Picking Cain's Brains

[Cain]

Thank you Cain,

If you would care to elaborate, I'd also like to know your thoughts on the Saudi aristocracy and their support for ISIL. I imagine the palace intrigue in a place like Saudi Arabia is quite interesting.

It is, but it's very hard for outsiders to actually find out anything about.  You have to be a dedicated House of Saud watcher, the equivalent of a Cold War Kremlinologist, to even scratch the surface of what is really going on.

I'm not one of those people.  I don't have the time and can't sustain the interest to the exclusion of other things.

That said, I'd say it goes something like this:

Hardliners in the Saudi secret service, especially around their former head (and former Ambassador to the USA, and former foreign policy tutor to George W Bush), Prince Bandar.  Bandar was someone who wanted to see the Assad regime gone, at any cost.  While I'm sure ISIS would not have been his main choice of horse to back, or even the primary beneficiary of Saudi largesse, there is little doubt that his appointment to lead the efforts to topple Assad, and subsequent "blind eye" to funding of jihadists coming from Saudi Arabia worked to their benefit.

Alongside that, there are always elements in the Saudi aristocracy who hate Shiites, hate modernity and hate the west.  These princes helped fund and protect Bin Laden, even after 9/11, and they likely fund ISIS now.  There is credible evidence that some members of Al-Qaeda even had highly ranked supporters in Saudi intelligence (one member of Al-Qaeda was tricked into believing he was being held by Saudi intelligence.  He gave them the number of Prince Ahmed bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz.  Prince Turki, the former head of Saudi intelligence, also allegedly kept close contact with Al-Qaeda).

Some Saudis see tactical and geopolitical advantages in these relationships.  Some of them, however, are hardliners who see the House of Saud as corrupt, too close to the Americans.  I'm sure they'd welcome a situation where more....pious custodians for the Holy Cities can come to power.

[Cain]

Incidentally, I recommend everyone click on that link.  It really is amazing:

Zubaydah, writes Posner, said the Saudi connection ran through Prince Turki al-Faisal bin Abdul Aziz, the kingdom's longtime intelligence chief. Zubaydah said bin Laden "personally" told him of a 1991 meeting at which Turki agreed to let bin Laden leave Saudi Arabia and to provide him with secret funds as long as al-Qaeda refrained from promoting jihad in the kingdom. The Pakistani contact, high-ranking air force officer Mushaf Ali Mir, entered the equation, Zubaydah said, at a 1996 meeting in Pakistan also attended by Zubaydah. Bin Laden struck a deal with Mir, then in the military but tied closely to Islamists in Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (isi), to get protection, arms and supplies for al-Qaeda. Zubaydah told interrogators bin Laden said the arrangement was "blessed by the Saudis."

Zubaydah said he attended a third meeting in Kandahar in 1998 with Turki, senior isi agents and Taliban officials. There Turki promised, writes Posner, that "more Saudi aid would flow to the Taliban, and the Saudis would never ask for bin Laden's extradition, so long as al-Qaeda kept its long-standing promise to direct fundamentalism away from the kingdom." In Posner's stark judgment, the Saudis "effectively had (bin Laden) on their payroll since the start of the decade." Zubaydah told the interrogators that the Saudis regularly sent the funds through three royal-prince intermediaries he named.

The last eight paragraphs of the book set up a final startling development. Those three Saudi princes all perished within days of one another. On July 22, 2002, Prince Ahmed was felled by a heart attack at age 43. One day later Prince Sultan bin Faisal bin Turki al-Saud, 41, was killed in what was called a high-speed car accident. The last member of the trio, Prince Fahd bin Turki bin Saud al-Kabir, officially "died of thirst" while traveling east of Riyadh one week later. And seven months after that, Mushaf Ali Mir, by then Pakistan's Air Marshal, perished in a plane crash in clear weather over the unruly North-West Frontier province, along with his wife and closest confidants.

[Pergamos]

So Israel is not supporting Daesh?

Why would they?

Because Daesh is really bad news for Assad, and Hezbollah.  Also bad news for Saudi Arabia and Iran.  They tend to focus on other Muslims as their enemies, which could make Israel see them as a useful tool.

[Cain]

So Israel is not supporting Daesh?

Why would they?

Because Daesh is really bad news for Assad, and Hezbollah.  Also bad news for Saudi Arabia and Iran.  They tend to focus on other Muslims as their enemies, which could make Israel see them as a useful tool.

