Alfred W McCoy on American hegemonic collapse

[Cain]

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LL07Ak01.html

A soft landing for America 40 years from now? Don't bet on it. The demise of the United States as the global superpower could come far more quickly than anyone imagines. If Washington is dreaming of 2040 or 2050 as the end of the American Century, a more realistic assessment of domestic and global trends suggests that in 2025, just 15 years from now, it could all be over except for the shouting.

Despite the aura of omnipotence most empires project, a look at their history should remind us that they are fragile organisms. So delicate is their ecology of power that, when things start to go truly bad, empires regularly unravel with unholy speed: just a year for Portugal, two years for the Soviet Union, eight years for France, 11 years for the Ottomans, 17 years for Great Britain, and, in all likelihood, 22 years for the United States, counting from the crucial year 2003.

Future historians are likely to identify the George W Bush administration's rash invasion of Iraq in that year as the start of America's downfall. However, instead of the bloodshed that marked the end of so many past empires, with cities burning and civilians slaughtered, this 21st century imperial collapse could come relatively quietly through the invisible tendrils of economic collapse or cyberwarfare.

But have no doubt: when Washington's global dominion finally ends, there will be painful daily reminders of what such a loss of power means for Americans in every walk of life. As a half-dozen European nations have discovered, imperial decline tends to have a remarkably demoralizing impact on a society, regularly bringing at least a generation of economic privation. As the economy cools, political temperatures rise, often sparking serious domestic unrest.

Available economic, educational, and military data indicate that, when it comes to US global power, negative trends will aggregate rapidly by 2020 and are likely to reach a critical mass no later than 2030. The American Century, proclaimed so triumphantly at the start of World War II, will be tattered and fading by 2025, its eighth decade, and could be history by 2030.

Significantly, in 2008, the US National Intelligence Council admitted for the first time that America's global power was indeed on a declining trajectory. In one of its periodic futuristic reports, Global Trends 2025, the Council cited "the transfer of global wealth and economic power now under way, roughly from West to East" and "without precedent in modern history," as the primary factor in the decline of the "United States' relative strength - even in the military realm." Like many in Washington, however, the Council's analysts anticipated a very long, very soft landing for American global preeminence, and harbored the hope that somehow the US would long "retain unique military capabilities... to project military power globally" for decades to come.

No such luck. Under current projections, the United States will find itself in second place behind China (already the world's second largest economy) in economic output around 2026, and behind India by 2050. Similarly, Chinese innovation is on a trajectory toward world leadership in applied science and military technology sometime between 2020 and 2030, just as America's current supply of brilliant scientists and engineers retires, without adequate replacement by an ill-educated younger generation.

By 2020, according to current plans, the Pentagon will throw a military Hail Mary pass for a dying empire. It will launch a lethal triple canopy of advanced aerospace robotics that represents Washington's last best hope of retaining global power despite its waning economic influence. By that year, however, China's global network of communications satellites, backed by the world's most powerful supercomputers, will also be fully operational, providing Beijing with an independent platform for the weaponization of space and a powerful communications system for missile- or cyber-strikes into every quadrant of the globe.

Wrapped in imperial hubris, like Whitehall or Quai d'Orsay before it, the White House still seems to imagine that American decline will be gradual, gentle, and partial. In his State of the Union address last January, President Barack Obama offered the reassurance that "I do not accept second place for the United States of America." A few days later, Vice President Joseph Biden ridiculed the very idea that "we are destined to fulfill [historian Paul] Kennedy's prophecy that we are going to be a great nation that has failed because we lost control of our economy and overextended". Similarly, writing in the November issue of the establishment journal Foreign Affairs, neo-liberal foreign policy guru Joseph Nye waved away talk of China's economic and military rise, dismissing "misleading metaphors of organic decline" and denying that any deterioration in US global power was underway.

