So, since Fictokitty brought it up, I thought it might be interesting to go through the backstory one more time, and rephrase some of the main foundations we keep referencing in our own words. If nothing else, it will keep me occupied for a few hours.
I'll begin with language, and why the ______ that can be told is not the true _______.
One of the things language appears to be, as I understand it, is a series of agreed-upon symbols that represent common experiences.
To facilitate communication, many words describe either ideal or average things: a Leaf, for example.
So, based on this, two things begin to appear: First, practically every experiential thing in the universe is different; there is no "average" or "ideal" thing. I can tell you I am holding a leaf, and that level of description might get us through a conversation, but I didn't truly communicate to you about what is in my hand. I could go into more detail, but even if I went to great lengths to describe the leaf, I could never describe it completely. Each attempt at saying what it "is" assigns another inaccuracy.
Secondly, because we have posited that language is based on common experience, it is inadequate to describe a unique occurrence specifically experienced by only one person, such as an emotion, or an ecstatic experience. The only way to describe it is by using words and concepts that (by definition) do not communicate individual experience, only common. So in trying to communicate a unique experience, the instant we use words, we are not speaking about the true experience.
The danger, I feel, arises in at least two ways: First, when someone decides that the inadequate descriptions are true, and are not just approximations. If taken far enough, you can't really see why saying "All black people are rapists" is inaccurate and wrong. The second danger is when people conclude that experiences which cannot be described are not true, and are dismissed, ignored, and attacked. This creates a self-justifying loop, where only things within language are deemed true, and blinds people to non-linguistic experiences.
From the Chao te Ching, Chapter 32:
Chaos cannot be labeled,
Because it contains all labels.
Therefore, all definitions are incomplete.
It's Gödels, all the way down.
Order and Disorder unite,
And Illusion slips into Chaos.
When people learn language, labels begin.
With labels, one should know when to stop.
Knowing when to stop, the wise spags see the Illusion;
And are free to create as they see fit.
Some of my own notes on the topic, since I cannot be bothered to write them up into something internally coherent:
Apparent objectivity is made possible only by a habit of thought which willingly forgets or suppresses its own provisional status. To halt such a process by invoking some ultimate claim to truth is a tactic foreign to the deepest implications of structuralist thought. There is no final analysis, no metalinguistic method, which could possibly draw a rigorous line between its own operations and the language they work upon. Semiology has to recognize that the terms and concepts it employs are always bound up with the signifying process it sets out to analyse. Hence Barthes's insistence that structuralism is always an activity, an open-ended practice of reading, rather than a 'method' convinced of its own right reason.
One way of describing this challenge is to say that Derrida refuses to grant philosophy the kind of privileged status it has always claimed as the sovereign dispenser of reason. Derrida confronts this pre-emptive claim on its own chosen ground. He argues that philosophers have been able to impose their various systems of thought only by ignoring, or suppressing, the disruptive effects of language. His aim is always to draw out these effects by a critical reading which fastens on, and skilfully unpicks, the elements of metaphor and other figural devices at work in the texts of philosophy. Deconstruction in this, its most rigorous form acts as a constant reminder of the ways in which language deflects or complicates the philosopher's project. Above all, deconstruction works to undo the idea – according to Derrida, the ruling illusion of Western metaphysics – that reason can somehow dispense with language and achieve a knowledge ideally unaffected by such mere linguistic foibles. Though philosophy strives to efface its textual character, the signs of that struggle are there to be read in its blind-spots of metaphor and other rhetorical strategies.
If language is radically metaphorical, its meanings (as Saussure was later to show) caught up in an endless chain of relationship and difference, then thought is deluded in its search for a truth beyond the mazy detours of language.
A word does not mean what it does 'naturally'; rather meanings arise on the basis of complex linguistic and cultural structures that differentiate between truth and falsity, reality and fantasy, and good and evil, and are inextricably tied up with value judgements and political questions, as well as with identity, experience, knowledge and desire.
Structuralism's understanding of the world, then, is that everything that constitutes it – us and the meanings, texts and rituals within which we participate – is not the work of God, or of the mysteries of nature, but rather an effect of the principles that structure us, the meanings we inhabit and so on. The idea is that the world without structures is meaningless – a random and chaotic continuum of possibilities. What structures do is to order that continuum, to organize it according to a certain set of principles, which enable us to make sense of it. In this way, structures make the world tangible to us, conceptually real, and hence meaningful.