Israel has a de facto alliance with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, and has vested interests in Christian militias in Lebanon, all of which are threatened by ISIS. 

They also may have learnt from their experience of tacitly backing Hamas against Fatah, after the first intifada.  ISIS, or more likely Jabhat al-Nusra, could try and set up shop in the Occupied Territories to gain greater legitimacy too.

[Brother Mythos]

Cain,

Thanks, again, for sharing your knowledge of Middle Eastern politics. I have more questions, but I'll give it a rest for now. Have a happy New Year!

[Mesozoic Mister Nigel]

Thank you Cain,

If you would care to elaborate, I'd also like to know your thoughts on the Saudi aristocracy and their support for ISIL. I imagine the palace intrigue in a place like Saudi Arabia is quite interesting.

It is, but it's very hard for outsiders to actually find out anything about.  You have to be a dedicated House of Saud watcher, the equivalent of a Cold War Kremlinologist, to even scratch the surface of what is really going on.

I'm not one of those people.  I don't have the time and can't sustain the interest to the exclusion of other things.

That said, I'd say it goes something like this:

Hardliners in the Saudi secret service, especially around their former head (and former Ambassador to the USA, and former foreign policy tutor to George W Bush), Prince Bandar.  Bandar was someone who wanted to see the Assad regime gone, at any cost.  While I'm sure ISIS would not have been his main choice of horse to back, or even the primary beneficiary of Saudi largesse, there is little doubt that his appointment to lead the efforts to topple Assad, and subsequent "blind eye" to funding of jihadists coming from Saudi Arabia worked to their benefit.

Alongside that, there are always elements in the Saudi aristocracy who hate Shiites, hate modernity and hate the west.  These princes helped fund and protect Bin Laden, even after 9/11, and they likely fund ISIS now.  There is credible evidence that some members of Al-Qaeda even had highly ranked supporters in Saudi intelligence (one member of Al-Qaeda was tricked into believing he was being held by Saudi intelligence.  He gave them the number of Prince Ahmed bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz.  Prince Turki, the former head of Saudi intelligence, also allegedly kept close contact with Al-Qaeda).

Some Saudis see tactical and geopolitical advantages in these relationships.  Some of them, however, are hardliners who see the House of Saud as corrupt, too close to the Americans.  I'm sure they'd welcome a situation where more....pious custodians for the Holy Cities can come to power.

I'm gonna leave this open in my browser to check out after tomorrow's hangover wears off.

I appreciate your nutshell analyses, BTW, they are really really helpful. I trust your take a hell of a lot more than any media outlet I'm likely to come across under my own steam.

[Brother Mythos]

Cain,

I was under the impression that the Iraqi Security Forces were little more than a corrupt, public welfare program. But it appears, for now at least, that the ISF are willing and capable of advancing into enemy held territory, capturing it, securing it, and holding it.

So, what's changed within Iraq to bring that about?

Thanks.

[Cain]

They're still terrible.  It's every bit as awful as you've heard, and worse.  Entire platoons exist only on paper, so generals can line their pockets with their pay.  Procurement is a joke, most of the money is siphoned off and the stock sold on the black market, and those divisions that do have weapons usually have substandard ones.  Officer positions are essentially paid for and/or political appointees, meaning most officers in the Iraqi Army are Shiites with little military background or training, which puts them at a significant disadvantage against ISIS (whose strategists are Saddam-era Republican Guard senior officers).

Nothing much has changed, except that the Iraqi Army is now bolstered by irregulars who are significantly more motivated to fight and, in many cases, are almost as brutal as the ISIS fighters they are being sent against.

In Tikrit, they used Shiite death squads.  Literal death squads, Mahdi Army, Badr Organization guys, people involved in mass killings and disappearances during the occupation.  In Ramadi, they decided to use local tribes instead, alongside local police forces and an elite counter-terrorism unit (who are usually where the few professionals the ISF have invariably end up).  Ramadi is something of a special case, too, as it's a stronghold of the former Awakening Councils, aka The Sons of Iraq, aka Sunnis who remember how much Al-Qaeda sucked during the occupation and so teamed up with the Americans to kill them in droves.

The Sons aren't quite the force they used to be, but they will have the alleigance, if not comprise of, the local tribes and the local police force. 

The local element is probably the critical one.  In Fallujah, ISIS leveraged tribal discontent with the central Iraqi government and, as a consequence, roflstomped the loyal security forces there and have held the city for 2 years, despite attempts by the Iraqi Army to retake it (including an infamous effort to mortar the city centre.  Yes, you read that correctly.  This is the level of "professionalism" the Iraqi Army deals in).

