Some research I got paid for

[Cain]

Because I'm bored, and they may actually interest someone.

Please note, all of these were completed within a few hours, with hurried research, and usually with the easiest thesis I could do with the evidence to hand.  As such, views expressed in the articles do not necessarily represent my personal views.

[Cain]

Is Realism Realistic?

Realism derives its name from its opposition to the other major school of international political thought, Idealism.  As the name suggests, Realists see themselves as putting forward a fact-based and historically grounded critique of the more "utopian" Idealist thinking.  Realism is a positivist political theory.  That is, it must, as Morgenthau says, "meet a dual test, an empirical and logical one: do the facts actually lend themselves to the interpretation the theory has put on them, and do the conclusions at which the theory arrive follow with logical necessity from its premises?"   The purpose of this essay will be to ask those questions of some of the basic foundations of Realist theory.

One such foundational theory is that of the "balance of power".  According to T. V. Paul, the balance of power is where "weaker actors flock together to form balancing coalitions" due to "a state or a coalition of states gain[ing] preponderance".   Depending on the theorist, the balance of power is either a prescriptive or descriptive theory of global politics.  Either way, it suggests a tendency towards equilibrium among states, and that this leads to peace, albeit of an uneasy and tense kind.  This has important implications, as it suggests an imbalance in power increases the chances of war, and that multipolarity and, especially, bipolarity, are more peaceful than a unipolar world (though some theorists, such as Waltz, disagree with this assertion).

But how important is the balance of power?  Theorists often look to the post-Westphalian European regional system as the prime historical example of the balance of power in action but, as Edward Gibbon pointed out, there was a cultural influence that also restrained European states in this period, that what Morgenthau referred to as the "restraining influence of a moral consensus"  led to a state of affairs where "the European forces are exercised by temperate and undecisive contests."   Arnold Toynbee agreed, noting that "Gibbon's confidence was justified in the event by the peace settlement of A.D. 1783.  In the American Revolutionary War Great Britain was eventually defeated by an overwhelming coalition of opposing forces; but her opponents did not think of crushing her [...] the secession of the thirteen American colonies from the British Empire would just suffice to restore a Balance of Power which had been unduly inclined in Great Britain's favour".

However, the modern state system has significantly expanded from Europe, to the extent of the globe.  The rise of China and India in particular, as well as the influence of "Eurasianist" political thinking in Russia, all represent a split with the formerly European dominated world system.  As such, reaching a restraining moral consensus will be much harder, and restrained warfare, along with balancing, will not be as common.  A constructivist theory would likely note this as an issue, whereas Realists (barring Morgenthau above) and Neorealists in particular do not.

Another potential issue with Realism is that of war initiation.  Realism is divided into two basic camps on the cause of war, with classical Realists preferring the explanation of human evil and lust for power (Kissinger, Morgenthau) and Neorealists preferring systemic imperatives as the deciding factor (Herz, Waltz).  The former has an obvious flaw: that it cannot account for the large variation in why wars are fought and how preferences change through time.  Morgenthau attempted to introduce the variables of state satisfaction (or lack of) with the existing international order and the breakdown of common international community mentioned above, but these are not convincing.

Herz introduced the concept of a security dilemma , the paradoxical situation where a state arming itself to improve its security may become less secure, as nations distrust their motives and suspect such a build-up to be a prelude to attack.  Because of the anarchical nature of the international system, states cannot be sure of others intentions, but nevertheless require arms to defend themselves, thus the international system is in a constant state of security dilemma.  But again, the security dilemma does not sufficiently explain war on its own, and other factors are required to explain why a state goes to war or not (after all, the largest security dilemma in history, the Cold War, ended not in violence, but the collapse of the USSR).

Waltz, building on Herz's work, tries to locate the cause of war at the systemic level, claiming the nature of the international system can make war or more less likely.  By this schema, war is least likely in a hierarchical system, followed by multipolarity and then bipolarity.  Waltz determines the structure of the international system through ranking the capabilities of actors.  However, this process is not as simple as it seems, and even Waltz himself has struggled with it, since "in 1990, Waltz and Mearsheimer argued that bipolarity was coming to an end... By 1993, Waltz had reversed himself and insisted the world remain bipolar despite the breakup of the Soviet Union."

In addition to this, the systemic "security" argument for war is not heavily supported by the existing data, either.  According to a study by Richard Ned Lebow, 58% of wars between the 18th and 20th century were caused by "standing", or what Morgenthau would call "prestige".  While the relative occurrence of these wars have declined going into the 20th century, being replaced by security, it still accounts for 17 out of 31 20th century wars, more than half.  A possible reason for this may be the adoption of the security paradigm of Realist thought by political decision-makers, though such an assertion is beyond the scope of this essay.  Still, it is worth noting out of a set of 94 wars, only 17 were due to security alone.

Francis Fukuyama also subscribes to this "standing" explanation, noting that "[t]he ultimate ground of war among states is therefore thymos rather than self-preservation.  Just as human history began with the bloody battle for prestige, so international conflict begins with a struggle for recognition among states, which is the original source of imperialism."   In addition to this, Fukuyama also cites the Democratic Peace Hypothesis as another example of how the Realist assumption of aggressive states locked in a state of perpetual struggle and suspicion is not necessarily correct, as "[t]he fundamentally un-warlike character of liberal societies is evident in the extraordinarily peaceful relations they maintain among one another" , noting in particular that Michael Doyle maintains there has not been a single war between a democracy in the past 200 years of history.  While some aspects of the hypothesis can be critiqued, the essential element of its claims have a fair amount of validity.

In addition to this, it should be noted that Realism has some issues with understanding contemporary war.  While during the majority of the 20th century, war was an inter-state affair, since the end of the Cold War, conflict has become "postmodern, asymmetric identity warfare between non-state organisations [...] they do not conform to state-centric realist understanding".   Warfare at a sub-state level is especially difficult for Neorealist theory, as it only accounts for the systemic international structure through the understanding of the Westphalian state system and the theory of the unitary, rational actor.  This assumption is not only a problem for these more modern conflicts, but also for their historical analysis of conflict since, as Fukuyama notes "[t]he desire of masters for recognition, and not the structure of the state system, is the original cause of war.  Imperialism and war and therefore related to a certain social class, the class of masters, otherwise known as the aristocracy, who derived their social status from their willingness to risk their lives in bygone days."

Thus, when it comes to considering the origins of war, Realism has significant theoretical and historical issues to overcome.

Another potential issue, highlighted by Robert M. A. Crawford is that, according to Waltz and other Neorealists, "a "real" theory is defined from its abstraction from the real world of political action."   This has, unfortunately, led to the kind of situation where those involved in the work of thinking about international relations are producing work without any kind of policy use whatsoever, as so noted by a frustrated former national security advisor who confided to Lebow that Waltz's work "said nothing about the likely outcome of the one bipolar conflict that interested him: the Cold War."   Abstractness, in this sense, allows for a lack of specificity concerning concrete issues.  And while a level of abstract theorizing is useful, it has to be considered at what point this theorizing is obscuring more than it is revealing.  As Crawford accurately notes "[c]omplex realities seem to demand more complex explanations – more factually inclusive, and less abstract theories."

