30,000 new targets to be placed in Afghanistan

[The Good Reverend Roger]

It can do I agree, but not always.  State collapse before they can do anything about it is equally likely - half of China is still villages cut off from central government anyway.  It all depends on the particular context of the crisis.

Actually, you're probably right.  Once the food situation becomes critical, no amount of clamping down will suffice.

[Cain]

They might try a foray into Russia, hope a blitzkrieg could force (greater) concessions, but a protracted campaign would be impossible.  And General January and February are especially brutal in Siberia.

[The Good Reverend Roger]

They might try a foray into Russia, hope a blitzkrieg could force (greater) concessions, but a protracted campaign would be impossible.  And General January and February are especially brutal in Siberia.

To survive, they need Siberia and probably Vietnam (or any other place with arable land).  They won't need the populations of those regions, though.

[Cain]

Back on topic

[LMNO]

 

[BabylonHoruv]

ECH, you're calling on Rog and I to debunk something that's pretty well fucking known, sorry.  China is not a free republic, it's a tightly controlled fuckface of an economy.  Western business partners are given only as much leeway as what's necessary to take from them what China wants.  Are we pretending here that their business practices are equitable and so therefore their populace is allowed to live free and do as they please? 

BAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAAAA!

Yeah, no.

BAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAAA!

Never.

Did you see wtf happened when Google of all things tried to implement some free press?  I'm not saying it's as bad as North Korea over there, but it's certainly not much different than, say, Iran, for example.

I'd say the Iranians are more free in their day to day life.  They may have no input in politics really, but they do have freeer access to the internet than the Chinese.

[Cain]

From Zones of Conflict:

Our analyses so far suggest that the post-September 11 policy of the US has not been guided by the imperative of the extermination of Al-Qaeda which, if at all, could have been achieved by intelligence and other surveillance and economic means, without the use of brutal military force on poor and deprived populations. Nor has it been guided by the need to remove Saddam Hussein from power because he may use WMD against Israel and other US interests in the Middle East.  Rather,the aim of the campaign in Afghanistan, or of any possible future campaign of the US–UK in the greater Middle East, has been/will be based on pre-existing schemes aimed at the gradual encircling of Russia and China, the control over oil and gas pipeline projects, the opening up of the Middle Eastern market to Western competition as well as the strategic surveillance of India and Pakistan, whose conflict over Kashmir has periodically assumed unpredictable turns. A Eurasian network of oil and gas pipelines with China and Russia at their epicentre would thwart any US plan for establishing hegemony over this crucial region. In addition, the US would prefer a disengagement of the EU dependency on Russia's supply of gas, as there are always fears of a special geo-political understanding between Russia and France/Germany.The US–Russia arms reduction deal of May 2002 and the joint NATO–Russia
Council are nothing more and nothing less than forms of engagement, whose continuing survival would depend on progress achieved on issues related to trade, oil, gas and Eurasian security matters.

'A few days before September 11', Bulent Gokay observed, 'the US Energy Information Administration documented Afghanistan's strategic "geographical position as a potential transit route for oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea".  During the campaign in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkmenistan discussed 'the development of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to the port of Gwadar, now being built with Chinese assistance on the Baluchistan coast'.  Given NATO's unstoppable eastward expansion, a US presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia – which follows that in the Gulf, Yemen and Saudi Arabia – provides strategic depth to the management and control of the region's energy resources for the US and its closest allies. In this context, as we shall see in more detail below, Turkey constitutes an invaluable strategic pawn in the energy pipeline projects of the US global interests, projects that aim, if possible, at bypassing Russia.  Moreover, the US, by using air and naval bases in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well as nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, can employ an integrated projection of power in Central Asia and the Middle East that cannot possibly be matched even by all the other Western powers put together.

This sort of interpretation of post-September 11 US foreign policy is evidenced by the pronounced links between the NATO's eastward enlargement drive and the US strategic projection of power towards the entire Western Eurasian zone, which is taking place with or without the direct involvement of other NATO powers. The US aims at unifying the Balkans with the greater Middle East for planning and geo-strategic purposes, a hegemonic scheme that could not be put into full operation during the Cold War due to the USSR's strong politico-military posture in Eurasia and the resistance of Arab nationalism. 