For Saussure language is not simply a system for naming a reality which pre-exists it. Turning that notion on its head, Saussure argued instead that language is in fact a primary structure – one that orders, and therefore is responsible for, everything that follows. If this is so, then it seems fairly straightforward that different languages will divide, shape and organize the phenomenal world in different ways. While this understanding of language allows us to see cultures other than 'our' own as relatively different, by implication it must also show us that the culture we claim as 'ours' is in turn neither natural nor inevitable. That is, it demands that we recognize as structurally produced the culture which seems to us most obvious, most natural and most true. What Saussure's work gave to structuralism, then, was an account of language as a primary structure, a system of signs whose meanings are not obvious, but rather produced as an effect of the logic internal to the structural system that language is.
The primary property of language is that it differentiates. We can confirm that vocabulary is not acquired simply by pointing to referents (things in the world) when we remember that later the child will go on to learn to use words such as 'justice' and 'honesty'. If abstract values are not learnt from referents in the world, what about words that name nothing material, but are crucial, even so, to the process of reasoning, such as 'because', 'although', and 'if'? There is nothing for them to correspond to. Does language name ideas, then? Poststructuralism would say not. On the contrary, ideas come into sharp relief for us when we learn the meanings of the terms.
Language – or signifying practice – does not belong to individuals. Instead, it already exists before we are born into a world where people reproduce it all round us. Though it constantly changes, these modifications prevail only to the degree that they are shared. In that sense, meanings belong to other people. Lacan calls language 'the Other'. If I opt to hijack it for purely private purposes, I must expect to be seen as psychotic.
...And of course, this can also relate to the Zen gambit of silently pointing to random things when asked a question.
Quote from: Cain on July 22, 2009, 05:07:34 PM
Language – or signifying practice – does not belong to individuals. Instead, it already exists before we are born into a world where people reproduce it all round us. Though it constantly changes, these modifications prevail only to the degree that they are shared. In that sense, meanings belong to other people. Lacan calls language 'the Other'. If I opt to hijack it for purely private purposes, I must expect to be seen as psychotic.
Or specially enlightened, but only if you can take those purely private purposes and turn them into something you can communicate. That just goes back to what you already said though. I just talked myself into a circle.
Quote from: LMNO on July 22, 2009, 04:57:53 PM
So, since Fictokitty brought it up, I thought it might be interesting to go through the backstory one more time, and rephrase some of the main foundations we keep referencing in our own words. If nothing else, it will keep me occupied for a few hours.
I'll begin with language, and why the ______ that can be told is not the true _______.
One of the things language appears to be, as I understand it, is a series of agreed-upon symbols that represent common experiences.
To facilitate communication, many words describe either ideal or average things: a Leaf, for example.
So, based on this, two things begin to appear: First, practically every experiential thing in the universe is different; there is no "average" or "ideal" thing. I can tell you I am holding a leaf, and that level of description might get us through a conversation, but I didn't truly communicate to you about what is in my hand. I could go into more detail, but even if I went to great lengths to describe the leaf, I could never describe it completely. Each attempt at saying what it "is" assigns another inaccuracy.
I don't understand the absolutism. Why would you _need_ to describe it completely? If you _could_ describe it completely, what would that achieve?
Wouldn't it be easier to say everything has a probability greater than zero, and less than one? Including our understanding of what each other means?
Quote from: LMNO on July 22, 2009, 04:57:53 PM
Secondly, because we have posited that language is based on common experience, it is inadequate to describe a unique occurrence specifically experienced by only one person, such as an emotion, or an ecstatic experience. The only way to describe it is by using words and concepts that (by definition) do not communicate individual experience, only common. So in trying to communicate a unique experience, the instant we use words, we are not speaking about the true experience.
If you cannot be sure that you _know_ what the true experience is, then why does it matter? Isn't this entropy/selection?
Quote from: LMNO on July 22, 2009, 04:57:53 PM
The danger, I feel, arises in at least two ways: First, when someone decides that the inadequate descriptions are true, and are not just approximations. If taken far enough, you can't really see why saying "All black people are rapists" is inaccurate and wrong. The second danger is when people conclude that experiences which cannot be described are not true, and are dismissed, ignored, and attacked. This creates a self-justifying loop, where only things within language are deemed true, and blinds people to non-linguistic experiences.