The Iraqi Army has also allegedly been training its more competent troops in urban warfare.  As opposed to the tactics used in the occupation, which were more of a "hit-and-run" sort, ISIS seize territory and have no qualms about fighting in urban areas.  This may account for the...significant delay in their campaign to retake Anbar.

[Brother Mythos]

From what you've said, it sounds to me like its going to be up to local forces to hold onto any ground taken back from ISIL.

Do you think the Iraqi central government will, at least, keep the local forces adequately supplied, or is it too corrupt to do even that much?

[Cain]

I can't see the Iraqi government supplying weapons to Sunni groups under almost any circumstances.

A lot of the reason ISIS has made significant traction in Iraq is due to how Sunni Iraqis have been treated by a Shia dominated government with close links to Iran.  Sunnis were essentially cut out of most of the major government bodies, decision making etc...this led to a Sunni protest movement (in the wake of the Arab Spring).  This was countered with harsh security crackdowns, disappearances and torture.

ISIS exploited popular discontent, managed to win some tribes over to their side, and the rest is history.  While Maliki, who sanctioned much of this behaviour, has stood down as PM, his party still holds most of the power in the Iraqi Parliament and though they are not all as hardline as he was, they are nevertheless his supporters and allies.

[Brother Mythos]

Thanks Cain,

I don't doubt ISIL has been able to recruit individuals from their areas of control in Iraq and Syria. And, I'm sure Sunni tribes within ISIL areas of control must cooperate with them on some level. I can also understand why some Sunni tribes revolted against Iraq's Shia dominated central government.

I do realize some wealthy Saudi Arabians are partially funding ISIL, and I can understand an enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend mindset.

What I'm having a hard time wrapping my head around is Iraqi Sunni tribes buying into the Islamic fundamentalist Wahhabi movement of Saudi Arabia.

I was under the impression that the Iraqi Sunnis under Saddam Hussein were somewhat tolerant of other religions in the Middle East. I can understand Sunnis from Hussein's government and military fomenting revolt among their tribes after getting thrown out of power. But, going from a somewhat tolerant religious attitude to full-blown fundamentalism seems, to me at least, to be a big step. However, I'm not of Middle Eastern heritage, so I might be mistaken about that. 

To your knowledge, are any of the various Sunni tribes living within ISIL controlled areas really enthusiastically and wholeheartedly supporting ISIL's fundamentalism?

[Cain]

I would be very surprised if they are buying into their ideology.  While a lot of these Sunni tribes and clans are quite conservative in their worldview, their focus is, as you would expect, not only waging global jihad.  The Al-Qaeda/ISIS ideology is quite distinctive in this respect amongst Islamist groups - almost all of them are focused on their respective national governments or else endorsing separatist ethnic groups within the nation-state setting.  Only Al-Qaeda, ISIS and a few of their affiliates are so focused on the "far enemy", on global conflict and of the restoration of the caliphate.

The alliances are almost certainly alliances of convenience.  The ex-Baathist cadre allied themselves with ISIS because it offered a way to attack the Occupation, the Iranians and the "traitors".  The local tribes are thinking much the same thing.  They've been cut out of the decision making, of access to central state funds etc....

This is another thing that Al-Qaeda and ISIS have proven themselves to be adept at.  After the invasion of Afghanistan, when Al-Qaeda fled across the border, they used their relationships with the local Pashto tribes - who didn't care a whit about America, but were very concerned with asserting their independence from political control in Islamabad - to give themselves a safe haven.  They've struck alliances with groups like the Haqqani (who may be a bit of an exception, as some of them have adopted the global view of Al-Qaeda) to augment their numbers and battlefield proficiency, and with other outcast Islamist groups who are also primarily concerned with their own national struggles (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan).

The situation in Iraq is further complicated that the occupation either deliberately, or through a brilliantly incompetent approach that just happened to mirror colonial standard practice, went about exacerbating sectarian tensions.  Somehow, the Americans got it into their head, when they invaded, that Iraq was already a sectarian mess (they modelled Saddam Hussein as a "Sunni dictator", likely using the same logic that led them to conclude he was cooperating with Al-Qaeda) and so they favoured political actors based on those religious identities over more representative or suitable actors.  They then favoured a political system under which sectarian identification became the most important factor....which predictably led to sectarian violence as those actors disagreed over their divide of the political spoils.

