Can the UK actually defend the Falklands?

[Cain]

This post covers a lot of good ground.

One of the problems with looking at this potential conflict is that everyone assumes that if Argentina invades, then the UK will immediately turn around and launch 'Task Force 2′, followed by a short bloody war in which the UK either kicks Argentina off the islands again, or is sent home humbled and never again enters the South Atlantic. Humphrey would suggest that this is unwise to consider – after all, UK planning is based on holding the islands for perpetuity (where perpetuity means 'for as long as the Islanders want us to remain'), and that if Argentina seeks to capture the islands militarily, it needs to be ready to defend them in perpetuity as well.

So, the first thing to ask is whether Argentina has sufficient military capability to not only invade the islands now, but also defend them in the long term without a major increase in defence spending.

The next issue when planning such an invasion is the level of violence and casualties one is willing to inflict upon an enemy force to achieve mission success. In 1982, the Argentine attack was predicated on landing roughly battalion sized forces to take out a sub company (barely platoon) sized formation. Its often forgotten that Argentine SF made a deliberate attempt to destroy the marine barracks, presumably hoping to take out the marines in their beds, rather than have a fight.

The world has changed dramatically since 1982 and the arrival of 24/7 media coverage, global news and analysis and the internet & other social media means that any attack or use of force will be questioned. To force the UK defending forces to surrender will mean either denying them the ability to fight or to sustain, or inflicting sufficient casualties to make the ground commander decide further resistance is futile.

Let's put this in context for a moment. The FI are garrisoned normally by up to 1500 military personnel, and supported by a range of logistics and infrastructure that will enable the garrison to continue fighting for a considerable period of time without requiring external support. For an Argentine attack to put the UK garrison in the position where it has to surrender due to an inability to sustain itself, we have to assume the loss of air and maritime resupply for a prolonged period of time, backed up by an aggressive land campaign which reduces stocks. This would seem to require a maritime and air presence beyond that which the Argentines currently possess.

Similarly, to put the defending force in a position where it has lost sufficient casualties that it feels it has not option but to surrender, one would need to inflict realistically more casualties than the UK has lost in Iraq & Afghanistan combined in over 10 years of fighting, and inflict them in a time scale probably measured in days. This would again require a very aggressive campaign, and one which would be quickly portrayed in global media as an exceptionally aggressive and brutal attack by Argentine forces.

The reality would be for Argentina that any attack has to be done in such a manner so as to force a surrender, without causing a massacre. Unless this occurs, then global opinion will swing firmly against Argentina, and it is likely that UNSCRs, or even possible military support from allies may be offered to the UK in any attack. Argentina has to be seen to be a liberating force in the manner of the Indians in Goa in 1961, and not the Iraqi 'annexation' of Kuwait in 1990.  In other words, a short military attack, limited resistance and then general global apathy, despite anguished pleas from the defending power (in this case Portugal, which the author understands still technically claims Goa is a part of its empire).

What this means is that any Argentine commander has to consider some immensely challenging tactical problems which in turn build in time delay. No plan survives first contact with the enemy, and it is likely that any assault will encounter delays. Lets now examine these considerations in a little more depth.

When considering the defence of Mount Pleasant Airfield (MPA), commentators who have not been to the islands often make the mistake of assuming it is a small facility which could easily be overrun. The reality is somewhat different – it occupies a large area of ground, and has many highly dispersed facilities. While the main admin / life support hub is located in the near legendary 'death star' complex, the remainder of the facility is spread over a large geographically dispersed area. This means that any assault has to factor in the challenge of denying multiple facilities, many of which may be defendable, and in doing so while operating on unfamiliar terrain.

To even get close to the facility would require a significant march by troops. Not exhausting in itself, but it would probably require insertion of special forces by SSK – this limits the locations that landings can be conducted. The terrain of the islands is not particularly conducive to building shelters, and the islanders are exceptionally suspicious of outsiders. At best the Argentines could hope to land a small SF force (roughly 50 men), which then has to avoid detection while it marches to the airbase.

At this point, it then has to conduct an assault against a large, well defended facility which is designed for the purpose of being used to fight a defensive battle, and they have to do so against a garrison which outnumbers them 30-1. They have to complete this assault and force the British to a position where they wish to negotiate for surrender prior to the airfield commencing reinforcement flights.

The airfield was designed in the 1980s at the height of the cold war, and reflects much of the thinking at the time. It is likely that it could easily be repaired in the event of a denial attempt, and there is likely to be sufficient room to permit landings in the event of damage. It would take a very significant attack to deny the runway to the point where it could not be used further. Such an attack would require equipment and munitions accuracy beyond that currently possessed by Argentina.

Any air movements, either transports to land troops, or bomber attacks are going to be picked up by early warning radar stations. There will be significant warning of inbound air attacks, and there are plentiful defences in place to handle them. Any air attack has to conduct a long overwater transit, and then will only have seconds on station to deliver its munitions. It will be doing so against a force likely to be expecting it. Similarly, if transport aircraft were inbound, then if needs be, they need not even be shot down. The base could merely park sufficient vehicles across the runways at regular intervals so as to prevent the plane from landing. While some bad fiction writers postulate about the idea of an Entebbe style strike, the reality is that the planes have to land first to deliver this strike. Again, a failure to land first time and commence the assault will see the reinforcement plan kicking into action.  Also, given the lack of air traffic in the region, one would hope that it is unlikely that anyone would be fooled by an aircraft faking an SOS message and then landing to disgorge hundreds of armed troops.