Part of a consequence of these beliefs is that the theoretical and policy aspects of international relations are largely separate, with little interaction.  The models become little more than philosophical musings which fail to have any kind of impact on the conduct of international relations whatsoever.  Given how Realists view the world as largely dangerous and filled with irresolvable dilemmas and potential for conflict, this would seem largely self-defeating, as it only ensures that they are ignored by those with the power to enact their preferred policies.

In science, it is generally accepted that a theory cannot be proven "true", it can only be falsified.  As such, any rigorous analysis of Realism must focus on the weaknesses of the theory and not the strengths, if it to be a full account of how "realistic" – which is, of course, another way of saying how true – that theory is.  While Realism may have been utilised correctly in a number of circumstances and accurately depicted the interests driving the acts of particular states, it only takes a single irrefutable failure to show the theory, at the very least, needs revision, if not rethinking entirely.

For Realism, that point may have been when it failed to correctly predict the end of the Cold War.  Realists were focused on issues of capabilities and resources, when the question of legitimacy, of whether the USSR and the Warsaw Bloc could survive the massive changes being implemented by Gorbachev and reformists in the Soviet Communist Party in particular, should have been at the forefront.  Perestroika opened up the Soviet Union to an unprecedented level of criticism, and revealed the true level of disenchantment with the failing Communist system of rule.  Realists ignored this, preferring to concentrate on the structure of the international system and the material strength of the Red Army, without ever considering that the strength of the Red Army was effectively nil if there was no intent or will to use it – as it turned out there was not, when Gorbachev formulated his "Sinatra" policy towards the Warsaw Bloc.

The "realistic" aspects of Realism, therefore, are sadly quite lacking.  While Realism, especially of the Classical variety, is open to varying interpretations and criticism, especially of a constructivist kind (anarchy is what states make of it, as Alexander Wendt would say), other aspects and especially the Neorealist incarnation are quite divorced from political reality, as indeed theorists like Waltz have admitted.  It remains to be seen what can be salvaged from the Realist project.

[Cain]

To what extent do Marxist theories of International Relations follow or differ from Realist theories?

Though coming from two obviously different traditions, Marxism and Realism nevertheless, as positivistic approaches to International Relations and global politics, have some key stands which compliment each other.  The purpose of this essay will be to examine these key trends to further understand the degree to which Realist and Marxist theories agree and disagree with each other.

Out of the three founders of modern Realist theory (E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt), one of them was a self-declared Marxist while the other, according to William E. Scheuerman, was influenced by "left-wing Frankfurt sociologists" .  The third, of course, drew from a more Catholic and theological worldview, and as such will not be discussed in this essay.  As such, one would expect there to be a certain level of overlap between the methods and theories of Realist and Marxist theories.  But what precisely are they?

As mentioned above, both Marxism and Realism are positivistic theories.  That is, they attempt to discover underlying laws that govern human behaviour.  To quote Morgenthau, "political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature".   Marxism, equally, argues a very similar point with its conception of Historical Materialism, that "regularities of society are primarily expressed in the productive activities and economic relations of its members".   Or, to quote Crawford, "Realism, liberalism and Marxism can be viewed as offspring of the common epistemological parentage".

Similarly to this, both Realism and Marxism seek to uncover "hidden truths" about the reality of international political life.  For Morgenthau, Realism gave a method whereby the "ambiguity of the material" of international politics through "the concept of interest defined in the terms of power", which allowed the observer to comprehend the underlying truths of global politics which are obscured because "the true nature of the policy is concealed by ideological justifications and rationalizations."   Equally, the Marxist project "aim to expose a deeper, underlying – indeed hidden truth.  That is the familiar events of world politics – wars, treaties, international aid operations, etc, - all occur within structures which have enormous influence on those events.  These are the structures of a global capitalist system."

Of course, here we can also see a split occurring between the Marxist and Classical Realist approach.  While the Marxist approach sees the global capitalist system as the definite foundation for political understanding, for the Realist it is the conception of power.  This is likely due to the different historical approaches each theory adheres to.  Realists, as pointed out by Fukuyama, "talk as if history did not exist... While all other aspects of the human social environment – religion, the family, economic organization, concepts of political legitimacy – are subject to historical evolution, international relations is regarded as forever identical to itself: "war is eternal"."   This is quite different to the Marxist conception of history, which sees an ultimate progress through various economic-social forms, noting that "the economic structure of capitalist society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal society"  and that capitalism is a new system which displaces the previous "historical form of natural economy", whether this is the "slave economy, feudalism, primitive communism or patriarchal peasant economy".

Because of this, the Realist, whether classic or neo, sees the pursuit of power or the anarchical structure of the international system, as timeless and ever present.  Capitalism is just another means of exercising power, another "ideological justification" as Morgenthau would see it.  Economics is a route to power and a source of power, but exists only in a pragmatic sense, not as an ordering principle in and of itself.

This is reflected in how Marxists and Realists also view the state.  The Realist theory is intrinsically linked to the existence of the modern nation-state.  "Statism is the centrepiece of Realism."   This is true of both the classical and the Neo-realist variations, as states make up the international system that, because of their legal equality, leads to the condition of anarchy whereby no state can act as a Sovereign like that of Hobbes' musings.  But Marxism, with its focus on historical change in the fundamental ordering of society, only sees the modern state as a contingent and temporary phenomenon.  For Marx, the modern state itself was "based on modern bourgeois society, only one more or less capitalistically developed."   As capitalism was supposed to cease due to its "internal contradictions", this puts the existence of the modern day state in doubt.  At first, Marx sees the existence of a "transitional period", which will be a "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat" within the existing state structure.  Lenin notes that this will allow for suppression of the ruling elites, and "when the resistance of the capitalists have disappeared... people will gradually become accustomed to observing the elementary rules of social intercourse that have been known for centuries and repeated for thousands of years in all copy-book maxims. They will become accustomed to observing them without force, without coercion, without subordination, without the special apparatus for coercion called the state."  For Marxists, the centrality of class conflict in explaining politics also runs counter to the Realist understanding of state-centric power politics.

One of the few theorists to have actually combined both Marxist and Realist assumptions about global politics is the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci.  His theoretical notion of "hegemony", seen as within a nation-state context, "took on greater theoretical prominence and became enshrined within the conservative school of realism that became prominent in the post-war under-standing of international politics."   Gramsci was also heavily influenced in his philosophical thinking by Machiavelli, who is often claimed as the "true progenitor of realism"  in the words of Fukuyama, and from him understood the principle that "political analyses and activities should be governed by 'effective reality', and not by the 'turbid void' of our 'desires and dreams'."   This rhetorically sounds very much like statements made by Morgenthau and other Realists.  Furthermore, Gramsci did not believe Marxism and Realism were necessarily conflicted, despite the differing philosophical and political backgrounds of the traditions, that in fact "Marxism was a form of Machiavellian realism, offering a practical vision of change."  Gramsci theorised about the possibility of a "critical realism", for want of a better term, that "seeks to penetrate beneath surface appearances to discover 'a new balance of forces' conducive to change."