100% agreed.
Quote from: LMNO on July 22, 2009, 04:57:53 PM
From the Chao te Ching, Chapter 32:
Chaos cannot be labeled,
Because it contains all labels.
Therefore, all definitions are incomplete.
It's Gödels, all the way down.
If X is the set of everything which have (assumed complete) labels, and does not have a label itself other than a (assumed incomplete) label Y. Then that says nothing about label Z which refers to the set of all labels which we cannot prove to be complete definitions. I call Z chaos. Checkmate ;-)
The middle seems to be missing, and I don't understand Gödels. That latter part may be evident by the last paragraph.
QuoteI don't understand the absolutism. Why would you _need_ to describe it completely? If you _could_ describe it completely, what would that achieve?
No one is saying that you NEED to, only that such a map or model is simply non-existent. You may want to read some Jean Baudrillard, I think he does a good job of covering the concept:
Not as detailed as his books, but here's a bit of his view: http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html (http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html)
Quote from: Ratatosk on July 22, 2009, 09:46:24 PM
No one is saying that you NEED to, only that such a map or model is simply non-existent. You may want to read some Jean Baudrillard, I think he does a good job of covering the concept:
Not as detailed as his books, but here's a bit of his view: http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html (http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html)
It's going to take me a while to chew through that, but thanks for the link.
Quote from: fictionpuss on July 22, 2009, 11:21:12 PM
Quote from: Ratatosk on July 22, 2009, 09:46:24 PM
No one is saying that you NEED to, only that such a map or model is simply non-existent. You may want to read some Jean Baudrillard, I think he does a good job of covering the concept:
Not as detailed as his books, but here's a bit of his view: http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html (http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html)
It's going to take me a while to chew through that, but thanks for the link.
Keep in mind, Jean is arguing that the map has 'replaced' the territory in modern society... the simulation has replaced the actual. However, his argument works well to flesh out the whole map/territory dichotomy.
Quote from: fictionpuss on July 22, 2009, 09:42:12 PM
I don't understand the absolutism. Why would you _need_ to describe it completely? If you _could_ describe it completely, what would that achieve?
You don't need to. Communication still functions even though descriptions are incomplete. The point is that language is innaccurate, yet most people treat it as "true". So, "the ___ which can be told is not the true ___."
QuoteWouldn't it be easier to say everything has a probability greater than zero, and less than one? Including our understanding of what each other means?
Why would that be easier?
QuoteQuote from: LMNO on July 22, 2009, 04:57:53 PM
Secondly, because we have posited that language is based on common experience, it is inadequate to describe a unique occurrence specifically experienced by only one person, such as an emotion, or an ecstatic experience. The only way to describe it is by using words and concepts that (by definition) do not communicate individual experience, only common. So in trying to communicate a unique experience, the instant we use words, we are not speaking about the true experience.
If you cannot be sure that you _know_ what the true experience is, then why does it matter? Isn't this entropy/selection?
Because, if people believe language to be true, then they will take the false description of the unique event as true.
QuoteI don't understand Gödels.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems
Simply put, a system cannot be both complete and consistent. In any consistent system, there will be truths that cannot be proven. See
Godel, Escher, Bach for more detail.
The passage is also a pun on the RAW story about the woman who believed the world was resting on the back of a turtle, which was on the back of another turtle, and then it was "turtles, all the way down".
Gödels - turtles.
Quote from: LMNO on July 23, 2009, 02:24:00 PM
Quote from: fictionpuss on July 22, 2009, 09:42:12 PM
I don't understand the absolutism. Why would you _need_ to describe it completely? If you _could_ describe it completely, what would that achieve?
You don't need to. Communication still functions even though descriptions are incomplete. The point is that language is innaccurate, yet most people treat it as "true". So, "the ___ which can be told is not the true ___."
If the sender never knows the degree of accuracy of any element of information before they communicate it, what more does it tell us that the receiver may not be able to translate it to the same degree of accuracy as the receiver beheld?
Quote from: LMNO on July 23, 2009, 02:24:00 PM
QuoteWouldn't it be easier to say everything has a probability greater than zero, and less than one? Including our understanding of what each other means?
Why would that be easier?