Overall, the US geo-strategic imperatives in Europe and Asia, as they had been elaborated during the first half of the 1990s, have not changed since September 11. If anything, September 11 seems to have accelerated the pace, the unilateral rigour and the theoretical comprehensiveness of policies by which the US is pursuing its goal of the political mastery of Eurasia and its oil and gas producing regions. As Michael Cox has suggested, the 'new' American hegemony of which so many writers now speak in earnest is in fact not 'new' at all. Rather, 'it is the result of a combination of largely ignored trends which predated September 11'.  As we shall examine in more detail below, throughout the 1990s, the US was fully aware of the dangers of terrorism and of 'rogue' states possessing 'weapons of mass destruction'. Furthermore, although post-Cold War terrorism may have new clothes, it was present during the Cold War either in the form of 'red terrorism' (e.g. the Red Brigades in Italy) or in the form of ethnic terrorism (e.g. the Irish case). In the light of this, I would argue that the US's struggle for mastery in Eurasia and the eastward expansion of NATO should be seen as aggressive geo-strategic extensions of America's top Cold War priorities, those being the defence of Western Europe from the Soviet threat and the destruction of the USSR.

But once the destruction of the USSR had been achieved, the Cold War schemes and institutions had to be reformed, extended and revamped so as to incorporate the geo-political priorities and needs arising from the new geo-strategic setting. The destruction of the USSR did not entail the destruction of Russia and the market economic reforms in China strengthened, rather than weakened the Communist-led Chinese state. Moreover, the EU, under the guidance of Germany and France has arisen as an economic global giant chal- lenging the trade supremacy of the US. Japan, plays its part in the global economic competition by consolidating a significant presence in the fields of technology and finance.

Seen from this perspective, the 'end' of the Cold War is an epiphenomenon, which may well, after all, misrepresent realities. The 'end' of the Cold War did not mean the end of the old geo-political, economic and strategic rivalries between the US, Japan, China, Russia, France and Germany. 'NATO's purpose', Lord Ismay had famously said back in 1949, 'was to keep the Americans in, the Russians down and the Germans out.' In a way, it remains so today, albeit in a renewed form with new meanings and novel strategic dimensions expressed through powerful regional economic blocs, such as those of the EU, China, Russia, North America and Japan. It is a matter of fact that the main antagonistic ingredients of the Cold War, including economic and military institutions, are still around, the sole differences being that Russia is weaker, European Germany and Asian China are stronger, and the US is the aggressive unstoppable global victor. More to the point, in many ways, the twenty-first century situation resembles the pre-1919 realist geo-political settings and Great Power rivalries, at the centre of which lay the defence of a multitude of competing national interests. But there is a crucial structural and political difference: no parallel can be drawn between Britain's imperial supremacy in the nineteenth century and the US might today. The US has indisputably become a unique global superpower that finds no match in any modern imperial precedent. And yet, as Nye put it, 'it can not go it alone'.

The most distinguished geo-strategic game in this respect is that between the leading EU states and the US. The US is in favour of the EU's eastward and southward enlargements, led by Germany and France respectively, but the process has to remain subordinate to the US's global strategic and economic interests. The best way to ensure this is by preventing the EU from achieving political integration – the so-called 'ever closer Union' project of the EU - US strategy is coupled with assistance of the UK, which favours EU enlargement along neo-liberal economic lines, something which was and is to the detriment of Europe's political cohesion.

I would, of course, argue the USA only has overwhelming conventional military power, which is increasingly useless and harming its economic power.  Otherwise, it is a good assessment.

[Cain]

30,000 targets being withdrawn from Afghanistan.

70,000 will remain, to babysit the ANA, who currently have.... no (0) operational units.

No cohesive national government.  No control over it's own borders.  No reliable army.  Very few non-corrupt police.  Taliban violence spreading to regions where Pashtuns were previously unwelcome. 