Ordinary Americans, watching their jobs head overseas, have a more realistic view than their cosseted leaders. An opinion poll in August 2010 found that 65% of Americans believed the country was now "in a state of decline." Already, Australia and Turkey, traditional US military allies, are using their American-manufactured weapons for joint air and naval maneuvers with China. Already, America's closest economic partners are backing away from Washington's opposition to China's rigged currency rates. As the president flew back from his Asian tour last month, a gloomy New York Times headline summed the moment up this way: "Obama's Economic View Is Rejected on World Stage, China, Britain and Germany Challenge US, Trade Talks With Seoul Fail, Too."

Viewed historically, the question is not whether the United States will lose its unchallenged global power, but just how precipitous and wrenching the decline will be. In place of Washington's wishful thinking, let's use the National Intelligence Council's own futuristic methodology to suggest four realistic scenarios for how, whether with a bang or a whimper, US global power could reach its end in the 2020s (along with four accompanying assessments of just where we are today). The future scenarios include: economic decline, oil shock, military misadventure, and World War III. While these are hardly the only possibilities when it comes to American decline or even collapse, they offer a window into an onrushing future.

I'm always suspicious of long-term geopolitical forecasting (it should be recalled that the only major international player to correctly predict the Soviet collapse was a major oil company, not historians, international relations experts or intelligence agencies) but there are some definite truths in this.   The coming geopolitical order is going to be much easier on China than the USA, and if the trends continue as predicted, the USA is going to be struggling to compete to keep up technologically and economically.

That doesn't mean an end for the USA - the Soviet Union suffered a truly horrific economic collapse, and twenty years later Russia is still a great, if somewhat struggling power.  It does mean, however, that the US will not continue to have many of its current advantages, such as global military basing, preferred entry into foreign economies, a deciding vote in most international bodies etc.  It will still retain some truly potent offensive military capabilities, and of course the benefits of having two friendly neighbours and two oceans for defense....but it wont be a leading power any more.

In theory.  If this pans out.  China, and to an extent France, have agititated for a while for a more multipolar world order, in both cases to pave the way for EU or Chinese dominance of the world-system, but the EU is looking a very shaky proposition at the moment, and either way will be in thrall to Russian energy supplies in the future (Germany in particular, it seems, is vulnerable to Russian political pressure, and Germany is the second major player in the EU besides France).  Of course, China has its own problems too, environmental degredation, corruption, authoritarianism, virulent nationalism....and these may impact on its ability to outperform the United States.  But it would take a China expert to say whether or not that would negatively impact within such a short time frame.

[Nephew Twiddleton]

I suppose one of the benefits of loss of hegemony would be that there would be less reason to attack us and be proxy less reason for the government to be overly intrusive.

[Cain]

Perhaps.  But that may be offset by societal violence, much as in Russia, sepratist movements arose in Chechnya, Dagestan etc

I wouldn't expect that kind of terrorism in the USA.  But the southern border would likely get interesting, as funding for border patrols dried up and the border guards became more receptive to taking bribes from Mexican cartels.

Both Dmitri Orlov and farFAL have also made the point that in the case of economic collapse or dislocation, local violent crime will certainly increase.  Lots more private security (though likely not enough to absorb all the returning soldiers and spies), lots more gated communities and lots more murder, muggings and robberies outside of the gates.  And that may keep the demand for "security Keynesianism" quite high.

[Nephew Twiddleton]

Perhaps.  But that may be offset by societal violence, much as in Russia, sepratist movements arose in Chechnya, Dagestan etc

I wouldn't expect that kind of terrorism in the USA.  But the southern border would likely get interesting, as funding for border patrols dried up and the border guards became more receptive to taking bribes from Mexican cartels.

Both Dmitri Orlov and farFAL have also made the point that in the case of economic collapse or dislocation, local violent crime will certainly increase.  Lots more private security (though likely not enough to absorb all the returning soldiers and spies), lots more gated communities and lots more murder, muggings and robberies outside of the gates.  And that may keep the demand for "security Keynesianism" quite high.