Because it sounds to me that it would be easier to remember - nothing being absolutely true, nor absolutely false is kinda catchy and long explanations tend to get lost in translation. It also applies to itself, and avoids the problems of infinite recursion.
Quote from: LMNO on July 23, 2009, 02:24:00 PM
QuoteQuote from: LMNO on July 22, 2009, 04:57:53 PM
Secondly, because we have posited that language is based on common experience, it is inadequate to describe a unique occurrence specifically experienced by only one person, such as an emotion, or an ecstatic experience. The only way to describe it is by using words and concepts that (by definition) do not communicate individual experience, only common. So in trying to communicate a unique experience, the instant we use words, we are not speaking about the true experience.
If you cannot be sure that you _know_ what the true experience is, then why does it matter? Isn't this entropy/selection?
Because, if people believe language to be true, then they will take the false description of the unique event as true.
If that person takes nothing as being absolute (true or false), then they can't fall into that trap. Let them test for themselves whether anything is absolutely true or absolutely false. Low probability is not equal to zero probability.
Quote from: LMNO on July 23, 2009, 02:24:00 PM
QuoteI don't understand Gödels.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems
Simply put, a system cannot be both complete and consistent. In any consistent system, there will be truths that cannot be proven. See Godel, Escher, Bach for more detail.
Thanks for the link, I took some time out today to work through it. I tried rewriting it in E-Prime, but it started to fall apart.
I have a shitty theorem of my own in response: You are one human. You take a shit. There's now one human and one shit where before there was only one human. Where did the shit come from? Are you any less of a human? No - you are still one human. The opposite seems true - if you didn't ever shit, you would be less of a human. Natural numbers are shit, and as far as the observable universe seems to be concerned, non-existent.
So I still don't see how Godel applies :-/
The inability to determine absolutes is not an inability to determine relative truths. In terms of "______ that can be told is not the true _______", then what does it matter? If the nearest we can get to a truth is to say that every definition in our universe can be categorised somewhere between "almost certainly not" and "almost certain", then what's the harm with running with that?
This originally (http://www.principiadiscordia.com/forum/index.php?topic=21595.msg730185#msg730185) came about in the context of mapping out mindfucks - weak mindfucks leading to the ability to be mindfucked by the next level of mindfucks and so on, continuing in greater levels of sophistication. If I'm still totally off-base then if you could explain it in terms of why the mindfuck map idea wouldn't work, then I might understand it more quickly.
But we aren't. And we can't. The Ultimate, whatever you may call it, is such because it is largely unknowable. If you believe in ultimates anyway. You can talk about it somewhat but ultimately (hehe) you must understand your words fall far short of real description. Symbols will never be completely adequate, and for something as near to unknowable as what we may or may not be discussing symbols like words aren't really going to cover it.
Note, the verse continues after "the tao that can be spoken of"
It goes something like: when you allow it to be nameless, it is the root of existence, but often you have to talk about it to avoid barstools. It should be understood that what you're talking about isn't true reality, just your filtered approximation. (damn this sounds too much like platos cave; understanding again that there is no eidos removes us from that particular philosophical quandry)
Quote from: fictionpuss on July 24, 2009, 02:11:30 AM
Quote from: LMNO on July 23, 2009, 02:24:00 PM
QuoteWouldn't it be easier to say everything has a probability greater than zero, and less than one? Including our understanding of what each other means?
Why would that be easier?
Because it sounds to me that it would be easier to remember - nothing being absolutely true, nor absolutely false is kinda catchy and long explanations tend to get lost in translation. It also applies to itself, and avoids the problems of infinite recursion.
If you're trying to open this up to Maybe Logic, then I'm ok with that. However, the way you're approaching it is still two-sided: After all, 86% true is a lot different than 51% true. Simply saying "neither True nor False" offers no insight, and even less clarity.
Quote from: LMNO on July 24, 2009, 12:58:32 PM
Quote from: fictionpuss on July 24, 2009, 02:11:30 AM
Quote from: LMNO on July 23, 2009, 02:24:00 PM
QuoteWouldn't it be easier to say everything has a probability greater than zero, and less than one? Including our understanding of what each other means?
Why would that be easier?
Because it sounds to me that it would be easier to remember - nothing being absolutely true, nor absolutely false is kinda catchy and long explanations tend to get lost in translation. It also applies to itself, and avoids the problems of infinite recursion.
