Syria reported to have use Chemical Warfare

[Junkenstein]

Hits pretty much every note. Corruption, Financial Fuckery, dodgy dealings and supporting unknown actors:

http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2014/10/billions-set-aside-for-post-saddam-iraq-turns-up-in-lebanese-bunker/

More than $1bn earmarked for the reconstruction of Iraq was stolen and spirited to a bunker in Lebanon as the American and Iraqi governments ignored appeals to recover the money, it has been claimed.

Stuart Bowen, a former special inspector general who investigated corruption and waste in Iraq, said the stash accounted for a significant chunk of the huge sums which vanished during the chaotic months following the 2003 US-led invasion.


Bowen's team discovered that $1.2bn to $1.6bn was moved to a bunker in rural Lebanon for safe keeping – and then pleaded in vain for Baghdad and Washington to act, according to James Risen, a journalist who interviewed Bowen for a book, Pay Any Price: Greed, Power and Endless War , to be published this week.

The disclosure of the bunker shines a light on one of the occupation's murkier puzzles: the fate of pallets of shrink-wrapped $100 bills which the Bush administration loaded on to Air Force C-17 transport planes in order to prop up the occupation of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. About $12bn to $14bn was sent in the airlift and another $5bn via electronic transfer.

Washington had long since forgotten about the cash and shrugged when informed about his discovery, he said. The CIA expressed little interest, the FBI said it lacked jurisdiction and the US embassy in Beirut denied his team permission to visit the bunker, because it was too dangerous.

"We struggled to gain timely support from the interagency as we pursued this case," Bowen said.

One reason for such indifference, Bowen believed, was because it was "Iraqi money stolen by Iraqis".

Bowen challenged that defence, saying there were few credible records of how the money was spent. "Our auditors interviewed numerous senior advisers of the CPA, and we learned from them that the controls on the Development Fund of Iraq money were inadequate," he said. "We didn't make this up; we learned this from CPA staff."

Bowen said he suspected some, possibly all, of the money had since been moved from the bunker.

A total shock for everyone, I'm sure.

No, seriously. I had no idea of the level of cash that had walked away on the QT and it certainly adds a new light to ISIS funding questions.

[Junkenstein]

Not a bad article, not the whole picture but a decent enough piece.

http://www.salon.com/2014/10/15/george_w_bushs_toy_soldiers_melt_down_why_the_rise_of_isis_was_inevitabe_partner/

In June, tens of thousands of Iraqi Security Forces in Nineveh province north of Baghdad collapsed in the face of attacks from the militants of the Islamic State (IS or ISIS), abandoning four major cities to that extremist movement. The collapse drew much notice in our media, but not much in the way of sustained analysis of the American role in it. To put it bluntly, when confronting IS and its band of lightly armed irregulars, a reputedly professional military, American-trained and -armed, discarded its weapons and equipment, cast its uniforms aside, and melted back into the populace. What this behavior couldn't have made clearer was that U.S. efforts to create a new Iraqi army, much-touted and funded to the tune of $25 billion over the 10 years of the American occupation ($60 billion if you include other reconstruction costs), had failed miserably.

To understand what really happened, a little history lesson is in order.  You'd need to start in May 2003 with the decision of L. Paul Bremer III, America's proconsul in occupied Iraq and head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), to disband the battle-hardened Iraqi military.

Bremer and his team vowed to create a new Iraqi military from scratch.  According to Washington Post reporter Tom Ricks in his bestselling book Fiasco, that force was initially conceived as a small constabulary of 30,000-40,000 men (with no air force at all, or rather with the U.S. Air Force for backing in a country U.S. officials expected to garrison for decades).  Its main job would be to secure the country's borders without posing a threat to Iraq's neighbors or, it should be added, to U.S. interests.

Bremer's decision essentially threw 400,000 Iraqis with military training, including a full officer corps, out onto the streets of its cities, jobless.  It was a formula for creating an insurgency.  Humiliated and embittered, some of those men would later join various resistance groups operating against the American military.  More than a few of them later found their way into the ranks of ISIS, including at the highest levels of leadership.  (The most notorious of these is Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, a former general in Saddam's army who was featured as the King of Clubs in the Bush administration's deck of cards of Iraq's most wanted figures.  Al-Douri is now reportedlyhelping to coordinate IS attacks.