The only way to "win" the war in Afghanistan is to invade Pakistan, inter most of the ISI and Army officer corps and raze every compound in the NWFP to the ground and shoot the occupants.  It is beyond the capabilities of NATO to topple Gaddafi, let alone Pakistan, so that will never happen.

In which case, leaving any troops in Afghanistan at all is foolish and pointless.

[Jenne]

All too true.  They're saying the Mayor of Kabul will continue to lose ground, both locally and geopolitically, and the place will devolve into a bigger hole of chaos than it was previously.  Can't say I'm shocked or surprised...Afghanistan may just need to come to its knees...I mean, more than it has previously...and broken into pieces as people were saying before and then just after 9/11 happened.  Its lack of cohesive ANYTHING other than clusterfucks points back to the notiona that perhaps it had no business becoming one country in the first place.

Be that as it may, it chagrins me that I have not been able to visit there, and if the situation becomes more untenable, I perhaps never well.

[maphdet]

I am really slow on these topics, so please bare with my question.

I still do not understand why or what the 'war' is about in Afghanistan. Why did we go there? I guess that doesn't really matter now though. So then-why can we not leave there? (and I really do not buy into the shit about -oh we cannot leave a country alone that is in such shambles. Bullocks. Countries are in shambles all the time everywhere. wtf? (Or am I missing something else here totally?)

[Cain]

The problem with leaving Afghanistan in a shambles is that it gives rise to the conditions the Taliban can exploit.  The last time the Taliban ruled (most of) the country, they invited jihadists in, who then turned around and brought the region to the brink of war.  It wasn't widely reported, because no-one cared about Central Asia back then, but Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Iran were prepared to go to war with the Taliban in 1999 or so. 

The Taliban hosted the IMU, who carried out vicious attacks in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.  They hosted a group who target Shia Muslims and Christians in Pakistan.  They hosted a number of groups who were interested in attacking India across the LOC in Kashmir.  Uighur exiles from China.  Drug traffickers who transported their goods through Turkmenistan into Iran.  And, of course, Al-Qaeda.

Since 9/11, the Taliban have become even closer to Al-Qaeda.  A whole generation of Taliban commanders have been taught their trade by Al-Qaeda fighters.  They accept the need for global jihad and the toppling of apostate "Muslim" rulers.  With Zawahiri's focus on the "near enemy", should the Taliban sweep to power again in Afghanistan, and they probably will if the current government cannot provide jobs, security and justice, Afghanistan again will become a vector for international terrorism.

Of course, the elephant in the room is Pakistan.  The NWFP provides a safe sanctuary and steady supply of fighters for the Taliban cause.  And the Pakistani establishment support radical Islam and run interference for the Taliban and their backers in the country, the sections of the military, of intelligence and certain Saudi-bankrolled parties.  That's why Pakistan needs to be dealt with.

[Dysfunctional Cunt]

Awwww come on, you know why we're still there, have been there before 9/11 and will always have a "presence" there until the planet burns.......





Oil. 

[Cain]

Awwww come on, you know why we're still there, have been there before 9/11 and will always have a "presence" there until the planet burns.......





Oil. 

Uh, no.

[Dysfunctional Cunt]

Awwww come on, you know why we're still there, have been there before 9/11 and will always have a "presence" there until the planet burns.......





Oil.  

Uh, no.

Strategic location, not because it's actually there.....

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan_Oil_Pipeline

Or maybe not....

http://afghanistan.cr.usgs.gov/oil.php

...just because it was both fascinating and scary....

http://www.ringnebula.com/Oil/Timeline.htm

So maybe more than we realize?  I'm still reading the dabte on the pipeline and the opinions from both sides that it has a major part in the US being there.  So I don't know exact reasoning, but I think oil plays a big part of it.

[Cain]

That project fell through in the late 90s when the Unocal-led consortium fell apart.

And it's more politically viable to use the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline, despite the geographical difficulties (because no-one is stupid enough to invest in putting a pipeline through the highly volatile Afghanistan and into a rebelling part of Pakistan).

And Central Asian reserves have been massively overestimated since the early 90s, anyway.  Turkmenistan "might" have oil reserves under 80% of the country.  But equally they might be like Uzbekistan, with barely enough oil to supply their own local needs.