If you're trying to open this up to Maybe Logic, then I'm ok with that. However, the way you're approaching it is still two-sided: After all, 86% true is a lot different than 51% true. Simply saying "neither True nor False" offers no insight, and even less clarity.
Ah - it has a name! I agree, but you do present a strawman. I think there's a lot you can do when you start mapping out "truths" relative to each other with no absolutes, not least because then you start invoking an Emergent process - and if Godel is right, then the "truth" of that process is not describable in our system of truths where we can perceive no absolutes directly.
No, godel would say that there are some "truths" that cannot be determined by the system. However, since Maybe Logic is a philosophy rather than an equation, Godel does not apply.
I'm happy if Godel doesn't apply, I brought it up because it does seem to match our expectations of what the participants of an Emergent process could or couldn't observe. If Maybe Logic is limited to philosophy then I'll back away from that connection - it seems to me that if you believe X is ~81% "true" with regards Z, and Y is ~56% "true" with regards Z, then there are statistical functions you can apply to make decisions when your entire probability scale is determined relativistically?
I'm not the Emergence scholar here, so I can't comment on that.
However, I can say that Z = "the current mix of information and ignorance that I am currently provided with."
I'm sure you can work out some sort of math, but ultimately, it doesn't matter. Maybe Logic is just another model... It's a way of saying "this is more true than that". The percentages are just a way of showing the gradual nature of truth in the system.
Any time you can evoke Emergence, the "truth" becomes the system, unrelated to the various "truth" states/predictions of the components. Since Emergence can be thought of as a metaforce which transcends domains, then the study of Emergence may be the closest we can get to a "first principle" truth. It doesn't directly contradict "the ___ which can be spoken is not the true ___", as there still remains no way (from within the system) to know the greater "truth" of the past, nor predict future events with absolute accuracy.
But to say that it doesn't matter is a tautological argument which doesn't seem to get us anywhere. My interpretation of Emergence may be tautological too, but you can derive a testable hypothesis from it, and stand to benefit as long as it holds true.
I'll let Kai kick me if I'm shitting all over the theory.
Again, I can't speak to emergence, but I can point to an old thread that might clarify my main points.
In this dialogue, JPF is "Jean Paul Fartres" and ME is, well, me.
QuoteJPF: To return to the original topic of conversation, EP/ML seems to gives us the best possible platform to move forward logically, but does that result in knowledge becoming a probability?
ME: Yes. Knowledge appears to be an evolving thing, and can often be hinged upon a frame of reference of a window of time. While I "know" that my pen will fall "down" if I drop it, there is a very small chance it won't, for various reasons. While the percentage of that happening is infinitesimal, it still precludes my knowledge from being 100% sure. But for me, it's close enough that I don't worry about it. I feel that nothing can be known 100%, and that's a good thing to me.
JPF: Truth as only a possibility?... and if that's so, then wouldn't the original assumption seem a possibility?
ME: Yes. Maybe Logic/E-Prime (ML/EP) are simply game rules that we have arbitrarily assumed. (Side note: even the phrase "original assumption" implies a less-than-100% level of assuredness to begin with). Those that find it useful, use it. Some have decided that, for now, it's the best set of game rules to use. If a better one comes along, the chances are good that ML/EP will be abandoned in favor of the new rules. ML/EP shouldn't be thought of as "the" answer, just a set of beneficial rules.
JPF: Doesn't it erode any ultimate basis for subscribing to EP/ML since probability encompasses all probabilities?
ME: Are you trying to do a George Bernard Shaw-style paradox? Because it's not working.
JPF: The benefit of EP/ML is only a possibility. Why do we have greater confidence in EP/ML?
ME: Because when using ML/EP, the level of opinion and prejudice is made more apparent. ML/EP shows the degree of bias in the system. This leads to greater clarity, though (of course), not 100%.
JPF: To what degree is our confidence greater in it than our confidence in other possibilities. Using ML, what convinces us that ML is true(r)?
ME: There is no "truth" in ML/EP. As said before, they are merely game rules.
JPF: In short can EP/ML convince us of any truth, itself included?
ME: No, because that is not its intended purpose.
Essentially, you seem to be trying to fold ML in on itself and make it implode, but ML easily encompasses itself in a very clear manner.
