Hobbes, Hegel, Nietzsche and Liberal Democracy

[Cain]

From The End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama, 1992):

Where Hobbes and Hegel differ fundamentally, however, and where the Anglo-Saxon tradition of liberalism takes its decisive turn, is in the relative moral weight assigned to the passions of pride and vanity (i.e., recognition) on the one hand, and the fear of violent death, on the other.  Hegel, as we have seen, believes that willingness to risk one's life in battle for pure prestige is in some sense what makes human beings human, the foundation of human freedom.  Hegel does not "approve", in the end, of the highly unequal relationship of master and slave, and knows full well it is primitive and oppressive.  He understands, however, that it is a necessary stage of human history in which both terms of the class equation, masters and slaves, preserve something importantly human.  The consciousness of the master is for him in a certain sense higher and more human than that of the slave, for by submitting to the fear of death, the slave does not succeed in rising above his animal nature, and therefore is less free than the master.  Hegel, in other words, finds something morally praiseworthy in the pride of the aristocrat-warrior who is willing to risk his life, and something ignoble in the slavish consciousness that seeks self-preservation above all else.
   
Hobbes, on the other hand, finds nothing whatsoever morally redeeming in the pride (or, more properly, vanity) of the aristocratic master: indeed, it is precisely this desire for recognition, this willingness to fight over a "trifle" like a medal or flag, that is the source of all violence and human misery in the state of nature.  For him, the strongest human passion is the fear of violent death, and the strongest moral imperative – the "law of nature" – is the preservation of one's own physical existence.  Self-preservation is the fundamental moral act: all concepts of justice and right for Hobbes are founded in the rational pursuit of self-preservation, while injustice and wrong are those things which lead to violence, war and death.
   
The centrality of fear of death is what leads Hobbes to the modern liberal state.  For in the state of nature, prior to the establishment of positive law and government, the "right of nature" for every man to preserve his own existence gives him the right to whatever means he judges necessary to accomplish that end, including violent ones.  Where men have no common master, the inevitable result is the anarchic war of all against all.  The cure for this anarchy is government, established on the basis of a social contract, under which all men agree to "lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself."  The only source of a state's legitimacy is its ability to protect and preserve those rights that individuals possess as human beings.  For Hobbes, the fundamental human right was the right to life, that is, to the preservation of every human being's physical existence, and the only legitimate government was one that could adequately preserve life and prevent a return to the war of all against all.
   
Peace and preservation of the right to life does not come cost-free, however.  Fundamental to Hobbes' social contract is an agreement that in return for the preservation of their physical existence, men will give up their unjust pride and vanity.  Hobbes demands, in other words, that men give up their struggle to be recognized, in particular their struggle to be recognized as superior on the basis of their willingness to risk their lives in a prestige battle.  The side of man that seeks to show himself superior to other men, to dominate them based on superior virtue, the noble character who struggles against his "human all too human" limitations, is to be persuaded of the folly of his pride.  The liberal tradition that springs from Hobbes therefore explicitly takes aim at those few who would seek to transcend their "animal" natures and constrains them in the name of a passion that constitutes mans lowest denominator – self-preservation.  Indeed, it is a denominator common not only to human beings, but to the "lower" animals as well.  Contrary to Hegel, Hobbes believes the desire for recognition and the noble contempt for "mere" life is not the beginning of man's freedom, but the source of his misery.  Hence the title of Hobbes' most famous book: explaining that "God having set forth the great power of Leviathan, called him King of the Proud", Hobbes compares his state to Leviathan because it is "King of all the children of pride."  The Leviathan does not satisfy that pride, but subdues it.

On the one hand, I find myself agreeing more with Hobbes that there is very little morally redeeming in the preening and strutting of warrior-aristocrats.  On the other, I find myself finding Hegel's overall thesis, of the history of humanity as being a search for a socio-political system that gives humanity the recognition they think they are due a lot more persuasive (though this could be a side-effect of spending a lot of time thinking about and reading the works of people who take their sense of pride and desire for recognition much more seriously than their lives).

The problem I have is this: Hegel's view is that this kind of recognition can be found, universally, in a sort of liberal corporatist state.  The Fukuyama - Kojeve interpretation of Hegel claims this is sense of recognition is found in liberal democracies.  And Marx, of course, claimed that instead this recognition would be found in communist societies.