In the military, it's called an "after action report" or a "hotwash" — a review, that is, of what went wrong and what can be learned, so the same mistakes are not repeated. When it comes to America's Iraq training mission, four lessons should top any "hotwash" list:

1. Military training, no matter how intensive, and weaponry, no matter how sophisticated and powerful, is no substitute for belief in a cause.  Such belief nurtures cohesion and feeds fighting spirit.  ISIS has fought with conviction.  The expensively trained and equipped Iraqi army hasn't.  The latter lacks a compelling cause held in common.  This is not to suggest that ISIS has a cause that's pure or just. Indeed, it appears to be a complex mélange of religious fundamentalism, sectarian revenge, political ambition, and old-fashioned opportunism (including loot, plain and simple). But so far the combination has proven compelling to its fighters, while Iraq's security forces appear centered on little more than self-preservation.

2. Military training alone cannot produce loyalty to a dysfunctional and disunified government incapable of running the country effectively, which is a reasonable description of Iraq's sectarian Shia government.  So it should be no surprise that, as Andrew Bacevich has noted, its security forces won't obey orders.  Unlike Tennyson's six hundred, the Iraqi army is unready to ride into any valley of death on orders from Baghdad. Of course, this problem might be solved through the formation of an Iraqi government that fairly represented all major parties in Iraqi society, not just the Shia majority. But that seems an unlikely possibility at this point.  In the meantime, one solution the situation doesn't call for is more U.S. airpower, weapons, advisers, and training.  That's already been tried — and it failed.

3. A corrupt and kleptocratic government produces a corrupt and kleptocratic army.  On Transparency International's 2013 corruption perceptions index, Iraq came in 171 among the 177 countries surveyed. And that rot can't be overcome by American "can-do" military training, then or now. In fact, Iraqi security forces mirror the kleptocracy they serve, often existing largely on paper.  For example, prior to the June ISIS offensive, as Patrick Cockburn has noted, the security forces in and around Mosul had a paper strength of 60,000, but only an estimated 20,000 of them were actually available for battle. As Cockburn writes, "A common source of additional income for officers is for soldiers to kickback half their salaries to their officers in return for staying at home or doing another job."

When he asked a recently retired general why the country's military pancaked in June, Cockburn got this answer:

"'Corruption! Corruption! Corruption!' [the general] replied: pervasive corruption had turned the [Iraqi] army into a racket and an investment opportunity in which every officer had to pay for his post. He said the opportunity to make big money in the Iraqi army goes back to the U.S. advisers who set it up ten years ago. The Americans insisted that food and other supplies should be outsourced to private businesses: this meant immense opportunities for graft. A battalion might have a nominal strength of six hundred men and its commanding officer would receive money from the budget to pay for their food, but in fact there were only two hundred men in the barracks so he could pocket the difference. In some cases there were 'ghost battalions' that didn't exist at all but were being paid for just the same."

Only in fantasies like J.R.R. Tolkien's Lord of the Rings do ghost battalions make a difference on the battlefield. Systemic graft and rampant corruption can be papered over in parliament, but not when bullets fly and blood flows, as events in June proved.

Such corruption is hardly new (or news). Back in 2005, in his article "Why Iraq Has No Army," James Fallows noted that Iraqi weapons contracts valued at $1.3 billion shed $500 million for "payoffs, kickbacks, and fraud." In the same year, Eliot Weinberger, writing in the London Review of Books, cited Sabah Hadum, spokesman for the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, as admitting, "We are paying about 135,000 [troop salaries], but that does not necessarily mean that 135,000 are actually working." Already Weinberger saw evidence of up to 50,000 "ghost soldiers" or "invented names whose pay is collected by [Iraqi] officers or bureaucrats."  U.S. government hype to the contrary, little changed between initial training efforts in 2005 and the present day, as Kelley Vlahos noted recently in her article "The Iraqi Army Never Was."