This in and of itself is complicated by a general worldview that has built up over the Middle East since the invasion of Iraq that sectarian enemies are being sponsored by the Americans.  Lebanon is a perfect example of this - every side is convinced the Israelis and Americans are backing the other, and that the most pressing need is to fight the [ x ]-sectarian conspiracy.  Nir Rosen's book, Aftermath, details this quite well (and is worth reading besides).  Because America is seen in such a negative light, it's also helpful for national governments there which are allied to America to use them as bogeyman or convenient excuse for their own crimes....and thus the scapegoating has significant political benefits.

[Cain]

Back to Hersh, you may find this interesting, LMNO: http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2015/12/hersh-gauthier-and-coming-of-terror-in.html

My interest, naturally, was attracted to Hersh's description of a "Uyghur rat-line" organized by Turkey to funnel militants from the PRC's Xinjiang Autonomous Region into Syria:

The analyst, whose views are routinely sought by senior government officials, told me that 'Erdoğan has been bringing Uighurs into Syria by special transport while his government has been agitating in favour of their struggle in China. Uighur and Burmese Muslim terrorists who escape into Thailand somehow get Turkish passports and are then flown to Turkey for transit into Syria.' He added that there was also what amounted to another 'rat line' that was funnelling Uighurs – estimates range from a few hundred to many thousands over the years – from China into Kazakhstan for eventual relay to Turkey, and then to IS territory in Syria.

Hersh also quoted Syria's ambassador to the PRC:

'China is concerned that the Turkish role of supporting the Uighur fighters in Syria may be extended in the future to support Turkey's agenda in Xinjiang. We are already providing the Chinese intelligence service with information regarding these terrorists and the routes they crossed from on travelling into Syria.'

Hersh also consulted analyst Christina Lin (who quotes me! In her pieces) on the Uyghur issue.

So the Uyghur angle in the LRB article leans on "the analyst", a source Hersh has relied on since 9/11 and whose conspicuous single-sourciness has been a constant complaint of critics seeking to impugn Hersh's reporting; a Syrian official perhaps happy to add to Erdogan's woes by hanging the Uyghur issue around his neck; and an analyst dealing to a certain extent in open source information.

Therefore, I paid attention to a statement Hersh made during an interview with Democracy Now!, describing a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency in 2013:

The third major finding [in the study] was about Turkey. It said we simply have to deal with the problem. The Turkish government, led by Erdogan, was—had opened—basically, his borders were open, arms were flying. I had written about that earlier for the London Review, the rat line. There were arms flying since 2012, covertly, with the CIA's support and the support of the American government. Arms were coming from Tripoli and other places in Benghazi, in Libya, going into Turkey and then being moved across the line. And another interesting point is that a lot of Chinese dissidents, the Uyghurs, the Muslim Chinese that are being pretty much hounded by the Chinese, were also—another rat line existed. They were coming from China into Kazakhstan, into Turkey and into Syria. So, this was a serious finding.

Unless Hersh is carelessly interpolating a non-sequitur about the Uyghurs in his remarks, it looks like his source told him there was a JCS/DIA finding, based on classified sigint/humint, about Erdogan playing footsie with Uyghur militants.

This is something I am inclined to believe, given the public record concerning the Turkey-Uyghur special relationship, and also the bizarre role of illicit Turkish passports in the travel of Uyghur refugees from Xinjiang, through Southeast Asia, and to their publicly acknowledged safe haven in Turkey.  I've written about the Turkey/Uyghur issue several times in 2015 including my July piece Uyghurs Move Edge Closer to Center of Turkish Diplomacy, Politics, and Geostrategic Calculation.

The other Uyghur related furor in the news concerns Ursula Gauthier, the Beijing correspondent for L'Obs.  It is speculated that Gauthier will not get her journalist's visa extended by the PRC, in retaliation for an article she wrote pouring scorn on the PRC's attempts to invoke a massacre of ethnic-Han security personnel and miners, apparently by Uyghurs, at Baicheng in Xinjiang, to claim "war on terror" parity with the November 13 Paris attack.

[LMNO]

Huh.  Interesting.  Thanks, Cain.

[Cain]

That journalist's stuff on the Uighur fighters to Turkey pipeline is very interesting.  Lots of Uighurs running around with Turkish passports, these days...quite a few Uighurs in Syria, too.  Obviously Turkey, not content with just picking a fight with Russia, has decided to pick a fight with China too.

That or else someone in NATO decided the War Nerd's gameplan to militarize Xinjiang sepratists was a good idea.