History tends to show that all of them are wrong, as they were commonly practiced.  What's more, if one reads the work of Nietzsche, who was of course obsessed in his usual fashion with the master-slave dialectic, a rather depressing picture emerges.  Nietzsche would argue that thymos, the "spritedness" which leads humans into acts of violence against each other (where both participants face the possibility of death) in search of recognition, is fundamentally undermined through liberalism and democracy in general.  Instead, liberal societies are very good at churning out what we could nowadays consider thoroughly bourgeois individuals - people who care for nothing at all outside of their own material well being and self-preservation, who care nothing for the societies they live in so long as their potentially negative actions do not impact on their personal lives, wealth and continued existence.

Nietzsche, of course, called this kind of person the Last Man, the triumph of slavish morality.

Businessmen like to compare their industry with warfare, but in truth, economics is no substitute for conflict.  Especially in Hegel's schema.  Historically speaking, as well, societies that took warfare seriously, warrior-aristocrat upper classes frequently sneered at merchants and bankers.  And nowadays...well, the only people who think bankers and bond traders are virtuous are Ayn Rand tards, in other words people who want to become bankers and bond traders, or are already and want to delude themselves that their actions aren't just making them filthy rich, but are right and good actions.

If a society does not satisfy these thymotic needs of humanity, it cannot necessarily be posited as the End of History.  I am personally of the opinion that nothing can truly satisfy the desire for recognition, if one accepts Hegel's framing of the subject.  It is implicit in his argument that respect comes from having someone defeated, that there is a Master and a Slave.  The triumph of liberal democracy at the moment is due to two major factors - every other competitor in the 20th century imploded before it did (absolute monarchies, fascism, right-wing authoritarianism and communism) and because the major remaining power, the United States, is (incoherently) devoted to the ideal.  It is a form of international signalling - movements and rebels will claim to be democratic much in the way they used to claim to be socialist, in order to secure the support of the remaining superpower.

But that superpower is now on a relative decline.  The USA will likely remain first among equals for the rest of my lifetime, assuming some nuclear accident doesn't instigate a planetary conflict that wipes out all life first (and if we continue on our current path, that is a mathematical certainty), but that is a much different state of affairs to the hyperpower rhetoric of the 1990s and early 2000s.  China and Russia are on the rise again, as are India and Brazil.  While there is a level of popular consensus for government in China and Russia, they are not what we would commonly call democratic.  So far, neither China nor Russia has shown much interest in acting internationally to topple governments, so claiming some kind of ideological affinity with them with not necessarily secure their support in the same way it seems to with the USA.

But that state of affairs may not necessarily last.

Furthermore, technological change could lead to new forms of government being proposed.  I cannot forsee how these would work, but it is a possibility that cannot be ruled out.  After all, the totalitarian states of the 20th century were simply impossible in an earlier age - it took industrialization and advances in communication technology to make such states even possible.  Similar changes may equally happen with new breakthroughs, especially those with post-human connotations, which could fundamentally alter the "natural" or evolutionary patterns of behaviour that humankind engages in.

In short, I would not personally place any bets on a future that sees the majority of the planet as liberal democratic, as we currently understand it (plutonomic corporatist, actually, but that is a different argument).

[Scribbly]

Interesting analysis, and I'd have to agree... I think that there is definitely something to the notion that societies are constantly seeking a way to give people recognition; or at least to let them feel validated. That's the ultimate tension in living life, I think, the struggle to find meaning. The trouble is that meaning is an intensely personal thing. Societies can try to impose it; through religion, warfare, the triumph of ideology or whatever... but these causes ring hollow if they aren't something that you can personally embrace.

The structure of a society certainly helps to shape its culture, but they also change over time. You just have to look at the America of today compared to the America of one or two hundred years ago to see that. I always felt that this undermines Fukuyama somewhat. His assertion that Liberal Democratic society is the end point was combined, IIRC, with an argument about the distribution of wealth, and he predicted that you'd wind up with regions in countries essentially becoming their own nations. That completely writes off the importance of national identity and culture, in favour of cold logic.