4. American ignorance of Iraqi culture and a widespread contempt for Iraqis compromised training results.  Such ignorance was reflected in the commonplace use by U.S. troops of the term "hajji," an honorific reserved for those who have made the journey (or hajj) to Mecca, for any Iraqi male; contempt in the use of terms such as "raghead," in indiscriminate firing and overly aggressive behavior, and most notoriously in the events at Abu Ghraib prison.  As Douglas Macgregor, a retired Army colonel, noted in December 2004, American generals and politicians "did not think through the consequences of compelling American soldiers with no knowledge of Arabic or Arab culture to implement intrusive measures inside an Islamic society.  We arrested people in front of their families, dragging them away in handcuffs with bags over their heads, and then provided no information to the families of those we incarcerated.  In the end, our soldiers killed, maimed, and incarcerated thousands of Arabs, 90 percent of whom were not the enemy.  But they are now."

Various links within the article, above par for their usual output I'd say.

[LMNO]

I'm learning not to believe everything I read:

A month ago, ISIS's advance looked unstoppable. Now it's been stopped.

Now, I'm learning to believe everything Cain and Junk write.


How full of suppositions and wishful thinking is this?

[Doktor Howl]

Now, I'm learning to believe everything Cain and Junk write.

This is the only place I get my news anymore.

[Mesozoic Mister Nigel]

Now, I'm learning to believe everything Cain and Junk write.

This is the only place I get my news anymore.

me too. Seriously, I don't even bother looking elsewhere. Although I have to choose wisely when I decide whether to read Junk's posts because sometimes that shit is too disturbing.

[Cain]

Er, I've gotten plenty wrong in this thread, to be honest.  I didn't expect the Saudis to kick ISIS to the curb quite so fast, or Qatar to, well, not.  I definitely expected Kobane to fall - not so much because ISIS are super scary super terrorists, but simply because they have more arms, material and experience than the Kurdish forces they are fighting against (though it's hard to tell if expected supplies from Europe and America are reaching the Kurdish Peshmerga and PKK yet).

In regards to the Vox article...it's more or less accurate.  Zack Beauchamp and Max Hastings, their main security and defence correspondents, are not egregiously stupid or odious individuals (which seems to be a requirement for those positions almost anywhere else).  They are, however, reliant on the assessments of others due to a lack of fluency in the local language or specialist understanding of intra-jihadi personalities and politics.

It's true that Anbar/Northern Iraq is one theatre of a larger campaign, and that ISIS has no less than seven such field commanders for different areas it has a presence in.  Furthermore, Anbar was a well prepared campaign.  However, I think they are giving "The Chechen" (which, amusingly, he isn't) far too much credit.  His military experience is NCO level, limited combat engagement.  Admittedly, that puts him on a level above most terrorist groups, but Anbar and Mosul type grand strategy, deception and alliance building?  I think not.  Especially when there are allegedly former Baathist, high ranking military officers who later got experience of irregular warfare fighting the US and Iraqi security forces post-Saddam, in the ranks of ISIS.

ISIS is being stalled, air power was always going to make further advances harder for them.  But I still don't think the Iraqi Army (or the Shiite militias who virtually replace it) or the Kurdish paramilitaries have the necessary stomach, firepower or logistical expertise for pushing deep into Islamic State territory and liberating cities.  ISIS are old hands at urban guerrilla warfare, they will make any invaders pay dearly for incursions into their territory. 

The Iraqi Army and Peshmerga are having limited success at the moment, hitting outlying areas of the Islamic State.  You'll notice no-one is reporting that Islamic State is shelling the Green Zone in Baghdad, or sending multiple car bombs daily into the city.  ISIS continue to take down Iraqi helicoptors with ease and are using tanks in their assault on outlying pockets of resistance in Fallujah.  And that was just yesterday's news.

Syria's not much more fun - ISIS have retreated from Kobane under coordinated US firepower and YPG assault.  But news came in yesterday that several Sunni tribes in Syria have denounced the US airstrikes and are building military alliances with "the rebellion" to bring down Assad.  Jabhat al-Nusra have a large supply of US-made TOW missiles now, it seems, and the FSA have at least one MANPAD. 

[Cain]

As an aside, I really cannot recommend the Institute for the Study of War's reports enough, if you want even a basic understanding of what is going on in Iraq and Syria.  They have a dedicated site to each, with maps and details of fighting, advancements, retreats, airstrikes, terrorist attacks and assassinations in each country, and their special reports are often worth paying attention to as well.

[LMNO]

Very cool.  I'll go check it out.


And thanks.

