Comprehensive National Power

[Cain]

This is quite an interesting article, IMO, from the ever-useful Federation of American Scientists website

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/pills2/part08.htm

a unique aspect of china's strategic assessments of the future security environment is the "scientific" method used to predict power relations among the major nations. Chinese ancient statecraft from the Warring States era focused on how a wise leader made strategy according to the power of his state. Sun Zi warned that the outcome of war depends on the correct assessment of power through calculations and estimates of enemy strengths and weaknesses. Consequently, more so than most Western futurists, Chinese authors want to forecast the future international status hierarchy. The means by which they make such strategic assessments is through the measurement and comparison of Comprehensive National Power (CNP).

CNP (zonghe guoli) refers to the combined overall conditions and strengths of a country in numerous areas. During the Cold War and the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, a nation's power was largely determined by military force, but in the current transition period, as the world moves toward multipolarity, military might is no longer the main defining factor of strength. Instead, elements such as economics and science and technology have become increasingly important in the competition for power and influence in the world. An evaluation of current and future strength requires the inclusion of a variety of factors, such as territory, natural resources, military force, economic power, social conditions, domestic government, foreign policy, and international influence. CNP is the aggregate of all these factors, as Deng Xiaoping stated: "In measuring a country's national power, one must look at it comprehensively and from all sides." (493)

Chinese assessments of CNP are done both qualitatively, in general discussions of country strengths and weaknesses, as well as quantitatively, through the use of formulas to calculate numerical values of CNP. China's forecasts of CNP reject using gross national product (GNP) indexes or the measurement methods of national power used in the United States. Instead, Chinese analysts have developed their own extensive index systems and equations for assessing CNP. It will be seen that their analytical methods are not traditional Marxist-Leninist dogma or Western social science but something unique to China.

Several assessments of the current and future CNP of a number of nations are provided in this chapter, including estimations of the rank order in the future security environment of 2010 and 2020. The conflicting findings reflect the differences seen in chapters 1 and 2 about both the rate at which the world is moving toward multipolarity and the rate of decline of U.S. national power. For example, of the 20 authors introduced in this section, some authors write, "It is certain that the five major powers will be the focus of the world, but the relative strengths of the various poles will be unbalanced," (494) while others emphasize, "The strength and political gaps among the five powers are gradually getting closer." (495) This "debate" about CNP is also important to analysts of the RMA, because knowing a nation's CNP can determine which side will win a war and which side will better implement an RMA. (496) To sum up, the future CNP scores for major powers can help identify:

   * The status hierarchy in world politics
   * The power of potential rivals and potential partners
   * Who will best exploit the RMA
   * Which side will win a war.

The AMS books and the CASS book are similar in that they see America declining and an evolution toward a multipolar world, as the quantitative power gap between the United States and other major powers closes rapidly between 2000 and 2020. Additionally, they avoid describing the rise of China to superpower status. A decade ago, senior Chinese analysts pondered in public the implications of China's surpassing the United States; however, this is not mentioned by AMS or CASS authors. The publications of both institutes agree that China will, at most, become merely one pole among five equals, in spite of its much faster growth rate and much larger population and territory. Where the AMS and CASS books differ is mainly in how to assess the rate of China's rise and America's decline. They also differ in how they assess military power. By examining this "debate" about the future security environment, foreign observers can better understand how issues about the future are "argued" among both civilian and military analysts.

According to interviews in Beijing, the assessments of future power ratios by CASS and AMS are not projected beyond 2010 because to do so might aid the China Threat Theory. However, for this study, the AMS and CASS estimated growth rates and their baseline power scores for 2010 are used to project 2020 findings. It is apparent that CASS and AMS use very different rates--AMS growth estimates have China's CNP increasing seven times faster than the CASS pace; the CASS rate for Japan is also much slower. The CASS assessment has U.S. CNP decreasing 1 percent a year, to be overtaken by Japan, which is growing by 1 percent a year.

