So what's shaking in Islamabad?

[Cain]

Can't believe I'm the only one to have noticed a potentially massive shift in Pakistani strategy, but maybe I have.

First thing is first: Rigi, the ISI asset, Taliban trained leader of the Jundullah terrorist group, is caught under mysterious circumstances and bundled off to Tehran for infinite rounds of "answer the question or get a red hot iron up your rectum".  That the Iranians knew the passport he was flying on (a passport allegedly given to him by either American officials in Afghanistan or corrupt Afghani officials) makes it even more likely that someone grassed on him.

Then, Pakistan catches half the Quetta Shura, the command cell for the Afghani Taliban, in under a week. 

Then, Pakistan's top military officer says he has no qualms about India helping out in Afghanistan, so long as Kabul doesn't gravitate towards New Delhi, and issues a not very thinly veiled threat to the Taliban that Pakistan is going to shop around for new clients in the region if they don't start jumping when the High Command says "jump".

And all this happens in the space of four days.  It's like some bizarre outbreak of regional cooperation against dipshits is going down.

[Bebek Sincap Ratatosk]

I heard a discussion on NPR with some 'expert' (can't remember title). He claimed that Kabul and the Taliban were in talks to negotiate some kind of end to this mess. This guy held that Pakistan reacted by capturing these guys to ensure that they get a seat at the negotiations.

He also pointed out that the 'seconds' that may replace the high command are far more extreme in their views and would be unlikely to negotiate.

Dunno if its true...

[Cain]

It's often the case the second-tier management are truly evil fucks.  In fact, they're often picked for exactly that purpose (leaders have to keep their hands relatively clean, whereas these guys often enforce).  That could suggest the Pakistani Army and ISI are double-dealing here, taking out dead wood and keeping the insurgency all fired up.

On the other hand, second-tier extremists often make foolish mistakes.  Look at Zaqawi in Iraq, he was so extreme he turned his own Sunni allies against him.  Fundamentalist intolerance could crack the Neo-Taliban down the lines (since it is a composite group of drug traffickers, Pashto nationalists, smugglers, family-based militant cells and fundamentalist extremists) and force more moderate elements to switch sides, rather like the Anbar tribes did.

Of course though, I wouldn't expect the Pakistani Army to do something which couldn't be read in several dozen different ways.  They're too good at this game for that.