[Mesozoic Mister Nigel]

Even if you aren't always spot-on, you offer a hell of a lot more insight than I would find in the newspaper, and I may not post often in political threads but I do appreciate it.

[Doktor Howl]

Er, I've gotten plenty wrong in this thread, to be honest.  I didn't expect the Saudis to kick ISIS to the curb quite so fast, or Qatar to, well, not.

Yeah, well, when you're making predictions, you say so.  That puts you light years ahead of the damn TV.

[Junkenstein]

Now, I'm learning to believe everything Cain and Junk write.

This is the only place I get my news anymore.

me too. Seriously, I don't even bother looking elsewhere. Although I have to choose wisely when I decide whether to read Junk's posts because sometimes that shit is too disturbing.

Sincerely, Thanks for that, I've been having an awful few days lately and that's probably helped more me more than it should.

I must make the same statement as Cain though, I've got plenty wrong (everywhere, not just here) and must again encourage everyone to never trust a junkie.

Anyway, Cain, this ISW org seems to be good. Very good.
For example:
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-expanding-egypt

Recent statements by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, and an alleged new group called the "Soldiers of the Caliphate in the Land of Egypt" has given rise to speculation that ISIS may be seeking to expand beyond Iraq and Syria into new territories such as Egypt. This fear is compounded by the recent arrest of an individual at the Cairo airport, allegedly seeking to travel to Syria for training with ISIS. He is also accused of recruiting Egyptians to train in Syria for the purpose of returning to Egypt to carry out attacks against security forces. It is possible that Egyptian authorities are falsely associating individuals or groups with ISIS in an attempt to legitimize harsh security measures. At this time it does not appear that ISIS is operating in Egypt or actively seeking to gain an operational footprint there, although recent events suggest viable routes for expansion by the Islamic State should it choose to pursue them. - f

Got to be worth watching from either angle, I'd suspect chunks of Egypt to be somewhat sympathetic and they've never been shy about being a little pre-emptive with black bags. I'm assuming the military is still the real power in Egypt so it would make sense for them to ensure their power base is secure and protected. I'd guess they'd have a reasonable chance at getting USA assistance if it became needed, they were polite enough to inform them about the last coup, after all.

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Forecasting%20ISIS.pdf

This is also good, their version of the rise of IS. Countless links within it, I've had a quick scan over it and it makes no mention of the role bribery and corruption (See Salon Article above, among others) within the military and re-building process and the resulting fuckups. The fact that the entire PDF is devoid of the words "Money", "Bribe", "Corruption", "Funds", "Drugs" or "Arms" makes me think that these people are good, but don't seem to be considering a number of the issues at play here. I hope I'm wrong and find content to the contrary as I read around the site.

[Junkenstein]

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IraqsSectarianCrisis_0.pdf

Also worth a read with a 18 months or so hindsight.

[Cain]

Truly shocking

http://www.newsweek.com/isis-and-turkey-cooperate-destroy-kurds-former-isis-member-reveals-turkish-282920

A former member of ISIS has revealed the extent to which the cooperation of the Turkish military and border forces allows the terrorist group, who now control large parts of Iraq and Syria, to travel through Turkish territory to reinforce fighters battling Kurdish forces.

A reluctant former communications technician working for Islamic State, going by the pseudonym 'Sherko Omer', who managed to escape the group, told Newsweek that he travelled in a convoy of trucks as part of an ISIS unit from their stronghold in Raqqa, across Turkish border, through Turkey and then back across the border to attack Syrian Kurds in the city of Serekaniye in northern Syria in February, in order to bypass their defences.

"ISIS commanders told us to fear nothing at all because there was full cooperation with the Turks," said Omer of crossing the border into Turkey, "and they reassured us that nothing will happen, especially when that is how they regularly travel from Raqqa and Aleppo to the Kurdish areas further northeast of Syria because it was impossible to travel through Syria as YPG controlled most parts of the Kurdish region."

I am totally surprised at this sudden turn of events. 

[Mesozoic Mister Nigel]

But Cain, Turkey is perfect and beautiful and there is no corruption there.

[Doktor Howl]

But Cain, Turkey is perfect and beautiful and there is no corruption there.

And it's way more free than America.

Unless you wish to say unkind things about the government or the founding father.  Then grab your ass.

Interestingly enough, both Rat and Purple Eris loved Turkey so much, they moved to England.