NATO for reactionary dictators

[Cain]

Holy shit, it's like if every radical criticism of NATO were true

The shiny new and enlarged Gulf Cooperation Group:

There has been widespread disbelief and a lot of jokes since the news broke of the invitations to Jordan and Morocco. It isn't only that Jordan and Morocco are rather conspicuously not in the Gulf.  It's also that they don't fit the profile of rich petro-states which has defined the identity of the GCC. If they actually do become members  -- which is far from a certainty, given the wide gap between an invitation to apply and acceptance -- it would profoundly change the character of the organization.  Jordan and Morocco have virtually nothing in common economically, culturally, or (of course) geographically with the GCC states.  They have different security challenges, different demographics, and different domestic problems.  Their inclusion would significantly erode the major commonalities which kept the GCC together over the years.

The two things which Jordan and Morocco do have in common with the GCC states, of course, are a Sunni monarchy and a pro-Western alignment. The creation of a Sunni King's club would bring the region back even more viscerally than before into the classical Arab Cold War of the 1950s and 1960, when conservative monarchies faced off against pan-Arabist republics.  Neither Jordan nor Morocco really faces the same sectarian Sunni-Shi'a issues as do most of the Gulf states, however, despite King Abdullah of Jordan's "Shi'a Crescent" ramblings of the mid-2000s and his enthusiasm to be part of any pro-U.S. and anti-Iranian alliance available.  Iran simply doesn't loom as large for Morocco as it does for, say, Bahrain or Saudi Arabia.  The real point here would seem to be a promise of GCC, or more specifically Saudi, assistance to those non-Gulf monarchies in order to prevent them from going too far in meeting popular demands for reform.  Such a Sunni King's Club would be a counter-revolutionary institution, one which would work directly against hopes for change in the Arab world.  

The exclusions are in many ways more important than the inclusions.  Yemen has been left standing at the doorstep of the GCC for many years, despite the advantage of actually being a Gulf state. The GCC initiative to transition Ali Abdullah Saleh from power has stalled, and most Yemenis seem to be pretty suspicious of Saudi intentions in that regard anyway.  It isn't clear whether a post-Saleh Yemen would be considered for an expanded GCC, but it doesn't seem likely.

The two more important exclusions are Iraq and Egypt.  Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq has been mooted as a possible candidate for inclusion in the GCC.  It's a wealthy oil producer in the Gulf region, so there is a surface plausibility.  GCC membership, by this argument, might embed Iraq in an institutional structure which firmly rooted it in a pro-U.S. and anti-Iranian camp, while dramatically increasing the size and power of the GCC alliance.  But its exclusion from this round isn't that surprising.  The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, remain deeply hostile towards and suspicious of the Shi'a dominated Iraqi government in general and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki specifically.  They have never been comfortable with its new democratic forms.  And an Iraq inside the GCC would pose a real challenge to Saudi expectations of dominating the alliance.  So the GCC not inviting Iraq to apply is hardly a surprise -- but not inviting it while inviting other, less plausible, candidates will only further drive a wedge between Baghdad and the Arab Gulf states with potentially dangerous results.

And then there's Egypt. Saudi anger at the fall of Hosni Mubarak has been palpable. It has clearly been furious over the new Egypt's softer line on Iran, and high-level Saudis were conspicuously absent from the Hamas-Fatah signing ceremony in Cairo.  Obviously, there is no rational economic or cultural reason to invite Egypt to join the GCC.... but neither is there any such logic to inviting Jordan and Morocco.  The exclusion feels pointed and direct: the new revolutionary Egypt is not part of the Sunni King's Club, while the expanded GCC will directly compete with the Arab League even if it gets a new Egyptian Secretary-General. This is a dangerous message at a time when Egypt's foreign policy orientation is very much a work in progress.  The new Egypt is likely to be far more responsive to public opinion, as has already been evident in its decisions to open the border with Gaza and broker Palestinian reconicilation.  If it comes to identify Saudi Arabia as an adversary, rather than as a slightly less close ally, then this will have major repercussions for regional politics and for the U.S. alliance structure.