Hopefully I'll be able to afford gates in 15 years then. Or to move elsewhere.

[Cain]

Yeah.

Just to point out though, I do dislike this kind of forecasting, as it is very easy to be wrong, and no shortage of doomsayers, even when they are respected historians.  The future is very hard to predict, or else billions wouldn't be spent on trying to do it all the time.  The trends suggest an overall decline.  But there are many factors to take into account, such as lithium, cobalt-improved nuclear warheads, the effect of the economic crisis on China etc which have not necessarily been given full attention. 

It's just worth noting the international situation for the USA looks a lot more bleak than it did in 2000 or so.

[Nephew Twiddleton]

Yeah.

Just to point out though, I do dislike this kind of forecasting, as it is very easy to be wrong, and no shortage of doomsayers, even when they are respected historians.  The future is very hard to predict, or else billions wouldn't be spent on trying to do it all the time.  The trends suggest an overall decline.  But there are many factors to take into account, such as lithium, cobalt-improved nuclear warheads, the effect of the economic crisis on China etc which have not necessarily been given full attention. 

It's just worth noting the international situation for the USA looks a lot more bleak than it did in 2000 or so.

Naturally. And you're right, it's hard to keep track of all possible factors and figure out which outcome is more likely. It will be an interesting next couple of years anyway. I think that I remember back in the late 80s it was expected that Japan was going to be the dominant economic power, and that has yet to occur.

[Precious Moments Zalgo]

What is China doing with its $2.5 trillion or so in dollar reserves?  Is it just sitting in treasury bills?  If I were in charge of managing that money for China, I would be using it to quietly buy up farmland, forests, rivers, mines, and oil and gas fields in the US, and buying up controlling interests, or at least substantial interests, in US companies in the energy, defense, and other key industries.  What else are those dollars good for?  We don't manufacture anything they need.

[Adios]

Hasn't the U.S. already lost a lot of influence world wide?

[Nephew Twiddleton]

Hasn't the U.S. already lost a lot of influence world wide?

Respect and political influence yes, but we still have the firepower, as it were.

I suppose it depends on whether foreigners define us as our government or our voting population.  

[Cain]

Like Robert Gates said "other countries don't have to like us...given our position in the world they have no choice but to do business with us".  For now, anyway.  European countries kicked up a stink about the Iraq War, but NATO locks them into military alliance with the UK-USA - who have the largest military share of the group. Most countries in the Middle East are American allies...on paper and when they cannot avoid being otherwise, at least.  India is playing ball.  China...I've already discussed elsewhere.  Russia is a tricky one, but always has been.  Japan is on board.  Africa is a trickier one, as is South America...but even if they're not overly enthusiastic, they're doing business.  Central Asia, well that varies, but it is the heart of the Great Game, so it naturally would.

[Adios]

All stick and no carrot is not good business. Other nations will only tolerate this for so long, IMO. NATO has been on shaky ground before and this could lead there yet again. If, big if, NATO is rendered useless then the world political shift would be like watching a speed chess game.

[The Good Reverend Roger]

All stick and no carrot is not good business.

This applies at all levels of society.

[Adios]

All stick and no carrot is not good business.

This applies at all levels of society.

Missed your call yet again, dammit.

[The Good Reverend Roger]

All stick and no carrot is not good business.

This applies at all levels of society.

Missed your call yet again, dammit.

Happens.  It was nothing important...I was just bored while driving through the desert.

[Cain]

All stick and no carrot is not good business. Other nations will only tolerate this for so long, IMO. NATO has been on shaky ground before and this could lead there yet again. If, big if, NATO is rendered useless then the world political shift would be like watching a speed chess game.

It's not all stick though.  Europe can afford more governmental spending on other areas due to an American military presence here, for just one example.  America and the EU cooperate on global financial structuring via the IMF and World Bank, instituting policies which are profitable both for European and American businesses.  Similar deals can be found in other places.