This possibility of a "critical realism" was also investigated by Scheuerman, who suggests that this was a "theoretical missed opportunity"  in Morgenthau's own thinking, building on a claim by the postmodernist theorist Richard K. Ashley.  Whilst Scheuerman concedes to Falk's criticism that Morgenthau "reified existing interstate relations by failing to acknowledge their historically alterable character", nevertheless he maintains that "some of Morgenthau's early writings contain the outlines of an alternative version of realism never fully developed by him" and that these outlines "not only can be interpreted as offering a socially critical account of inter national politics, but it also lacks many of the more intellectually troublesome and politically conservative features of the brand of realist theory endorsed by Morgenthau in the immediate after math of World War II."

Nevertheless, those post WWII writings of Morgenthau's were especially influential on Realist thinking, and as such do show a departure from a more accommodating approach to Marxist international theory.  One of the areas where this is most obvious is that of imperialism, a subject which interested both Marxist writers and Realist ones in equal measure.

Lenin, in writing Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, linked the struggle between European imperialistic powers at the turn of the 20th century and, in particular, in WWI (which was partly driven by colonial ambitions on the part of Germany) to monopoly industrial interests within the various states involved, noting that "[t] he epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations between capitalist associations grow up, based on the economic division of the world; while parallel to and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between political alliances, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the "struggle for spheres of influence"."

Morgenthau, however, rejects that explanation as being ahistorical, noting that "during the entire period of mature capitalism, no war, with the exception of the Boer War, was waged by the major powers exclusively or even predominately for economic reasons."  He notes economics was a factor in this, as "victory in these wars brought economic advantages and, more particularly, defeat brought in its wake economic losses."   Even more damaging for the Marxist thesis of imperialism, the "main period of colonial expansion precedes the age of mature capitalism" and so capitalism cannot be the cause of this kind of imperialism.  Furthermore, with the benefit of hindsight, Morgenthau notes that, in the later 20th century, capitalist powers oversaw "the liquidation of empire on a large scale in the form of retreat from Africa and Asia" , though of course one could argue that this was due to American and Soviet imperialism, albeit not convincingly.

As we can see from above, there is area for overlap between Marxist and Realist theories.  Their methodological approach, with an insistence on using a scientific, empirical and logically consistent method suggest there is much room for theoretical agreement, and that the major differences between the two are based on the interpretations of facts.  But these differences in interpretation are very significant, and cannot be easily overlooked.  The most basic empirical observations of the two, in their most orthodox understandings, are deeply opposed to each other, with their different conceptions of history, the potential for change and the importance of economics versus power.  Only when both borrow from less heterodox thinking, with Gramsci's hegemonic conceptions of politics and Morgenthau's sadly abandoned "critical realism" do we see the possibility of the two theories being reconciled in any way.  Another avenue for potential analysis might also be how Neo-Realist structuralism and World Systems Theory interact and agree or disagree.  Sadly, there was not the space for such a discussion in this article.

In conclusion, Realist and Marxist theories disagree far more than they agree.  Nevertheless, the tension between their disagreements, due to their few similarities, provide areas for fruitful theoretical discussion and exploration.

[Cain]

Is the EU a successful global actor?

As of 2010, the European Union was the world's largest market, even in spite of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, generating a GDP of €12279.033 trillion.  It has a population of over 500 million, almost universal literacy, high levels of education and some of the highest living standards in the world.

By all of these standards, one would expect the European Union to be a major world power, alongside the likes of the United States of America and China.  Yet in the international relations literature there is no discussion of "Europe's rise" in the same way there is of China.  It is frequently the United States, not the EU that takes the lead when it comes to international issues, especially those concerning military action.  Furthermore, the supranational nature of the EU's institutions is a new and relatively untested innovation in governance, especially when compared to the nation-state.  Many are unsure whether or not these institutions could weather a serious and threatening crisis in the same way China or America – both traditional nation-states – are able to.

Therefore the question must be asked, is the EU a successful global actor?

In some areas, the EU's success is relatively simple to see.  In the first half of the 20th century, rivalry between European powers, political instability and imperialism led to two highly destructive wars, which eventually became global in scope.  Since that time, there have been no wars between the major European states.  In part, this was no doubt due to the Cold War nuclear balance, but it has persisted well beyond the end of that conflict.  The only other institution that could explain that is the European Union.  War between France and Germany, or Italy and Spain is, in the words of John Mueller "subrationally unthinkable" .  Instead, the EU is the premier example of Robert Cooper's postmodern world, as the EU "does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasize sovereignty or separation of domestic and foreign affairs."  It instead corrects the failures of the European system, where "the balance of power [...] ceased to balance, and the nation state [...] took nationalism to destructive extremes."   It has also been argued that one of the main focuses of European integration was to "keep Germany in the democratic fold" , a geopolitical necessity given the population, central position and economic/military potential of the state.  

Either way, in bringing peace to a large area of the world, in developed economies with advanced economies and WMDs, and thus the potential for mass destruction, the EU has been very successful indeed.  It can also be argued that the success of the EU has been a model for other regional cooperation groups, such as ECOWAS, the OAS and the Shanghai Cooperation Group, as Anne-Marie Slaughter did when she noted that "(i)n many regulatory areas [...] the European Union attracts as many imitators as the United States" .  This suggests a large pool of "soft power" upon which the European Union can draw, in its dealings with other regional groups, and thus individual states.

However, providing a zone in which the state (or in this case, supranational body) has created peace, through a mixture of inducements and coercion, is something most moderately well equipped states are able to do, and while important in the context of 20th century history, only suggests regional success, especially with the relative decline of European military force in relation to the USA, former USSR and China.  Instead, the EU's greater foreign impact must be assessed, to truly answer whether it is successful on a global level.

One indicator of success is the EU's foreign aid.  The EU is "by far the world's largest source of aid" .  Such aid, deployed conditionally, gives the EU a large amount of clout in its dealings with other states, especially since by definition, almost every state the EU will be dealing with will be less economically well off than the Union.  Access to the Common Market is also a very tempting incentive to try and work with the EU diplomatically, rather than against it.