The estimates of the orthodox authors support the assertions of Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng that the multipolar world is approaching. By 2020, based on projected AMS scores, the United States and China will have roughly equal national power. However, the reform view published by the team from CASS predicts different results. Its CNP scores for the present suggest American unipolar superpower, not multipolarity. Projected CASS scores show that by 2020 Japan will be number one, followed closely by the United States, whereas China will still be only number eight in the world, not even one of the top major powers. China and Russia will be "half poles" because they will each have only about half the national power of Japan and America. These differences in CNP affect the debates discussed in other chapters of this study about which nations will be first to exploit the potential of an RMA.

The close connection between warfare and national power, which formed the basis of earlier Chinese strategic theory on the subject, of course remains a prominent issue today. However, because the foundation and means for exerting one's power and influence have diversified, because conflicts between countries are more focused on nonmilitary issues, and because they can be resolved through diplomatic and economic channels, Chinese scholars in a number of disciplines, both military and nonmilitary, today use the concept of CNP to make assessments in their particular areas. CNP scores can aid "warfare" today in general terms in an "all directional economic war," (514) and more specifically in future warfare to predict "who is capable of winning a victory in a new RMA war." (515)

High-Technology Warfare

The basis of a discussion on employing the framework of CNP to analyze the outcome of future wars in The New Revolution in Military Affairs and High-technology Warfare, by Li Qingshan, a People's Liberation Army (PLA) colonel, is highly similar to the arguments put forward by China's ancient strategists. Sun Zi and Wu Zi both discussed how victory or defeat in war can be known in advance if a comparison is done of certain factors that contribute to a country's strengths. Li Qingshan agrees: "Through the analysis of belligerent countries' Comprehensive National Power, even before a war has begun, people can frequently know the results in advance." (516) However, Li adds that power changes during a war, because "Comprehensive National Power is a relatively dynamic concept." As a war develops, fluctuations and transformations will inevitably occur in the strengths and functions of the various component factors. Li states, "The outcome of war to a very large extent is determined by the contrast of the actual strength and potential of the two sides before the war begins, but what plays a direct role in the outcome of the war are the changes that take place in this comparison of forces during the process of military operations, as well as the results of diplomatic struggles, ideological struggles, and economic struggles."

Li's book asserts that the RMA will not override previously existing premises for making strategic assessments. Li claims that high-technology weaponry "can change the appearance of warfare, but it cannot change the laws of victory in warfare. Victory or defeat in war is, of course, related to the technological means used by the belligerents, but it is not the sole relationship. Historically, in numerous wars the victors have been both those who have technically inferior weaponry and those who have technically superior weaponry. Technology is not the only factor determining victory or defeat in war." (517) Li links the RMA to CNP. Lenin wrote, "War is a test of every nation's complete economic and organizational power," which Li asserts means that new RMA warfare "is still a comprehensive test of the level of countries' strength."

During development of the RMA, Li believes that CNP will continue to be composed of a country's strength in five major areas--politics, economics, military affairs, science and technology, and foreign affairs--each of which he discusses with regard to its influence and role in war. Beginning with political affairs, he states, "Warfare is the continuation of politics and reflects a country's strategic intentions, the desires of the people, organizational ability, and decision making ability." (518) According to Li, if a country's decisionmaking, organizational capability, or strategy is weak, unfocused, or defective, these factors will outweigh "actual" strength in determining the outcome of a war. Popular will expressed in opposition to a war can also reduce "actual" power. Pure military power "is warfare's most direct material force, it includes people, weaponry, strategy and tactics, organization and command, as well as various safeguards, etc. It is the most basic factor determining victory or defeat in war, and strength or weakness in any area will have a major role in war." Of course, in future RMA warfare, where "the entire process of war is permeated by the contest and match of technology," the extent of a country's scientific and technological development will be of major importance in attaining victory. (519)

Economic Rivalries

While Li Qingshan views the component factors of CNP from the perspective of their relevance to warfare, authors Tong Fuquan and Liu Yichang analyze them with more economic issues in mind. Tong and Liu's interest in evaluating and comparing countries' CNP stems from the role it plays in world conflicts and rivalries over "science and technology, industrialization, foreign trade, finance, and natural resources." (520) They divide CNP into four major parts--economics, politics, science and technology, and military affairs--placing economics in the most crucial position. "Actual economic strength," they write, "is, of course, the major component part of Comprehensive National Power, and to a certain extent, a country's actual economic strength represents its Comprehensive National Power." The other three areas are not discussed as independent factors but with regard to their relationship to economics.