In addition, you seem to be saying that if we can't get to 100% truth, then its Hassan I Sabbah (misquoted) time: "Nothing is true, everything is permitted."
But that's not what ML does. You seem to be using polar thinking on ML, "true/false", where ML behaves more like, "not true/kinda true/more true than that/pretty awfully convinced that this is most likely true".
Just because probably nothing can be 100% true doesn't mean that everything is false (unless you ask a Buddhist).
JPF: As far as possibilities are concerned, do you think that there are ways to deduce what degree of probability can be associated with any idea?
ME: So, you're looking for a mathematical equation that will give you an exact percentage? I'm not sure there's a catch-all formula, but if you really wanted to look, I'd suggest quantum physics as a start.
JPF: Does everything end up having an equal possibility of occurring or is there still a difference in possibilities?
What I mean is: your pen is dropping. There's an infinitesimal chance of it becoming a brown dwarf and a more likely chance of it hitting the ground. Can you measure that still? Can you say that hitting the ground has a greater chance of happening than brown dwarf-morph? If so, how do you measure that with ML?
ME: Remember, these are game rules, and therefore, arbitrary. Yes, you probably can measure the probability of pen-to-brown dwarf, but I don't get that picky. I just say, "not fucking likely", and carry on with my day. Not to mention, if that did happen, knowing how improbable it was will be the least of my worries.
JPF: "not true/kinda true/more true than that/pretty awfully convinced that this is most likely true"
-- Can we provide percentages or is thaat impossible?
ME: You can, if you'd like. I'm more subjective. The point is that it's not a "yes/no" dichotomy; it's a "more than/less than" evaluation.
JPF: I guess what I want to know is: if every possible scenario is still a possibility, does that mean that 100% chance (of something happening and something not happening) is divided infinitely?
ME: I don't see why not. But much like in physics, you'll get a large chunk of the 100% divided among a handful of things, and an extremely small fraction of a percent taken up by everything else.
JPF: I was asking specifically ABOUT the more/less thing and your last paragraph answered my question.
Finally.
ME: Wait, your whole point was whether or not a system of game rules that subjectively applies percentages of truth can be divided infinitely?
Wow, that was really stupid.
...And that, my friends, is how these sorts of things usually end.
Knowing only one weighted neuron in a network can tell you nothing about the result, it's the interactions and mapping of multiple neurons which are weighted relative to each other that produces a truth/result greater than the "comprehension" of the individual neurons.
I'm sure you think you're making a point, but I have to be honest, I'm not seeing it.
Quote from: LMNO on July 23, 2009, 02:24:00 PM
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems
Simply put, a system cannot be both complete and consistent. In any consistent system, there will be truths that cannot be proven. See Godel, Escher, Bach for more detail.
I never got why thats supposed to be insightful. We *made* the systems, they are 100% made up from human imagination. Usually they try to match the world we live in, because that makes them useful, but they don't have to. Those unprovable bits are the basic building blocks of the system. It's like an architect getting excited by realizing that you can't make wood and have to get it from somewhere.
Far more interesting is the idea that its possible to have a completely proven (if inconsistent) system at all.
no that stuff would be the axioms of a system, Gödel talks about theorems.
the difference is that axioms are given as the basic building blocks of a formal system, and are asserted as True. like wood, in your example.
the unprovable theorems can be stated, but their truth value can never be determined or proven. like uhm ... i dunno what the architectural equivalent of this would be. some kind of paradox thing.
Because, thanks to the influence of Plato, everyone thought they were making use of a most excellent mental faculty (ie reason) to discover the underlying, inbuilt laws of the Universe which are both Really Real, 100% discoverable and entirely comprehendable by a person of a certain amount of intellect.
I thought the unprovable theorems thing was Turing?
Quote from: Requia ☣ on July 24, 2009, 08:09:55 PM
I thought the unprovable theorems thing was Turing?
nope Turing was the undecidable problems ..
...
:lol:
undecidable problems, unprovable theorems, whatever this is cracking me up.
lemme help you out, these things are about formal mathematics. if there's any way to draw an analogy with reality, it's not been mentioned in this thread so far.
they're good fun proofs and if you read them and can grok the mathematical rigour, provide an excellent mindfuck, and in that way they are useful for taking a good look around in your cage (happened to me), got me started on a long journey, eventually took me to discordia, but by now I know they're not exactly suitable for drawing conclusions about reality.
they are useful, but as far as I know only as important fundamentals in formal mathematics and computer science. building blocks in order to derive other more useful and practical proofs from. and very important in that they show there are hard limits to what mathematics can do. and that is awesome.