I'm not sure I'd like to guess where we'll be in thirty or forty years time in regards to the world stage. I wouldn't even like to bet as far ahead as five years the way events in Europe are unfolding today. But it'll be interesting to see if the old rhetoric about the inevitability of liberal democracy and capitalism comes back if undemocratic powers rise more openly, and traditional capitalist structures start failing. The discourse should be very interesting.

[Elder Iptuous]

The problem I have is this: Hegel's view is that this kind of recognition can be found, universally, in a sort of liberal corporatist state.  The Fukuyama - Kojeve interpretation of Hegel claims this is sense of recognition is found in liberal democracies.  And Marx, of course, claimed that instead this recognition would be found in communist societies.

History tends to show that all of them are wrong, as they were commonly practiced.  What's more, if one reads the work of Nietzsche, who was of course obsessed in his usual fashion with the master-slave dialectic, a rather depressing picture emerges.  Nietzsche would argue that thymos, the "spritedness" which leads humans into acts of violence against each other (where both participants face the possibility of death) in search of recognition, is fundamentally undermined through liberalism and democracy in general.  Instead, liberal societies are very good at churning out what we could nowadays consider thoroughly bourgeois individuals - people who care for nothing at all outside of their own material well being and self-preservation, who care nothing for the societies they live in so long as their potentially negative actions do not impact on their personal lives, wealth and continued existence.

Nietzsche, of course, called this kind of person the Last Man, the triumph of slavish morality.

Businessmen like to compare their industry with warfare, but in truth, economics is no substitute for conflict.  Especially in Hegel's schema.  Historically speaking, as well, societies that took warfare seriously, warrior-aristocrat upper classes frequently sneered at merchants and bankers.  And nowadays...well, the only people who think bankers and bond traders are virtuous are Ayn Rand tards, in other words people who want to become bankers and bond traders, or are already and want to delude themselves that their actions aren't just making them filthy rich, but are right and good actions.

If a society does not satisfy these thymotic needs of humanity, it cannot necessarily be posited as the End of History.  I am personally of the opinion that nothing can truly satisfy the desire for recognition, if one accepts Hegel's framing of the subject.  It is implicit in his argument that respect comes from having someone defeated, that there is a Master and a Slave.  The triumph of liberal democracy at the moment is due to two major factors - every other competitor in the 20th century imploded before it did (absolute monarchies, fascism, right-wing authoritarianism and communism) and because the major remaining power, the United States, is (incoherently) devoted to the ideal.  It is a form of international signalling - movements and rebels will claim to be democratic much in the way they used to claim to be socialist, in order to secure the support of the remaining superpower.

Perhaps i'm missing something in the interpretation of 'thymos'...
If the businessmen that view their endeavors as conflict are able to find a satisfactory recognition without resorting to physical violence or the subjugation of others with competing governance, then why do we throw away the possibility that some form of recognition can be achieved within the structures that the authors say are the end state?  obviously, the conflict they engage in may seem hollow to most, but my point is, it apparently isn't absolutely necessary to conquer through the imposition of one state or another in order to satisfy this need. 
So, the warrior aristocrats sneered at the merchants.  so what?  the merchants, i would assume sneered right back at the warriors' barbarism.  and artists achieve their recognition through celebrity (sometimes even in obscurity!) and sneer at both the warriors and the merchants. etc. etc.
And if some state that protects the animal nature's drive for self-preservation also allows this satisfaction, then perhaps there wouldn't be any motive force for changing the structure of the state internally.  and lacking a viable contender externally, then it's end of game, no? (in the context of this argument at least)

So am i missing something in my understanding of the thymos, or is it just the besting of each other in any sense that we can gain recognition from?

[Cain]

Well, for Hegel, historically, the distinction did come from actual violent conflict where the possibility of death was possible.  What Hegel says is that this was the historical model that provided the social structure for most states in the world, and led directly to the formation of the aristocracy.

However, because it created a slave class who were not honoured, who were not accorded certain basic human recognition, it engendered a contradiction.  Because, at the end of the day, people want to be "recognized", to posses glory and ambition, but there was no avenue for slaves to do that.  This contradiction is the Hegelian dialectic, which subsequent forms of society have tried to address, but thus far failed.