Concerning politics, Tong and Liu write, "In general, political power and actual economic strength are linked together." (521) They believe a country with strong economic power will have powerful political influence, and a nation with unsubstantial economic strength will not have major political influence. However, they do grant an exception for Japan, whose great economic strength does not translate into a strong role in international political affairs. A similar relationship exists between the extent of a country's economic strength and the level of its scientific and technological development. While the authors recognize the importance of military power, they assess it based on its connection to the other factors:

   Actual military strength also is an area that can not be lacking in Comprehensive National Power; if a country's military power is not strong, it is out of the question that this country could have powerful Comprehensive National Power. In general, the size of military expenditures is both a reflection of whether a country's actual military strength is strong or weak, and an important sign of whether its economy is powerful, additionally, the development of military technology is related to actual scientific and technological strength. Therefore, in a certain sense, the enhancement of actual military strength is a strong symbol of a country's powerful Comprehensive National Power. (522)

Strategy and Structure

Sun Zi's emphasis on the importance of knowing and then attacking an opponent's strategy has also found its way into the study of CNP. "Prospects for the New World Structure," by Xi Runchang of AMS, is an effort to predict the future world structure based on each area that contributes to Comprehensive National Power--strategy, population and national territory, military affairs, economics, and international influence. However, in his discussion on evaluating and comparing CNP, Xi does emphasize an area of definite significance to his discipline--the less concrete component factors, especially strategy. Xi explains that his particular stress on the importance of strategy does not ignore the position of the other components, but is "done in order to give prominence to this important area that people often overlook." (523) According to Xi, national strategies need to be evaluated in three aspects:

   * A determination is needed on whether or not a country's leaders have actually even "established a national competition strategy, in order to participate in the international competition" and, if they have, how quickly they did so. (524)
   * "Whether or not a nation's policymakers, when developing Comprehensive National Power's hard national power, put the main means for conducting international competition in the most prominent development position." (525)
   * How a country's leadership "effectively utilizes" its strategy. Xi writes, "In the current information age, for any major nation in the strategic competition, whether they take action early or take action late, is extremely important with regard to gaining the leading position." (526)

Today, the United States, Europe, and Japan, because of their "overwhelmingly ambitious" goals and because they have moved quickly to implement their strategies, are ahead of other countries. "By comparison, Russia and China, particularly Russia, are especially slow in the area of action. In a certain sense, this is an important reason why, in today's international competition, Russia and China are in defensive positions, or are said to have been late to enter the ranks of the major competing nations." (527)
Grand Strategy

In Grand Strategy, Wu Chunqiu, of AMS, views the relationship between a country's strategy and CNP somewhat differently than Xi. He argues that CNP and grand strategy have an "unbreakable internal connection" of a "dual nature." (528) On the one hand, CNP is wielded to attain the goals of grand strategy, but on the other, because this requires strong CNP, its development becomes one of the aims of grand strategy. Wu therefore does not consider strategy to be a component of CNP. Rather, he breaks the main factors and their functions down in the following manner: "In the current age when peace and development have become the main trends in the world, numerous countries, to different degrees, recognize that economics are the foundation; science and technology, especially high technology, are the guide; education is the guide of the guide; national defense is the backup force; and national policies are the key factor playing a unifying and coordinating role."

Not only can studies of CNP aid a country in making strategic assessments of the international situation, but they also are an important tool for analyzing a country's own strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, Wu explains that countries can learn from mistakes made by other countries by analyzing the development of both their national strategy and Comprehensive National Power. Like many Chinese authors, Wu cites the collapse of the Soviet Union as an example of a policy failure in the CNP competition.

[Triple Zero]

Hm sounds very interesting. I only read the first bit, so far, though.

Very big contrast with that supercomputer that supposedly "predicts" revolutions from news archives. This kinds of forecasting I can imagine myself placing some trust in.

[Chairman Risus]

Marking this so I can find it later.

[BabylonHoruv]

Japan huh?  I haven't heard much about them in a while, it's been all BRIC.