Definitely awesome, but if Godel et al are not that useful for drawing conclusions about reality, then what relation do they have to First Principles?
That First Principles don't exist, basically.
Quote from: LMNO on July 24, 2009, 10:28:18 PM
That First Principles don't exist, basically.
(http://i1008.photobucket.com/albums/af205/spiff_bucket/exploding-head.gif)
H, come on, you MUST have seen that coming.
There is no spoon.
You must slurp your soup directly from the bowl.
Quote from: Cain on July 25, 2009, 03:33:56 PM
There is no spoon.
You must slurp your soup directly from the bowl.
:mittens:
Quote from: LMNO on July 24, 2009, 10:28:18 PM
That First Principles don't exist, basically.
Or we just made them up.
Quote from: Requia ☣ on July 26, 2009, 08:14:35 AM
Or we just made them up.
But who made them up
first?
LMNO your first post quoted a piece from the Chao Te Ching and it struck me that I hadn't been following its progress as well as I should. So I Googled it and after a couple hits on the magnum opus was an obit for
Edward Ching-Te Chao. I love serendipitous finds and as the headline was Edward Chao Rock star of Geology read it http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/08/AR2008020803834.html
theres a nice quote that seems relevant to some of the recent discussions on the forum
QuoteMore of a practical scientist than a theorist, Dr. Chao was known for his field work and meticulous collection of evidence and documentation.
"I've been involved in controversial studies during my whole career," Dr. Chao told the Reston Times newspaper in 1992 after an asteroid was named for him. "People don't believe, but you do your hard work. It takes time to gradually convince them. You always have to find new, better evidence."
I'd saint him just over his name, but he actually sounds dreadfully boring.
Still, whatever, sainted.
"St. Chao?"
"St. Dr. (!!) Chao!!!"
Heh.
For a more direct link, it's still in progress at: http://www.principiadiscordia.com/cramulus/index.php?title=Sacred_Chao_Te_Ching
Quote from: LMNO on July 28, 2009, 02:07:08 PM
Heh.
For a more direct link, it's still in progress at: http://www.principiadiscordia.com/cramulus/index.php?title=Sacred_Chao_Te_Ching
Cool Thanks
Quote from: RainbowLeigh on July 28, 2009, 02:03:20 PM
I'd saint him just over his name, but he actually sounds dreadfully boring.
Boring? The field holds no real interest to me personally, but the way he went about it suggests a touch of class - evidence before ego:
Quote
Goresy, who was at the lecture in which Dr. Chao reported that the Ries Crater, thought to be volcanic, was born 15 million years ago when a meteor struck the Earth. "It was, in fact, a shock for all of us," Goresy said. "I still remember . . . a German scientist stood up and said: 'I have been working on Ries my entire career, for 30 years, and have turned over every rock. Here comes an American who's been there two days.' . . . [Dr. Chao] said 'Here is the evidence.' "
Okay, fair enough, I can see a golden apple when I read it. But he's already a saint, and I'm not about to canonize him again!
Quote from: Ratatosk on July 23, 2009, 01:38:40 PM
Quote from: fictionpuss on July 22, 2009, 11:21:12 PM
Quote from: Ratatosk on July 22, 2009, 09:46:24 PM
No one is saying that you NEED to, only that such a map or model is simply non-existent. You may want to read some Jean Baudrillard, I think he does a good job of covering the concept:
Not as detailed as his books, but here's a bit of his view: http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html (http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html)
It's going to take me a while to chew through that, but thanks for the link.
Keep in mind, Jean is arguing that the map has 'replaced' the territory in modern society... the simulation has replaced the actual. However, his argument works well to flesh out the whole map/territory dichotomy.
This has been a firefox tab I've come back to every few days since. I have to confess that I can't get that far into it. To me he comes across as a bit of a one-handed writer, and I can't follow the logical steps because to do so requires setting aside any pretence at requiring first principles and instead embarking on a journey of logical leaps which I can only assume is self-referential in conclusion. If his writing is itself supposed to be a simulacrum, then how is that different from any other cleverly constructed tautology?
Sorry - I tried and failed!