Fukuyama and Kojeve suggest, that, ultimately, liberal democracy accords a certain basic respect and dignity to every individual, and thus overcome the contradiction.  Furthermore, for those who have an excess of thymos, there is the theatre of economics to keep them busy.

I find both those assertions unconvincing.  I base my observations on the European nobility, who, when power was eventually taken away from them by the middle class, griped and complained and partially took part in things like trading and money-making, but mostly still chose to go into public service - almost uniformly into Parliament, the diplomatic corps or the military, those organs of state most devoted to the "high politics" of the past, and where personal bravery or cunning is still awarded some merit.  In other words, those classes which historically were most obsessed with their thymotic urges deliberately chose to put aside the world of economics and high finance, as their ancestors did. 

I believe that is because there is something fundamentally lacking from the "recognition" that is provided to those who prove successful in business.  Most people, except those in business, accord very little prestige and moral value to success in business - in fact, a large amount look upon it with suspicion, especially in more traditionally rural and conservative societies, where such a person will be suspected of being a cheat and a liar as a matter of basics.  The only people who tend to afford business practices some kind of high moral standing are involved in finance themselves, which is rather self-serving.  No-one except Ayn Rand tards would refer to a CEO as "heroic" and mean it in its serious, classical sense.

Liberal democracy, equally, does not provide recognition for all.  In fact, I would go so far as to say liberal democracy is very, very good at demonizing its enemies as evil and portraying them as entirely without merit.  The historical concept of homo sacer, applied to bandits and pirates, is nowadays applied to terrorists and drug traffickers.  Maybe illegal immigrants, in a couple of decades.  Democracies mislead their publics, treat voters with contempt and automatically assume they are children and uncapable of making most decisions for themselves.

The aristocratic system provided thymotic outlets for some of its members.  Equally, democracy provides recognition for some of its subjects.  But not many.  And that number seems to be decreasing every year.  "Why bother voting?  It's not like it makes a difference" etc.  People feel, accurately, they are not being listened to.  Therefore, the liberal democratic system is equally flawed as its predecessors. 

[Cain]

I should probably add I'm massively simplifying the theories of at least three different people here, so I may be skipping vital information without realizing it.

[Elder Iptuous]

Got it.  i think
So those with an excess of thymos that enter into politics are having their drive for recognition met, you agree?  the prestige of besting political opponents is a viable substitute for killing enemies and conquering lands?
Then, the only remaining obstacle is providing an outlet for the more tempered folk...  Does this need to be, under the Hegelian line of thinking, recognition through influence on policy?  if the governance prescribed by the ruling class is generous enough that it doesn't overly impinge on the liberty of the masses under it's rule, then i don't see why they would feel that they are slaves as you describe in the Hegelian dialectic.  they are then free to pursue recognition through peaceful and constructive means, whether that be business or art or sport or academics etc...
Do you think that liberal democracy can't afford the necessary dignity to all individuals (or has the natural tendency to deny it), or that it simply doesn't as it is currently set up?

[Prince Glittersnatch III]

I should probably add I'm massively simplifying the theories of at least three different people here, so I may be skipping vital information without realizing it.

What would you recommend as reading for anyone who wants a more in depth understanding of the theories?
Aside from Leviathan and End of History. 

[Cramulus]

so let me see if I've got a handle on this...

Hegel says that man craves recognition. So we built a meritocratic society as a theater for us to show off our [relative] advancement. This led to some of us as masters, some of us as slaves. To hegel, the slave is focused on basic needs, like survival, and this means that they are never fully conscious. The master is free from worrying about basic survival concerns and can act on a higher praxis.. He therefore can see himself reflected in the world around him.

Hobbes says that the only thing keeping us from running around and stabbing everybody who looks at us f funny is this social contract that government provides ... it gives us a meritocratic framework. It aligns our motivations towards common incentives.

and both of these guys tend to think that liberal democracy is the best form of meritocracy. Cain's point is that there are tons of non-capitalistic societies that have existed, they are all in some form meritocratic (or at least it seems that way if you're at the top of the pyramid) so there's no reason to conclude that democracy is eventually going to win out against communism or theocracy or whatever.

Is that the gist of it?