It is far too soon to expect anything tangible to emerge from this proposed GCC expansion. It may very well go the way of other short-lived alliances -- remember the Damascus Declaration?  And it is hard to see how Jordan or Morocco would fit into any kind of economic integration schemes such as those the GCC has intermittently discussed.  But as a signal of emerging trends in regional politics, even the declaration of intent is quite significant.  It could push Iraq and Egypt in other directions. It could intensify the lines of regional conflict both between revolution and counter-revolution, and between Sunni and Shi'a, while inhibiting serious efforts at reform which might ameliorate either.  And it could put the new GCC, particularly Saudi Arabia, into ever more open conflict with the United States over the future of Arab reforms and priorities.  

Why does this remind me of The League of the Three Emperors?

In its first incarnation, the League directly opposed the expansion of French power and Napoleon III's inclination to fodder self-determination movements, thus threatening the established monarchical order in each of their countries.  Despite German victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the violence remained fresh in the newly united state's memory and made Germany reluctant to antagonize the French, but keen as ever to limit their power. According to the coalition, radical socialist bodies like the First International represented one of the other key threats to regional stability and dominance. For this reason, the League actively opposed the expansion of their influence.

Or indeed, the Holy Alliance?

Ostensibly it was to instill the Christian values of charity and peace in European political life, but in practice Klemens Wenzel von Metternich made it a bastion against revolution. The monarchs of the three countries involved used this to band together in order to prevent revolutionary influence (especially from the French Revolution) from entering these nations. It was against democracy, revolution, and secularism.

[Precious Moments Zalgo]

This seems to be rather blatant.

I read up on the Gulf Cooperation Council on wiki, and a link there led to the article about the Peninsula Shield Force (the military arm of the GCC), which quoted the PFS commander as saying that the role of the occupying PFS force in Bahrain was "to bring goodness, peace, and love".  

[Cain]

Oh dear.

Incidentally, look who is training the Saudi National Guard:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/28/uk-training-saudi-troops

Britain is training Saudi Arabia's national guard – the elite security force deployed during the recent protests in Bahrain – in public order enforcement measures and the use of sniper rifles. The revelation has outraged human rights groups, which point out that the Foreign Office recognises that the kingdom's human rights record is "a major concern".

In response to questions made under the Freedom of Information Act, the Ministry of Defence has confirmed that British personnel regularly run courses for the national guard in "weapons, fieldcraft and general military skills training, as well as incident handling, bomb disposal, search, public order and sniper training". The courses are organised through the British Military Mission to the Saudi Arabian National Guard, an obscure unit that consists of 11 British army personnel under the command of a brigadier.

The MoD response, obtained yesterday by the Observer, reveals that Britain sends up to 20 training teams to the kingdom a year. Saudi Arabia pays for "all BMM personnel, as well as support costs such as accommodation and transport".

[Adios]

Good grief. This has incredible potential as a real life parody of political protectionism.

[Cain]

UAE has hired Blackwater to form an 800 strong battalion of foreign fighters

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/uae-prince-hires-blackwater-founder-to-set-up-foreign-force/2011/05/15/AF7S9O4G_story.html

UAE, of course, is a charter member of the Gulf Cooperation Group.

[Adios]

UAE has hired Blackwater to form an 800 strong battalion of foreign fighters

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/uae-prince-hires-blackwater-founder-to-set-up-foreign-force/2011/05/15/AF7S9O4G_story.html

UAE, of course, is a charter member of the Gulf Cooperation Group.

Death, the number 1 export of the U.S.

[Jenne]

...interesting.  And this is the shit that is perpetuated by the "established" hegemonic powers-that-be in the US government with 1) denial by the GOP's voter base and 2) shamefaced shrugging apologies by the Dems.