Another, more complicated indicator of a successful global role is involvement in conflict zones.  Here, the EU track record is a little less than ideal, not least because the EU did not even have a unified foreign policy executive until May 1999, when the Treaty of Amsterdam went into force .  The EU's lack of direction and unified approach to the Balkans conflict, in the case of Bosnia, particularly stands out.  Nevertheless, the EU did take steps to improve its clout in that regional conflict and by the time the 1999 Kosovo conflict had started, the EU was in a position to politically back and show "impressive solidarity with NATO when it militarily confronted Milosevic over the skies of Kosovo and Serbia."   Given the lack of political authorisation from the United Nations Security Council for the humanitarian intervention in the conflict, the solidarity the EU showed with NATO gave a greater feeling of legitimacy to the mission internationally.  The conflict also spurred on the EU to create a unified European Security and Defense Policy.  The aim had been, by 2003, to be able to deploy a force of up to 60,000 military personnel, but due to individual member military obligations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and other conflict zones, this project predictably stalled.  

However, the EU does not necessarily interpret conflict in a military sense.  As studies by Kirchner and Rasch show, the Union has "a preference for the non-military instruments in response to the most pressing security threats."   Therefore, it would make more sense to analyse EU involvement in conflict and security with that in mind.  For example, the EU has been heavily involved in negotiating with Iran over concerns with the latter's nuclear program and the possibility of it using such a program to manufacture nuclear weapons.  In 2003, the EU attempted to negotiate with Iran for a peaceful nuclear program, under more intrusive IAEA inspections, international transparency and no uranium enrichment in return for a number of economic incentives, including aid packages, and to aid Iran in resisting US pressure to refer the issue to the UNSC.  However, Iran eventually reneged on this deal, possibly due to the Iraq War and subsequent shift in power away from the reformist clerics and towards the conservative-radical faction around Mahmoud Ahmadinejhad.  Nevertheless, the EU managed to engage Iran in a way that the United States would have found impossible, given the mutual distrust between the two states, and in which China has no apparent interest in doing, despite the obvious constraints placed upon the EU which "significantly restrict it's capacity to play a major role", namely it's status as a "civilian power" .

Foradori correctly points out, however, that the EU can probably not expect to reach some kind of negotiated settlement with Iran without some kind of input or assistance from the USA.  This would seem to question the EU's status as a successful global actor, putting it in a second-tier "helper" role to the United States.  Thomas P. Barnett clearly sees the EU in this role when he describes it as the "second great source code for the future of globalization", with the United States being the first, and that the EU in "improving on and falling short of the original, it provides the world a much needed contrast and range of choices.  It also lightens America's load" .  While that indeed suggests a role as a global actor, it also sees the EU in a role where it works alongside America, aiding American policies and strategies, rather than a partnership among equal Great Powers, where both work to mutually agreeable goals.  

Hall Gardner suggests, in a form of contrast to this, that the EU has some advantages over NATO, especially when it comes to European/Russian security issues, as "democracies are better secured by joining the European Union" than they are by "expanding NATO to countries that can't help" .  This is important, since Russia is a major player in Eurasian security issues still, having inherited the vast majority of the Soviet Union's military power and with a large influence over Central Asian states that are vital to the war in Afghanistan, and it has felt antagonised by NATO encroachment into its "near abroad" in the past.  Given Russian cooperation is necessary for not only the above reasons, but also due to its influence over Iran, it is better to entrust the EU with expansion into such regions, as Russia has proven to be willing to work with the EU in the past, and its civilian nature means it does not pose a security risk to the Russian Federation.  However, Gardner also urges caution, as he notes that EU-NATO "double enlargement" may be contributing to Russia "developing a more authoritarian, "Eurasian" system of overlapping alliances and trade agreements and model of political-economical development [...] as opposed to adopting a "liberal democratic" approach" .  If this is correct, it would be a significant failure of EU policy, given EU outside energy dependency, and Russia being the nearest major military power.  Not to mention that it is EU policy to promote a stable, open and pluralistic Russia, as part of the Common Strategy on Russia, which seems to be at odds with this Eurasian model.

The EU relationship with China is also worth scrutinising.  In 2004, "the EU became China's largest trading partner, while China is now the EU's second largest trading partner after the United States" .  While it would not be unfair to see the EU as broadly critical of China on the subject of human rights, which is the rationale for the arms embargo it has placed on the country, it has nevertheless attempted to integrate China more effectively into global institutions, for instance in the case of Chinese accession to the WTO, where the EU "played an active role in facilitating China's membership" .  This would seem to be similar to the US policy of "containment and cooperation" with China, though, of course, the EU is more constrained when it comes to containment because of its lack of military options.

Nevertheless, if the aim of the EU is to promote a more open and democratic China, that is respectful of human rights, then its engagement with China must be considered a failure.  China remains authoritarian and reacts with large scale repression to signs of public dissent.  In this case, the EU cannot be considered a successful global actor, as China has not budged on this important (to Europe) issue.

In considering all of these events and relationships, a very unclear picture of the European Union's global capacities and effectiveness is emerging.  On the one hand, the EU has brought peace and economic integration to the European continent, to the point that war between EU states is utterly unthinkable.  The EU has also been able to adapt, albeit slowly, in order to present a more unified voice in foreign affairs.  The EU has also engaged not only major geopolitical actors, such as Russia and China, but it has also engaged states which others (notably the USA) would have significant difficulty in negotiating with.  Its civilian nature has meant it can approach actors and negotiate with them without arousing much suspicion about its goals, despite a close relationship with NATO.

Yet at the same time, progress in the EU is terribly slow, regardless of the topic.  A lack of a powerful executive and a more unified military force do constrain its options, in ways that could be quite unfavourable.  The EU is clearly able to act on a global level, that is without question.  Whether or not it is "successful" in its actions is much harder to ascertain, as that can only be said definitively over the long term.  The reaction to the economic crisis, for example, threatens to undermine the stability of the Eurozone, and thus one of the major pillars of EU influence.  Unless the EU can increase cooperation and improve the speed of decision-making, it will suffer over the long term, and hamper what global credibility and influence it has been able to collect thus far.

[Cain]

"Burke opposed political change because he believed human nature to be intrinsically wicked." Discuss.

Edmund Burke is best known as a founding father of modern conservative political theory.  In particular, he is well known for his vehement opposition to and denunciation of the French Revolution of 1789, which is considered to have ushered in the modern era of political thought.

According to A. O. Hirschman, there are three broad strands of reactionary thought, the "perversity thesis, the futility thesis and the jeopardy thesis."   Working from this model, Joseph V. Femia places Burke in the camp of perversity, which states that "no matter how lofty or noble our intentions may be, our actions often have counter-productive (and counter-intuitive) effects.  We witness this in our everyday life, and on levels of public policy, it is undoubtedly true that supposedly progressive policies or innovations sometimes generate perverse outcomes [...] Reactionaries or conservatives tend to assume that such perversity is the rule, not the exception.  Since everything backfires, since our pathetic delusions and ridiculous aspirations are gleefully mocked by God or fortune, striving after democracy is bound – on this logic, to engender nothing but oligarchy and tyranny" .

This is a good summation of the general tone and themes of the perversity thesis, but it does not answer the question of why Burke believed political change should be opposed.  The roots of where this perversity springs from, in Burke's opinion, remain unknown however, and that is the focus of our investigation.

