Some research I got paid for

[Cain]

Yeah.  Also, I think most Grand Theory adherent academics have a, uh, simplified and unrealistic view of how science works, which infects their work, and has caused the post-positivist backlash.  As in, they actually seem to think they can have a Physics of Politics.  I'm actually doing some research now on Can We Have A Science of Politics.  Only 1600 words though, so not exactly an in-depth examination.  I wont be able to post it for a while, though, as it's not due for another six days, and I want a decent cool down period after that, also.

[Kai]

Yeah.  Also, I think most Grand Theory adherent academics have a, uh, simplified and unrealistic view of how science works, which infects their work, and has caused the post-positivist backlash.  As in, they actually seem to think they can have a Physics of Politics.  I'm actually doing some research now on Can We Have A Science of Politics.  Only 1600 words though, so not exactly an in-depth examination.  I wont be able to post it for a while, though, as it's not due for another six days, and I want a decent cool down period after that, also.

Definitely am interested in reading that, when you finish.

[Cain]

The larger problem with the Realist methodology, which I did not really deal with in the essay is that, uh, there is no agreement about what constitutes power among scholars, or a way to quantify it.  The most persuasive attempt I've seen at doing such a thing is China's National Comprehensive Power system, and aspects of how that is weighted and quantified are closely guarded state secrets.

The other thing is, for certain states, like Japan, Saudi Arabia and, yes, the USA, there are areas of latent, potential power which are circumscribed by the national politics of the country in question.  Therefore, the constraints on power are institutional and political, and not always entirely rational.  The USA, as a whole, would be a lot stronger in the long term if it made the shift to renewable energy resources (indeed, it would become a net energy exporter, just with current technology).  However, the power of the existing energy lobbys, links with the ruling classes, "prosperity" doctrine among the large number of Christians in the USA etc impact in such a way that the USA is reliant on foreign governments and foreign oil for continued economic growth. 

Japan has a large population, militaristic past, fairly decent economy and world-class expertise in various aspects of hi-technology.  In theory, this makes them a very dangerous opponent in a war, despite their reliance on fuel imports.  But, their military is not a military.  It's a self-defence force, a civilian ministry from which one could resign at any time, and it lacks the military ethos of other forces around the world.  The ministry in question was only recently made a ministry (it was formerly a department) and compared to other Japanese ministries, does not have a huge amount of political clout, prestige or large budget associated with it.  On top of that, the general Japanese political malaise (five prime ministers in a single year) suggest a political paralysis that would set in should a war happen - leaving effective control of the ministry to untested civil servants.

These problems point to institutional (or what we call unit-level) analysis, which is generally not the focus of modern Realism.  You basically have four levels of analysis (though you can certainly argue for more) which are:

Systemic
State
Unit
Individual

Most Realist thinking is based at the systemic level, explicitly so in the case of Neorealism, the dominant Realist paradigm.  Which isn't to necessarily say they don't believe in levels below that of having any importance (Mearsheimer and Walt, two prominent neorealists, wrote the controversial "Israel Lobby" book after all) only that the systemic level features are the ones which determine the parameters of global politics.

Personally, I think it's a lot more complicated.  For instance, their insistence on "structural anarchy" makes no sense for more than a few states today.  Britain does not fear invasion by France or Ireland, and the only future in which I envisage this being the case is one far removed from our own.  The condition of international anarchy, and all that implies (self-help, distrust, security dilemmas) is not universal, and Alexander Wendt's constructivist theory is much better at explaining how differing perceptions and norms can lead to security dilemmas or not than current realist thinking.  No EU nation fears a military build-up in another EU nation, even where those are well beyond the normal amount (Greece's military spending is double of that of any other EU nation's percentage of it's GDP...we don't fear Greek invasion, we fear Greek default). 

The unit-level can impact on the upper levels, as much as the lower levels, in unexpected ways.  They're all interconnected, and that is what makes politics so unpredictable and potentially so unstable.  A religious insurgency in a central Asian backwater becomes the new defining paradigm of international security and norms relating to warfare, civil rights and state surveillance.  Certainly no Realist, most of whom had their eyes on China and/or a resurgent Russia would've predicted that, despite the warnings coming from the intelligence community throughout the 1990s, ranking drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism as ever-increasing priorities compared to worries about infiltration by Chinese and Russian agents.

But the epistemological foundations of international politics, as they are currently studied, are just one of the things I find infuriating about the discipline.  There is a lot of distorted thinking in there, and it would require an almost blank slate approach to make something workable.

[Kai]

Is a blank slate approach possible?

[LMNO]

I need to print this out for later.  I can't focus on it at work, and it deserves my full attention.