In short, this won't be a re-run of 1982.  Falklands defence was significantly beefed up in the aftermath of the previous conflict, and even in the UK's currently weakened state, an aircraft carrier and naval task force might actually not be necessary.

The UK also has the "defender's advantage", in that it only needs a "draw" to actually win.  The political challenges that the Argentinians would be presented with would mean, outside of some serious provocation by the United Kingdom, which is unlikely because, as previously mentioned, our offensive capacity outside of Europe is significantly weakened without an aircraft carrier, the Argentinians would be on the wrong side of global opinion, carrying out an aggressive war.  Against a NATO power, EU member and UNSC veto holder, no less.

The harder the Argentinians strike, the more likely they can take back the islands, but also the more likely they are to provoke world opinion into seeing them as the bad guys.  Furthermore, even if they do manage to get a foothold on the island, in addition to the garrison, the islanders themselves may take up arms against the invaders, especially if they prefer to attack with massive force.  That the Argentinian claim is purely legal and territorial, while the UK one has to do with citizens and nationality, will definitely make them look like aggressive invaders, rather than liberators.

Politically and militarily, the Argentinians cannot hope to hold the islands.  Lets just hope that they are also aware of this fact.

[Don Coyote]

I don't really understand why Argentina want the Falklands. Or is this one of those, "Crazy guy in charge of country wants land that he thinks he has claim too no matter waht" things?

[Cain]

It seems to be a big thing for Argentinian nationalists.

The BBC had quite an even-handed article a while back about the competing claims to the islands, which was quite good.  Mostly, the Argentinian claims are historically based, due to treaties and Papal Bulls, claims descending from when it was a Spanish territory, etc.  More recently, there has been the issue of commercially viable oil finds in the region.

[Don Coyote]

So it's mostly about 'BAW THE POPE SAID IT'S OURS!!!" and oil. Id be inclined to agree except that don't the people view themselves as members of the UK?

[Cain]

Yup.  That's the entire problem with the Argentinian claim: everyone who lives on the Falklands considers themselves British, and don't want to be part of Argentina at all.

[Junkenstein]

This would partly lead me to think of it as a bout of sabre rattling, but if they've learnt from their mistakes and that analysis holds true it could get rather interesting.

Hells, I can conjecture half a dozen scenarios where if you really fucking wanted them, you'd get them.It all really depends on how much you care about the islanders and the world perception.

If it happened to escalate to any real degree, I'd suspect relatively little support from the EU, more a direct call to the USA. Again, it'd be interesting to see just how that request gets denied.

I also suspect that someone, somewhere, is waiting on a report of "How much oil if any". A bit of horrendous calculating later you get the literal profit of war.
In summary, find the chaps who do those sums. Questions must be asked and righteous beatings must occur.

[Cain]

One of the chief problems for the Argentinians is logistics.  Any naval force in the world, the USA/Russia/China aside would have serious issues in organizing more than 1500 troops for amphibious assault - and 1500 is roughly the number of troops at the British garrison, so such an assault would be a very uncertain venture.  To be certain of success, you'd want closer to 5000 or so soldiers/marines.  Which the Argentinians simply aren't capable of.

And then, the UK would have rather ample warning of their arrival due to the communications and warning systems put in place since the last war.  Throw in a nuclear sub or two, and that once they've landed, they then need to launch an assault against heavily fortified troops who are expecting them, and....well, lets just say, I can see them being made to lose quite a lot in that situation.

[bds]

Are they actually likely to try and invade? The only thing I've seen about this in the past few weeks has been a Mirror (?) headline about how "we're sending Argentina aid but every Argentinian hates us"

[Cain]

There has been a lot more noise lately from the Argentinian government about how they are the rightful owners of the Falklands, and trying to get other South American nations to sign up to refusing trade from the islands.  I think the likelihood of invasion is relatively low...but these things can escalate quickly.  The Argentinians did freak out when the UK dispatched a nuclear sub to the region, for example.

[bds]

Weird. You'd think (hope) they'd just let it go.

[Bebek Sincap Ratatosk]

Strategic sheep purposes...

[Cain]

It's also nearing the 30 year anniversary.  People get funny around anniversaries...

[Doktor Howl]

Or the ghost of Galtieri is possessing the Argentine ruler.

[Deepthroat Chopra]

It's also nearing the 30 year anniversary.  People get funny around anniversaries...

It's also the 416th anniversary of the treaty of Tordesillas. I still think it's hilarious that the Argentine government uses a papal bull based on an innacurate world map to claim the Falklands should have Spanish, and therefore, theirs. If the quareel was with the Portuguese, then maybe they'd have a point. A stupid one, but some sort of point anyway.

http://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/1480-1768/

[hirley0]

 the Falklands  title to Argentina  /-/