Some of Burke's own political and social thinking has been discussed at length by Lorenzo Infantino.  According to him, like Hume, Burke saw that "the norms we refer to are a product of a social process."   This is important because, as Burke himself notes "we are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private reason; because we suspect this stock in each man is small, and that individuals would better avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and ages."

This does not exactly seem to support the "wicked human nature" thesis posed in the question.  It suggests a deficit of reason available to the individual person, which makes their ability to judge effectively without guidance suspect, and therefore they should instead rely on norms, which are the product of a long sequence of social processes and have been shown to work to create a workable, if not perfect, society.

This argument reached it's zenith in Burke's own Reflections on the Revolution in France, where he argued that "violence and oppression were immanent and implicit in the revolutionaries' commitment to abstract reason" .  Because abstract reason can only fail, due to the lack of it humans have available, a society based on such a foundation, as opposed to the "organic state" Burke saw as natural and right, could only dissolve into violence and suffering.
However, as Femia notes, despite his reputation as a founding father of modern conservative thought, "Burke [...] was not always on the side of reaction, and many were surprised by the illiberality of his Reflections."  A useful comparison here would be Burke's views on the American Revolution in comparison with France, the former of which he was broadly supportive of. Burke said in a speech to Parliament "again and again, revert to your old principles—seek peace and ensue it; leave America, if she has taxable matter in her, to tax herself. I am not here going into the distinctions of rights, nor attempting to mark their boundaries. I do not enter into these metaphysical distinctions; I hate the very sound of them. Leave the Americans as they anciently stood, and these distinctions, born of our unhappy contest, will die along with it.... Be content to bind America by laws of trade; you have always done it.... Do not burthen them with taxes..." .  Femia expands on Burke's political background, noting he is "[a] Whig rather than a Tory, he was steeped in the thought of the Scottish Enlightenment, which had stressed the importance of unintended effects of human action."   The unintended aspect of this may be the important one for our consideration, as it reaches to the crux of the argument – whether Burke opposed political change because of the inherent wickedness of human nature or for other reasons.

It is therefore entirely possible, probable even given his support for the American revolutionaries, that Burke saw democracy and political change as a potential good, but one that could very easily go awry, as it did in France.  In fact, it would be fair to saw that Burke foresaw the seeds of The Terror and the Jacobins before they were readily evident, though this may have been as much due to ideological prejudice as cogent analysis.  While the American revolutionaries had largely kept the existing social structure of England, with some Enlightenment-era adjustments (such as a President instead of King or Prime Minister, a larger political franchise made possible in part through the lack of settlements in America), the French Revolution had been far more ambitious, in their methods as much as anything.  While the French revolutionaries had much of the same ideological background as the American colonists, with Enlightenment ideals and a middle class, capitalist composition, it differed with "moderate middle class reformers mobilizing the masses against die-hard resistance or counter-revolution.  We shall see the masses pushing beyond the moderates' aims to their own social revolutions, and the moderates in turn splitting into a conservative group henceforth making common cause with the reactionaries, and a left wing group determined to pursue the rest of the yet unachieved moderate aims with the masses, even at the risk of losing control over them."

This factionalism and potential for demagogic populism inherent in the French Revolution was simply not present in the American Revolution, which preserved much "English liberties" and institutions with Enlightenment era modifications.  We can also note that Burke formulated his argument with much reference to, and in defence of these liberties, which he saw as traditional and part of the English character and history.  Therefore the American Revolution was not as great of a break with social norms as the French Revolution, with France's relative authoritarianism and hierarchical class structure making a transfer to an egalitarian society all the more unlikely.

For Burke, the French Revolution was so terrible because it represented such a break with the "natural order" France had hitherto seen.  "Burke's use of the metaphor therefore performs a useful ideological function in terms of his organic analogy, reaffirming the illusion of organic and political order. Behind the representation of the revolutionary events as monstrous is the assumption that organic and political order are one and the same. The unease produced by the monster is thus a form of disease. Revolutionary France is monstrous because it is 'out of nature' – nothing less than 'a contrivance of nature'."

However, Burke's conservatism was not the more severe reactionary beliefs of the likes of Joseph de Maistre.  While Burke did not like the idea of rapid social change, he recognised that for modern society "there could be no reversion to a feudal or clerical society of unthinking obedience to throne and altar."   Instead, Burke created a tradition of what could be seen as "grudging acceptance of democracy with elitist features".  In practice, this meant "combining an unenthusiastic acceptance of the political forms of mass democracy with an emphasis on wise leadership from a traditional elite experienced in statecraft, to build up bulwarks and arrest or restrain the progress of mass democracy, if one could not turn the clock back altogether."

Somewhat ironically, Burke foresaw that democratic government would lead to the creation of political elites, but unlike traditional elites, who would be bound by the social norms which made up their society, making them far more tyrannical.  This is because "where obedience is no longer based on inherited prejudices or settled habits, it must be obtained by pure force", and that a democratic political culture will automatically lead to a demand for the greater use of political power, as "[a]ny hindrance to their power is automatically condemned as an affront to the demos, as a selfish restriction on majority preferences."   As such, political power becomes at once concentrated, not bound to former social norms and far more prevalent.

From all of the above, it is clear that Burke's opinion on "human nature" is not at the root of his concern about political change.  Instead, it is more to do with a deep-rooted scepticism as to how quickly society can adapt to change, and how that change can be easily abused or unintentionally lead to dangerous and catastrophic consequences.  Rapid and abstract or philosophically informed political change, based on ideas not necessarily deeply rooted in society, can be abused by would-be dictators, as did happen during the French Revolution, and as such, social change should be as slow and gradual as reasonably possible.  For Burke, the question of human nature was separate from this socio-political issue.

[Cain]

Does coherence in political theory matter?  Answer with reference to Burke on the revolutions in France and America.

Skinner undoubtedly has more than a point in his contention that some of the coherency of political thought has its origins in the analysis of the scholar studying authors, than the authors themselves. 

One of the more interesting questions about coherency in political theory and thought is that of Burke supporting the American Revolution while viciously denouncing the French Revolution at the same time.  It is of interest partly because of Burke's prominence, but also because Burke was actively involved in politics at the time and so the apparent contradiction can be seen to have practical as well as theoretical implications.

It is of course entirely possible to accept Burke's positions as they appear.  There is a contradiction; Burke was mistaken, or inconsistent in how he applied his beliefs.  A number of reasons can be proffered for this, not least the long-running conflict between France and the United Kingdom for Atlantic hegemony and a nationalist fervour which may have predisposed Burke to the colonists over the French.

But then the investigation moves away from political theory, and becomes a matter of historical speculation.  And not even very interesting historical speculation, at that.

However, if one works from the assumption of coherence, then one is forced to ask: what is it that I missed in Burke's work which can explain this? It forces a re-evaluation of the political thought of the author in question, in an attempt to make the existing text and the apparent contradiction fit without violating the principle of coherence.  This form of "creative reading", which may be very creative indeed depending on the nature of the contradiction under discussion, allows for the text to be freed from conventional understanding and considered in a more critical and nuanced light.

