate that some general rules of operating within that social group (ie ethics) would further develop the advantage and helped make it possible for us to get our sticky hands on ever part of the planet.

I am not an evolutionary expert. In arguing against the idea of a divinely given sense of morality, some notable atheists and evolutionary scientists have speculated on the biological origin of morals. I think its an interesting idea, and this is what I was attempting to suggest earlier.

[LMNO]

Our social dynamics are still largely based on primate pack behavior.

A large amount of "morals" seem to run counter to this, creating cognitive dissonence, and guilt (some here call it The Machine™).

Many "morals" seem to be how we wish other people would act, not how they actually act.

This would appear to make "morals" fall into the same set of impossible and imaginary ideals as in Plato's cave.