In the case of Burke, for example, one could resolve the contradiction by pointing to how the American colonists mostly kept British institutions, with some Enlightenment-derived adjustments, while the French attempt to supplant their feudal model with an entirely new, and never experienced before political system.  We therefore have a new area of discussion – a question of institutions, revolutions and political culture, which Burke has introduced through a nuanced reading of his political thought, even if some of that thought actually derived from the reading of the scholar, rather than was intended by Burke himself.

Coherence also allows for a work to continue to have relevance long after the concrete political situation in which it is rooted has been resolved, in one form or another.  Coherence is another way of looking for underlying, abstracted rules which lie behind the pronouncements of the author – a metaphysics of their political position, if you will.  From this abstracted position, one can then deduce general propositions and arguments on behalf of the author and so continue to use their (modified) ideas and apply them to other historical contexts, or even existing issues.   In this way the work does not simply become a historically contingent document, but closer to Thucydides expectation of the History of the Peloponnesian War – a document for all time.

These are just a few ways in which coherence in political theory can matter, but they are important ones.

[Cain]

Explain why the concept of culture became more important than the concept of race in international political approaches.

While it is sometimes seen as an uncomfortable or embarrassing precursor of modern political science, the history of political thought and practice has often been one of questionable methods and theories.  This is especially true in the case of race, which was once considered a highly important, indeed possibly fundamental basis for understanding global politics.

Though it is sometimes assumed that this was a constant feature of historical thinking, which has only been dispelled in more recent, scientific and enlightened times, this is simply not the case.  While historically a "sense of ethnicity has been widespread in human history", the ancient world was not "an era in which ethnicity cemented states" existed.  Indeed, historical empires were, as a rule, unconcerned with concepts of ethnicity and race, "they did not regard them [conquered neighbours] as alien" .  Indeed, most interpretations of historical ethnic rivalry are essentially invented myths, which do not date back more than a couple of centuries at best, such as the Serbian construction of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, which was "actually fought between two armies we would today consider multiethnic" .

According to Mann, the main change came in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, where conceptions of political outsiders or "inferior" political communities took on especially race-based language.  Using, or abusing, what was at the time, modern science, there was instead a move towards "classification of races as distinct species or as thousands-year-old adaptations to climate, ecology, disease, and so on then added rigidity, linking races hierarchically, conjoining physical, temperamental, and moral qualities, and viewing the whole ensemble of races as natural and God-given."

As noted above, the "ethnic identity...is more stable than most other types of identity."   This would suggest a form of stability or, at the very least, predictability in the relationship between differing ethnic groups in the period, which is borne out by the historical record of ethnic cleansing and colonialism by the globe by European or European-derived powers in the 18th and 19th century.  As Fanon notes, "When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a given species. In the colonies the economic substructure is also a super­structure."   While there were other factors concerning colonialism, not at least economic and strategic, the racial factor that legitimised colonialism cannot be discounted.   Especially since racial "always entails a hierarchical construction of difference...racial categorizations are most often assigned to a group by an outside power" .

Given the importance that colonialism had, in terms of prestige for a particular nation and in, depending on one's interpretation, helping fuel conditions for WWI, this puts race at the very heart of global politics in the 19th century period, from the start up to the turn of the century.

There were not only implications for colonialism, however.  For example, American and Australian expansionism was undertaken against a pre-existing population who were cast as inferior, in racial terms, to the incoming occupiers.  But also, in the multiethnic empires of Central and South-Eastern Europe, there was a growing sense of ethnic nationalism, which those nations failed to respond to constructively.  This failure to facilitate integration, often with elites playing off ethnic groups against each other, lead to a racial "security dilemma", whereby, for example, "Austro-German [nationalism] fueled Czech nationalism in the 1890s. In turn, both fueled Slovak nationalism."   These sentiments led to the foundation of nationalist, secessionist movements that frequently viewed their nominal rulers, as well as other ethnic groups, with considerable suspicion, which can and did turn to violence, most notably and tragically in the case of the Serbian "Black Hand" group.

The aftermath of WWI and the realisation of the ethnic and racial dimension to some of the causes of the war, led to several declarations in Wilson's 14 Points concerning the right to self-determination and colonialism, the most general being that "[a] free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined."   While these principles were applied inconsistently and, indeed, barely at all by the victorious powers, there was a move away from more value-laden approaches to race during this period among many of the liberal and capitalistic states.  However, there were exceptions who, because of their geopolitical significance, ensured race continued to be a central theme in global politics.

The most prominent of these was, of course, Germany, who under the Nazi Party had an increasingly racially-based internal and foreign policy.  The German policy of lebensraum and Continental Empire, for example, were modelled on the US model and how the US dealt with its indigenous population, though in the particular case of Germany the "Slavs" of Eastern Europe (which of course included Poles, Ukrainians, Russians and others).  The Nazi view on race was especially extreme, where "[e]ach race bore particular characteristics that were transmitted, completely, ineluctably, from one generation to the next. The lofty accomplishments of human beings, from the architecture of the ancient Greeks to the classical music of nineteenth-century Germans, were the results not of isolated instances of individual creativity, but of a genius bred and sustained by the racial characteristics that lay "in the blood." "

This race-focused foreign and domestic policy led to the twin tragedies of World War II, and the Holocaust.  After WWII, there can be seen a large decline in racial thinking in global politics, except among fringe individuals and groups, especially those of a neo-fascist bent, such as Francis Parker Yockey .   There are two major historical forces which may be responsible for this.  The first is the rise of the Soviet Union and the United States to the status of global superpowers in the aftermath of the war.  Their conflict was ideological in nature, and both ideologies were, theoretically, universal in their scope and not bound to race, though of course both exploited the failure of the other to live up to these ideals for international gain.  The second reason, which links to the first, is the retreat of the European empires, who could not afford the maintenance of empire after the debilitating costs of waging war had been fully realised.  Sometimes this was resisted violently, as was the case with France's war in Indochina, or it was mostly peaceful, as with the British retreat from India and the French withdrawal from Algeria (the OAS notwithstanding).

Nevertheless, even here there was a racial dimension to the political events, sometimes.  As Porteous notes, "[w]hite settler lobbies, linked to British commercial interests, exercised considerable influence in Whitehall, in parliament and in the British press."   These were the exceptions, rather than the rule, though.

But, the end of the Cold War saw a resurgence in ethnic and racial violence on the international scale – normally within the former Soviet sphere of influence, though not entirely.   Yugoslavia fell into a very brutal, multisided conflict where sides were decided by heavily defined ethnic groups which would qualify, for the purposes of this essay, as races.  1994 saw the Rwandan genocide, which in part helped set the conditions for the two Congo wars, where ethnicity (especially Tutsi, or those suspected of being Tutsi or having "Tutsi features") played a tragic role.  Some of the violence in the region is due to those Hutu responsible for the genocide having evaded justice, allowing excuses for Tutsi commanders to keep forces in occupation of certain regions.

In the case of Yugoslavia, the constitution of the state "'reified nationality' and thus created automatically nationalist responses to crisis situations" .  It is worth noting that this kind of constitution has become increasingly popular in multiethnic or confessional states, such as Lebanon.

Secessionist issues are also increasing in importance again in global conflicts, with almost all such issues being promoted and directed by ethnic and racial groups who feel their grievances and needs are not being met by a traditional nation-state with an ethnic majority making up most of the voting population.  Such movements would include those in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the latter of whom led to a war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the Niger Delta groups and the intractable Israel-Palestine conflict.

While there have been attempts to move towards a more cultural theorization of global politics, as evidenced by Huntingdon's The Clash of the Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, it is not immediately clear, looking at the above evidence, that cultural approaches have superseded racial approaches.  While most of the relations of nations are no longer cast in racial terms, it is nevertheless quite clear that inter-state and intra-state conflict in the late 20th and early 21st century is largely ethnic based.  This is especially true in the case of the state's dealings with sub-national groups, often whom have less political representation or ability to extract concessions from a state who uses racial rhetoric when referring to them, as a nation-state may be able to.  An example of this would be the War on Terror, which has often been cast in racial and sectarian terms, with many assumptions made about the innate nature of Arabs and South Asians as well as Americans and Europeans in various propaganda efforts.

While race has fallen out of favour as a construct for theoretical approaches to international relations, and indeed was never a major approach within the discipline (as one can confirm by looking at foundational texts from both Realist and Liberal sources), it is still very evident in the practice of global politics in the 21st century.  Therefore one cannot explain why the concept of culture became more popular, as this is not in fact borne out by the evidence.

[Cain]

Book Review: The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order by Parag Khanna (published by Random House in 2008).

A lot of attention in the international press and academic literature is paid to the contemporary developed states – those countries with advanced economies, high literacy and significant military capability – and to failed states, those countries where the official government has lost the monopoly on legitimate violence, or there is no official government anymore.

Falling in between these two extremes is what the author Parag Khanna calls the "second world".  Originally applied to Communist, or recently post-Communist states, the term actually embraces a far wider range of countries, those which are neither the first nor the third world – places of uneven development, a certain level of corruption, not international movers or shakers and yet not countries that can be easily moved or shaken.  For Khanna, this is the stage on which the geopolitical manoeuvring between the three major centres of power in the modern world: the United States, the European Union and China.

Khanna does not shy away from describing these three entities as "empires", and shrugs aside the popular thesis of Huntingdon that civilizations are the unit that matters by pointing out that empires can, and frequently have, spanned across civilizations in history.  Because of their size, financial wealth and latent military power – as well as being unified enough and willing to expand, it is these three powers that will set the tone for the next century of international politics.  America's unipolar movement is definitively over; instead globalization is not just Americanizing the world, but also Europeanizing and Sinicizing it.  Khanna is quite frank in noting that globalization has become a self-sustaining system now, independent of any particular nation-state or empire.  And instead of the traditional, historical mode of military competition, all three of these empires are market civilizations.  Therefore, their competition will play out in the economic sphere as much as anywhere, and the logic of the market will also dictate the alliances they make, as the second world will be able to choose between patrons according to their own interests – making international isolation increasingly difficult, as if one empire tries to isolate a country or desert an unreliable ally, it may find another moving in to take its place, to their relative gain.

Khanna also notes that while all these modern empires have certain similarities, such as their acceptance of the market and relative lack of ideological competition (in direct opposition to the assertion of the likes of Robert Kagan, who incorrectly believes that China is interested in supporting autocratic governments internationally), they do have differing styles of leadership.  America prefers the coalition, Europe favours consensus and China uses consultation.  These differing modes of diplomacy have their benefits and downsides – America's coalitions are put together quickly and allow America to take a lead role in whatever issue is currently troubling it, but does not inspire long term alliances and trust – Europe deliberates and takes a long time to come to a policy, but when it does, it invariably sticks with it and the weight of that consensus often wins support from other states and China tries to find areas of common agreement as much as possible, while putting off areas of disagreement for discussion further down the road, once other issues are settled.

Khanna is quick, perhaps a little too quick, to dismiss India, Russia, Japan and a possible future Caliphate based in the Middle East (based perhaps around Iranian hegemony?) as potential contenders as geopolitical empires to rival the three existing powers, noting the existing empires already hold the balance of the world's power, and will act to prevent these states from reaching empire status.  Instead, he envisions these states as balancers, whose allegiances will determine who is most or least capable among the empires to effectively deploy their power, without being able to prevent it entirely. 

Khanna is right to be sceptical about a Middle Eastern Caliphate – any form of integration there is highly unlikely, especially in the near future, and about Japanese prospects for Empire status.  However, he may be dismissing Russia and India too quickly, especially if one has read the projections of Goldman Sachs Global Economic Paper No: 99, the now infamous "BRICs" report.  Russia's economic growth is relatively robust, especially when one considers the impact of the economic crisis on countries like the UK, France and Germany.  Also, there demographic issues have been somewhat overstated, and likely will improve or, at the very least, stabilize within the next decade.  In addition to their natural resources and educated populace, they represent a real possibility of becoming a resurgent Great Power, and their already considerable military power means dissuading them from doing so will be very difficult, more difficult than Dr Khanna may suspect.  But I digress.

While the introduction of the book deals with Khanna's take on the three empires, the majority of the book takes the form of a geopolitical analysts' travel diary.  Khanna invites the reader to join him on his tour of the second world where, unlike far too many popular political analysts and journalists, he does not simply visit the capital and look at the regime-approved projects to show to important foreigners.  Instead, he is willing to explore the often all too stark dichotomy between the relatively clean, efficient and modern capitals of the second world, and their much poorer and more corrupt hinterlands.  Interestingly, Khanna also frequently speaks to diplomats who, against the stereotype, are often quite honest and open about the faults of their countries, or the reasons for adhering to a particular strategy or policy. 

One notable aspect of how the author treats the nations he is investigating is that he does not resist the impulse to consider their psychology, and compare state psychology to human psychology.  He even goes as far as to declare that they have "innumerable parallels".  This is refreshing, when one considers the usually stale, strategic-mathematical logic of Neorealist and Neoliberal academics.  It allows for history and culture to be considered in the analysis of a nation.  It is hard to argue that a country that has been historically encircled by enemies, such as Russia, may be more suspicious of moves which appear to do the same to it in the present, yet such calculations are not easily quantified. 

Another interesting observation Dr Khanna makes, related to the psychological observations above, is that democracy is not necessarily correlated with the spread of globalization.  Democracy is like self-actualization on Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs: it is something which shows a nation is successful and has "made it", but other needs, such as providing food and water as well as basic security, must be met first.  We have already seen one disastrous attempt at introducing democracy without providing those more basic elements which make democratic politics possible first, and it has devolved into an authoritarian, religiously-influenced "hybrid" regime closer to Tehran than the United States.  Khanna's argument persuasively suggests this would have always been the case, and that democratization should perhaps take a lower priority in the strategic calculations of Washington and Brussels.  This is especially true when one considers the advice of Khanna that the most popular ideology in the world is "success", rather than any particular ism.

Khanna contrasts globalization with geopolitics frequently throughout his travels, often with reference to the past writers of the subject, such as Rudolf Kjeller, Harold Mackinder and the civilizational theorist-historians Spengler and Toynbee.  These are interesting not only for their historical value, but as competing paradigms for understanding international relations.  Geopolitics emphasises the continuity of factors in world politics, a form of determinism that declares "geography is destiny".  Globalization, by contrast, aims to destroy geography, to render irrelevant.  Khanna is not blind to the problems of globalization, he is no Thomas Friedman propagandist for the "Golden Straitjacket" and he is keenly aware of the many losers the system creates, in the various countries he travels through.  However, as he points out, that globalization arose as an opposing paradigm to the pessimism of geopolitics is indicative of some kind of progress, even if its benefits are unevenly distributed.

Still, globalization is not a one-way process, Khanna warns.  It has ebbed and advanced throughout history, and there is no good reason to expect we will never return to a geopolitical planet, for globalization and geopolitics are deeply rooted in human psychology, through the drives of greed and fear respectively.  At the moment, it seems somewhat unlikely, but another prolonged recession, a "double-dip" could potentially change everything.  As the author astutely points out, empires can promote peace and prosperity, but also find it hard to resist strategic meddling in the affairs of their foes.  So long as our world remains a globalized one, this competition will remain mostly economic in nature.  But if that change were to occur...what was previously treated economically troubling may be instead seen as militarily threatening.  Globalization, therefore, does not subsume or remove the potential conflict, instead, as Fukuyama suggested in the End of History, it gives a non-violent venue for the drives which were previously sated through warfare.

Though he does not dwell on it, the obvious fact of US relative decline in comparison to the EU and China is made clear through Dr Khanna's travels.  China is a more reliable friend to autocratic regimes like Uzbekistan, because it cares more about sovereignty and trade than it does about human rights.  The EU serves as a better model for democratisation and liberalisation for democratic activists in hybrid and newly democratic regimes.  Even in the traditional spheres of American power, regional cooperation groups and its rival empires are proving more capable of proving security and stability.  Even more so than South America or the Persian Gulf, where America fights mostly futile wars against local drug traffickers and terrorists respectively, American decline is most obvious in the Pacific Rim, once the lynchpin of US global dominance according to the geopolitical analyst Nicholas Spykman.  Whether one prefers Spykman's analysis that the Rimland is the critical area to control or the Eurasian landmass, as Harold Mackinder thought, one cannot help but notice that China is encroaching on both, ensuring global hegemony either way.

Khanna's book is highly readable, with a prose which engages the reader while readily passing along facts and anecdotes.  While the above review suggests a quite analytic book, it does not read that way.  The theorizing is implicit in much of the text, or else woven into the story of his travels.  It not yet another dry and academic treatise, in the vein of The Man, State and War, but tends to the more popular market with its readability, while retaining enough analysis to keep the political scientists, policy analysts and students of global politics interested.  Aspects of it, of course, have been outdated by the economic crisis and the ongoing revolutions and revolts in the greater Middle East, but the vast majority of the book retains valid and cogent analysis – which is an achievement in and of itself when one considers the nature of the field, where one year can change everything (especially if that year was 1989).  It will also be of interest to those wishing to understand the foreign policy of Barack Obama, as Dr Khanna worked as a policy advisor for him in 2008.  Elements of Khanna's thinking can readily be seen in Obama's actions towards Russia, for example, in attempting to "reset" relations with them and draw them out of China's sphere of influence, and use their clout to try and resolve the Iranian nuclear issue.  It may also explain Obama's marked reluctance to get involved in the revolutions of the Middle East, as Khanna makes it only too clear that a civil war between Islamism and Arabism is dividing the region, and US involvement could doom Arabism to being perceived as an American stratagem for continued dominance.

All in all, this is a book I would be happy to recommend friends or family as much as I would undergraduate students. I would score it 8/10, as there are no obvious failures or faulty examples of logic but, by the same standard, some especially informed readers may find it slow going in places.

[Mesozoic Mister Nigel]

Very cool! I'll check these out when I get home tonight.

[Cain]

Swote.  For some reasons, the citations vanished when copying and pasting, but if anyone really wants them, I can edit them in.

[Kai]

I've read the first one about Realism, so far. From my scientific perspective, I'd maintain positivism is the right way to go about analyzing information of any kind, as per the scientific method. Good hypotheses and theories are marked by their ability to describe, predict and explain phenomena. Am I wrong to think that realism favors the scientific method?

[Cain]

It claims to.  I have my own doubts about that, personally.  It's ahistorical and abstracted, and tends to fail when put it contact with reality.  It's more prescriptive than descriptive, really, based on half a dozen anecdotes which have become accepted wisdom amongst its acolytes.

[Kai]

It claims to.  I have my own doubts about that, personally.  It's ahistorical and abstracted, and tends to fail when put it contact with reality.  It's more prescriptive than descriptive, really, based on half a dozen anecdotes which have become accepted wisdom amongst its acolytes.

Is there anyone doing scientific style analysis in IR? I think you mentioned one before, the people who analyze individual events on multiple levels: culture, psychology, sociobiology, etc.

[Cain]

That seems to be the conflict resolution people.  Also, historical sociologists, though, of course, they are analysing past events and not looking to predict future ones (irony alert: the historical sociologists first interacted with the realists because they wanted some ideas on what caused war.  Ultimately, IR got a lot more out of the exchange than they did).  Apart from that, no particular school seems to use a pluralistic methodological approach, though a recent survey suggested a quarter of all American political science professors do not adhere to any single school of thought, and so probably employ those kind of approaches more.

[Kai]

That seems to be the conflict resolution people.  Also, historical sociologists, though, of course, they are analysing past events and not looking to predict future ones (irony alert: the historical sociologists first interacted with the realists because they wanted some ideas on what caused war.  Ultimately, IR got a lot more out of the exchange than they did).  Apart from that, no particular school seems to use a pluralistic methodological approach, though a recent survey suggested a quarter of all American political science professors do not adhere to any single school of thought, and so probably employ those kind of approaches more.

In other words, there are these high tiered academics who make up these "schools", but the average poli sci researcher is simply trying to figure out how things work.

Reminds me of these "big" biological controversies that the public hears lots about but regular researchers barely pay any attention to them. I feel more and more like Khun was right, that everyday science is puzzle solving within a paradigm, and slowly over time the paradigm changes. Rather than the Popperian model which is more prescriptivist and revolutionary than descriptive. Not that logico-deductive method is bad, per say. Just that it's not how most people do science in practice.